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REAL ACTIONS IN LOUISIANA AND
COMPARATIVE LAW
A. N. Yiannopoulos*
In civil law systems distinction is frequently made between
personal and real actions.' This distinction ostensibly corre-
sponds to that between personal and real rights. 2 Indeed, in
medieval Roman law, and in continental legal systems, real
rights have been defined as the rights protected by real actions
and personal rights as those enforced by personal actions.8 Con-
versely, the nature of an action as personal or real has been said
to depend on the nature of the right protected or enforced.4 The
purpose of the present study is to clarify the notion of real
actions and their relation to real rights in Louisiana and com-
parative law. Analysis of Louisiana law will be preceded by a
discussion of Roman and French law and will be followed by a
brief reference to common law and a number of selected conti-
nental legal systems.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University. The author wishes to express.
his thanks to Boyd Professor Henry George McMahon who read this manuscript.
and made valuable suggestions for its improvement.
1. See Badr, Some Remarks on Real Action Proceedings in Egypt, 29 TuL. L..
REV. 731 (1955) ; Bernini, The Concept of Real Actions in Italian Law, 29 TuL.:
L. REV. 635 (1955); Chung Han Kim, Real Actions in Korea and Japan, 29 TUL.
L. REV. 713 (1955) ; Hahlo, The South African Law of Real Actions, 29 TUL. L.
REV. 725 (1955) ; H6braud, Real Actions in France, 29 TuL. L. REV. 673 (1955) ;
Jurt, Actions Relating to Possession and Property in the Swiss Civil Law, 29.
TuL. L. REV. 735 (1955) ; Ramos, In Rem Actions in Puerto Rico, 29 TUL. L.
REV. 659 (1955) ; Zepos, Law of Things and Real Actions in Greece, 29 TUL. L.
REV. 697 (1955).
2. See Bouchard v. Parker, 32 La. Ann. 535, 537 (1880) quoting from
BONJEAN, TRAITt DES ACTIONS (1841-45) ("it semble done qu'on pourait ddfinir
l'action rdelle, celle qui repose sur violation d'un jus in re, et l'action personnelle
celle qui repose sur la violation d'un jus ad rem"). Cf. Yiannopoulos, Real Rights
in Louisiana and Comparative Law, 23 LA. L. REV. 161, 518 (1963).
3. Cf. text at note 11 infra.
4. Cf. text at notes 33-34 infra; 2 DEMANTE, COURS ANALYTIQUE DE CODE.
CrrIL 377 (1896); 9 DEMOLOMBE, TRAiTr DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 191
(1874-82).
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A. ROMAN LAW
"Right" and "action" are distinguishable concepts in con-
temporary civilian theory.5 "Right" is colncei'ed 'as a creature
of substantive law, while "action" is regarded as a procedural
remedy: rules of substantive law confer rights and rules of pro-
cedure provide the means for recognition or enforcement of
rights. 6 In this light, rights are considered as "pre-existing"
5. See CAPITANT, INTRODUCTION A L'ATUDE DU DROIT CIVIL 119 (1929); 1
GLASSON, TIssIER Er MOREL, TRAITt- TH!tORIQUE ET PRATIQUE D'OROANIZATION
JUDICIAIRE, DE COMPItTENCE ET DE PROCtDURE CIVILE 441 (3d ed. 1925) [herein-
after cited as GLASSON, TISSIER ET MOREL] ; VIzioz, ETUDES DE PROCftDURE 33(1956). "Action" and "right" differ as to their cause, prerequisites of exercise,
and effects. MOREL, TRAIT] ]kL]tMENTAIRE DE PROCIDURE CIVILE 26 (2d ed. 1949).
Cf. ASCARELLI, STUDI DI DIRII'ro COMPARATO ED IN TEMA DI INTERPRETAZIONE 88
(1952) ; BALiS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL LAW 348 (1955) (in Greek) ;
BRETHE DE LA GRESSAYE ET LABORDE-LACOSTE, INTRODUCTION G]tNkRALE A L'ItTUDE
DU DROIT 414-16 (1947) ; and in general, WINDSCHEID, DIE ACTIO DES ROMISCHEN
ZIVILRECHTS VOM STANDPUNKTE DES ILEUTIGEN RECHTS (1856); PETER, AcTIo
UND WRIT 13 (1957). For the distinction between "right" and "action" in com-
mon law systems, see STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 128 (1950).In order to explain more clearly certain features of German civil law, analyt-
ical jurists in Germany draw a distinction among "right" (subjektives Recht),
"claim" (Anspruch) and "action" (Klage). A right is ordinarily defined as "the
power to satisfy a recognized interest." 1 ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, ALLOEMEINER
TEIL DES BV.RGERLICHEN RECITS 437 (15th ed. 1959). Claim has been defined in
the German Civil Code as "the right to demand from another the performance of
an act or omission." B.G.B. § 194. Claims, therefore, are species of the generic
concept "subjective right." Action is defined as the "demand to afford protection
by judicial decision." ROSENBERO, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCITEN ZIVILPROZESSRECHTS
396 (8th ed. 1960). According to the prevailing view in Germany actionability is
an indispensable quality of a claim. See LEHMANN, ALLOEMEINER TEIL DES
BtROERLICHEN GESETZBUCHES 82 (10th ed. 1957). For a critique of the various
theories concerning the notion of action in Germany, see Groh, Der Anspruch auf
Rechtspflege, 51 ZEITSCHRIFT FtR DEUTSCHEN ZIVILPROZESS 145, 173-200 (1926).
In France the notion of action has not been elaborated upon as extensively as in
Germany and Italy. Doctrinal treatment of this subject has been made mostly
by public law writers, Hauriou, Duguit, and Jze. See VIzIoz, ITUDES DE PROCIt-
DURE 27, 127-50 (1956). It has been observed that in most French commentaries
on the Code of Civil Procedure the notion of action is obscured by the adoption,
in different parts of the same treatise, of conflicting theories and definitions.
Action is defined "at times as a recourse in justice, in case of contestation or vio-
lation of a right, and at times as an aspect of the right itself which the judge will
recognize and protect." Thus, while in principle distinction is made between "right"
and "action" the two are in some instances assimilated! The notion of action as
a recourse in justice is the traditional doctrine of the processualistes. See POTHIER,
INTRODUCTION AUX COUTUMES, ch. IV, Des actions (Rondonneau ed. 1831) ; 1
BONCENNE, THItORIE DE LA PROCtDURE CIVILE 55-56 (1839). The notion of action
as an aspect of the right itself derives from the idea that action is the sanction
of a. personal or real right. The sanction came thus to be regarded as a corollary,.
and the action as an inherent characteristic, of the right. Accordingly, action was
defined as the right itself on the war path or the right in a dynamic state. Cf. 9
DEMOLOMBE, TRAITIS:DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS .190 (1874-82).
:.6. See ROSENBERG, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN ZIVILPROZESSRECHTS 4 (8th ed.
1960) ; and in general, NEUNER, PRIVATRECHT UND PROZESSRECHT (1925) ; BIN-
DER, PROZESS UND RECHT (1927) ; GOLDSCHMIDT, DER PROZESS ALS RECHTSLAGE
(1962).
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judicial enforcement.7  Obviously, this distinction between
"right'' and "action" is possible in modern law because there is
a firmly established analytical distinction between substantive
and procedural law.
In Roman law, however, the distinction between substance
and procedure was unknown and the juxtaposition of "right"
and "action" almost inconceivable. If we were to explain Roman
legal institutions by application of contemporary terminology,
we could say that rights were the posterius rather than the prius
in relation to procedural remedies: one had a right if one had a
remedy." Thus, at least during the classical period, the Roman
law was a system of nominate actions. These actions functioned
as writs, i.e., as procedural forms available to particular plain-
tiffs for the enforcement of specifically described claims.9
As a result of certain peculiarities of Roman civil procedure,
distinction was early drawn between personal and real actions'
Personal actions were available, in general, for the enforcement
of obligations (which we term "personal" or "relative" rights)
and real actions for the protection of real rights and claims de-
riving from status (which we term "absolute" rights)." For
7. See 1 BONCENNE, THItORIE DE LA PROCtDURE CIVILE 55-56 (1839) ; 1 BER-
EIAT SAINT-PRIX, COURS DE PROC]EDURE CIVILE 96 (1858) (le droit de celui qui
actionne est necessairment anterieur a son action") ; SATTA, DIRITTO PROCESSUALE
CIVILE 93 (4th ed. 1954). Actions, however, do not presuppose a right for their
initiation and the commencement of the process. A right is presupposed only
where the judge concludes that he must grant relief. See Vizioz, tTUDES DE PRO-
CEDuRE 36 (1956).
8. See PETER, ACTIo UND WRIT 56 (1957) ; ARANGiO-RuIz, ISTITUZIONI DI
DIRITro ROMANO 108 (12th ed. 1954) ; MOREL, TRAITt IELtMENTAIRE DE PROCIE-
DURE CIVILE 28 (2d ed. 1949). Cf. Chung Han Kim, Real Actions in Korea and
Japan, 29 TUL. L. REv. 713 (1955) : "Presently our view is this: 'A person has a
right, therefore the right should be protected legally.' The Roman view was just
the opposite: 'In such and such a case one can sue, i.e., has an actio, so he has
a right.'
9. See 1 LIEBMAN, MANUALE DI DiRITTo PROCESSUALE CIVILE 34 (2d ed.
1957) ; REDENTI, DiRiTTO PROCESSUALE CIVILE 48 (2d ed. 1957).
10. See 4 Gains, INSTITUTES 2-3: "An action in personam is one in which we
proceed against someone who is under contractual or delictual obligation to us, an
action, that is. in which we claim 'that he ought to convey, to do or answer for'
something. An action in rem is one in which we claim either that some corporeal
thing is ours, or that we are entitled to some right, such as that of use or usufruct
of foot or carriage way, of aqueduct, of raising a building or of view. On the
other hand, an action (in rem) denying such rights is open to our opponent."
Translation by ZULUETA, THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS 233 (1946). On Roman
civil procedure in general, see WENGER, INSTITUTIONEN DES RMISCITEN ZIVI L-
PROZESSRECHTS (1925), English translation by FISK, INSTITUTES OF THE ROMAN
LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1940) ; voN KELLER, DER R6MISCHE ZIVILPROZESS UND
DIE AKTIONEN (1850), French transl. by CAPMAS, DE LA PROcEDURE CIVILE ET DES
ACTIONS CHEZ LES ROMAINS (1870).
11. See Yiannopoulos; Real Rights in Louisiana and Comparative Law'-' Part
I, 23 LA. L. REv. 161, 163 (1963).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the purpose of this discussion, analysis may be restricted to the
protection accorded to the rights of ownership, the jura in re
aliena, possession, and quasi-possession.
Ownership was protected mainly by a system of three impor-
tant real actions: the rei-vindicatio ("revendicatory action"),
the actio Publiciana ("Publician action") and the actio negatoria
("negatory action"). In the classical period, the revendicatory
action 12 was available to the dispossessed quiritarian owner of a
thing against a defendant who had the thing in his possession.
The ultimate object of the action was restitution of the thing to
the lawful owner, but this object could be achieved only indi-
rectly. The action could be brought under two alternative forms
of procedure, per sponsionem or per formulam p etitoriam.
Under the first of these forms the judge decided only the ques-
tion of ownership, without decreeing restoration of the property
or its value. If, on the strength of the judicial decision, the de-
fendant elected to restore the thing the proceedings terminated.
If the defendant were recalcitrant, plaintiff could bring a per-
sonal action for damages in the value of the thing. Under the
more prevalent second form, the judge could pronounce an arbi-
trium decreeing specific restitution. The judge also had author-
ity to award fruits and damages to the lawful owner and com-
pensation for expenses to a possessor of good faith. If the de-
fendant did not comply with the decree of restitution, the judge
had to pronounce a pecuniary condemnation, namely restitution
of the value of the thing.
The revendicatory action lay only against a person who pos-
sessed the thing at the time of trial. The defendant could avoid
responsibility by transferring possession to a third person. The
defendant had also the option not to defend the action, by aban-
doning the thing to the plaintiff. In such a case, the plaintiff
could obtain possession of the thing by an interdictum quan
fundum, for immovables, and an actio ad exhibendum, for mov-
ables. These last remedies were available even against a former
possessor: the defendant was ordered to discover and produce
the thing rather than to restore it. The actio ad exhibendum
was a personal action; it served as preparatory to the revendi-
12. See 1 HUVELIN, COURS ALtMENTAIRE DE DROIT ROMAIN 532 (1927);
KASER, DAS RBMISCHE PRIVATRECHT 363 (1955) ; 1 MONIER, MANUEL 1tLkMEN-
TAIRE DE DROIT ROMAIN 373 (6th ed. 1947) ; SCHULZ, CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW
368 (1951); SOHM-MITTEIS-WENGER, INSTITUTIONEN DES R6MISCHEN RECHTS
308 (17th ed. 1923).
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catory action, afforded a remedy in case defendant elected to
abandon the thing, and was a substitute for the revendicatory
action in case defendant had transferred possession. In the Jus-
tinian legislation the revendicatory action was reshaped and
evolved as a drastic remedy for the protection of ownership. The
arbitrium of the judge became an enforceable judgment and was
no longer an alternative to a money judgment. The sources,
however, indicate the possibility of a pecuniary condemnation
and doubts still persist as to the extent the defendant could be
compelled to make specific restitution.
1 3
In revendicatory proceedings the plaintiff ought to prove his
quiritarian ownership by original title or by an unbroken chain
of valid transfers from the original owner. This was a hard
task, since acquisitive prescription was kept within narrow lim-
its and the law did not protect acquisition in good faith. This
proof, styled by medieval jurists probatio diabolic, was dis-
pensed with in the actio Publiciana.14 This last action was intro-
duced into the Praetorian Edict by an otherwise unknown Prae-
tor Publicius around the first century B.C. It was available to
any possessor who, though not having quiritarian ownership of
the thing, was in the process of acquiring such ownership by
acquisitive prescription. Thus, if a possessor fulfilled all re-
quirements for acquisition of title by prescription except the time
element, the judge was instructed in the formula to determine
the case as if plaintiff had completed his prescription and as if
the action were a rei-vindicatio. Technically, the action was not
available against the quiritarian owner of the thing claimed but
a possessor protected by the Publician action could, in certain
cases, prevail over the quiritarian owner who had sold and de-
livered the thing without thereby transferring quiritarian own-
ership.
; Neither the revendicatory action or the Publician action af-
forded protection to the owner in possession whose ownership
was disturbed by persons claiming a servitude over the thing.
Protection to that effect was afforded by another real action,
13. See SCHULZ, CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW 379 (1951).
14. See BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW 192 (2d ed. 1932); 1
HUVELIN, COURS tLAMENTAIRE DE DROIT ROmAIN E 542 (1927); KASER, DAB
R6MISCHE PRlVATRECHT 368 (1955) ; 1 MONIER, MANUEL .LhMENTA iE DE DR0IT
ROMAIN 380 (6th ed. 1947); SCHULZ, CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW 375 (1951);
SoHM-Mirr-s-WENGER, INSTITUTIONEN DES R6MISCKEN RECHTS 320 (17th ed.
1923).
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the actio negcatoria.15 This action derived its name from the neg-
ative expressions employed in the intentio, namely, that part of
the Praetorian formula in which the cause of action was stated.' 6
If the judge were convinced that plaintiff's ownership was un-
encumbered, he issued an arbitrium enjoining further interfer-
ence. If the defendant failed to comply with the injunction, the
judge had to pronounce a pecuniary condemnation against him.
Like ownership, the jura in re alien were protected by a
number of nominate actions.17 The usufructuary had a special
action known as actio de usu fructu or vindicatio usus fructus.
This was a real action available against the owner and, later on,
against any possessor who could be sued by the revendicatory
action. The owner of the thing was protected against claims of
usufruct by the possessory interdicts and by the cautio usu-
fructu-aria. The holder of a servitude was protected by the vin-
dicctio servitutis which in the Justinian legislation assumed the
name of actio confessoria. This real action was available against
the owner of the servient estate and apparently against any one
interfering with the servitude. Finally, rights of real security
were protected by a number of actions bearing such names as
actio fiduciaria directa or contrria, and actio pigneraticia di-
recta or contraria.
Possession of movables and immovables and the quasi-pos-
session of servitudes were protected in classical Roman law by
interdicta rather than by real actions.' s Interdicts were avail-
able to-any possessor whether he had the right to possess or not;
they lay against any one who violated another's possession again
without regard to whether or not he had the right to possess.
Thus, since the only issue was the fact of possession and distur-
bance, ownership. was not a valid defense. The purpose of the
interdicts was to preserve the public peace and order and this
15. See KASER, DAS R6MISCHE PRIVATRECHT 367 (1955) ; 1 MONIER, MANUEL
LtMENTAIRE DE DROIT ROMAIN 376 (6th ed. 1947) ; SCHULZ, CLASSICAL ROMAN
LAw 374 (1951) ; SOHM-MITTEIS-WENGER, INSTITUTIONEN DES ROMISCHEN
RECHTS 317 (17th ed. 1923).
16. Cf. Yiannopoulos, Real Rights in Louisiana and Comparative Law -Part
I, 23 LA. L. REV. 161, 163 (1963).
17. See KASER, DAS R6MISCIIE PRTVATRECHT 380, 393, 374 (1955) ; SCHULZ,
CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW 389, 396, 426-27 (1951) ; SOHM-MITTEIS-WENGER, INSTI-
TUTIONEN DES ROMISCtIEN RECHTS 334, 348 (17th ed. 1923).
18. See 1 HUVELIN, COURS IfLtMENTAIRE DE DROIT ROMAIN 472 (1927);
KASER DAB R6MISCHE PRIVATRECHT 335 (1955) ; 1 MONIER, MANUEL tLtMEN-
TAIRE DE DROIT ROMAIN 393 (6th ed. 1947); ScHULZ, CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW
444 (1951);. SOHMrMITTEIS-WENGER, INSTITUTIONEN DES ROMISCHEN RECHTS
276 (17th ed. 1923).
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was achieved by summary proceedings. There were several
kinds of interdicts in classical law for the recovery, and mainte-
nance in possession, of both movables and immovables. In the
Justinian legislation the classical interdicts were converted into
actions of two species, bearing the names of interdictum unde vi,
and interdictum uti possidetis. The first was available for the
recovery of the possession of immovables. The second was avail-
able for the maintenance in possession of immovables and mov-
ables. Perhaps due to inadvertence, there was no procedure for
the recovery of the possession of movables.19
B. FRENCH LAW
The classical system of nominate actions has been replaced
in modern procedure by a general "right of action" for the
enforcement of any protected interest alleged in the petition. 20
In such a system, it would seem that the traditional distinction
between personal and real actions would be without object and
no longer justified.2 1 Yet, this distinction has persisted and
still exists in contemporary French law. Article 2262 of the
French Civil Code declares that all actions, whether "personal
or real," are lost by a thirty-year prescription; and several
provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure and in special pro-
cedural statutes reflect a differentiation between personal and
real actions.22 In addition to this distinction, which is said to
depend on the nature of the protected interest, actions are
divided in France into movables and immovables depending on
the object of litigation.2 3 Article 526 of the French Civil Code
19. See SCHULZ, CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW 453 (1951).
20. See MOREL, TRAITI IL1]MENTAIRE DE PROCEtDURE CIVILE 29-42 (2d ed.
1949); PETER, ACTIO UND WRIT 13 (1957). Quite frequently, however, courts
and writers employ traditional terminology and refer to particular actions by
name (e.g., revendicatory, negatory, confessory and the like). This does not mean
a return to the numerus clausus of the Roman formulas nor to a system of
nominate actions. The fact that certain actions carry a name and still have an
apparent individuality has no procedural relevance today. Of. text at note 37
infra.
21. The contemporary civil procedure allows great freedom in the formulation
of judicial demands and the non-identification, or incorrect denomination, of an
action is no bar to the appropriate relief. The various distinctions and classifica-
tions of acts are thus mostly a remnant of the past and are analytically valid
only to the extent they correspond to a number of special rules relating to venue
and capacity to sue. See text at notes 28-29 infra.
22. See FRENCH CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 59, 64, 404; Law of Aug. 16,
1790, tit. IV, arts. 4-6; Law of April 11, 1838, art. 1; Law of July 12, 1905,
art. 1; Decree No. 1284 of Dec. 22, 1958, arts. 1, 20.
23. See CUCHE, PRftIS DE PROCtDURE CIVILE ET COMMERCIALE 37. (12th ed.
1960); 9 DEMOLOMBE, TRAIT DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 198, 358 (1874-82) ;
1965]
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alludes to this second division and declares that actions relating
to the revendication of an immovable are immovables by the
object to which they apply.24 Courts and commentators have
construed this article broadly to include not only the right of
ownership but also all other real rights related to immovables;
accordingly, actions for the protection of use, habitation, usu-
fruct, predial servitudes, and emphyteusis, in so far as they
relate to immovable property, are classified as immovable real
actions.25 These distinctions and classifications of actions are for
the most part a remnant of the past; they are "the product of
a rather excessive spirit of generalization" and "have no abso-
lute value" in contemporary French law.26 In general, personal
actions, whether movable or immovable, and movable real ac-
tions are subject to the same procedural rules and only im-
movable real actions are governed by a number of special rules.2 7
The traditional distinctions, therefore, have practical impor-
tance only in combination, to the extent they establish the cate-
gory of immovable real actions.
In the light of the special rules applicable to immovable real
actions the classification of a particular action in this category
entails significant legal consequences. This is particularly so
for the determination of plaintiff's procedural capacity, the
identification of the property in the petition, and the power of
defendant to implead a third person as warrantor and withdraw
from the proceedings. 28 Further, classification is important
in the light of rules relating to the appealability of judgments,
jurisdiction of courts (compdtence ratione materiae), and venue
(compdtence ratione personae) .29 In immovable real actions ap-
1 GARSONNET ET CAZAR-BRU, TRAITt THItORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE PROCtDURE
CIVILE ET COMMERCIALE 584 (3d ed. 1912) [hereinafter cited as GARSONNET Er
CitzAR-Bu]]; 1 GLASSON, TISSIER ET MOREL 475; JAPIOT, TRAITA ]kLAMENTArE
DE PROC]ADURE CIVILE ET COMMERCIALE 73 (3d ed. 1935); MOREL, TRAITt tIt-
MENTAIRE DE PROCIDURE CIVIL 58 (2d ed. 1949).
24. See also FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 464, 482, 529, and 1428.
25. See CUCHE, PRPiIS DE PROCtDURE CIVILE ET COMMERCIALE 38 (12th ed.
1960) ; 2 DEMANTE, COURS ANALYTIQUE DE CODE CIVIL 377 (1.896) ; 9 DEMOLOMBS,
TRAITA DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 198, 341 (1874-82) ; 1 GARSONNET ET
CIkZAR-BRU 588-89; 1 GLASSON, TISsIFR ET MOREL 489; cf. POTHIER. INTRODUC-
TION GlNARA L AUX COUTUmES No. 50, 1 OEUVRES DE POTHIER 15 (1861)
("actio ad mobile est mobilis, actio ad immobile est immobilis").
26. MOREL, TRAITt tLAMENTAIRE DE PROCEDURE CIVILE 58 (2d ed. 1949).
27. Ibid. See also notes 28-29 infra.
28. See Hbraud, Real Actions in France, 29 TuL. L. REV. 673, 675 (1955).
29. See 1 GARSONNET ET CzAR-BRu 587, 608; 1 GLASSON, TISSIEB ET MoL
at 479; MoREL, TRA T± ,LMENTAIRE DE PROCtDURE CIVILE 59, 63 (2d ed. 1949).
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pealibility is determined by reference to the income produced
by an immovable, while in personal and movable real actions
the value of the object or right as capital is controlling. In
matters involving immovable property the civil courts have ex-
clusive jurisdiction, while in matters involving personal prop-
erty their jurisdiction may be concurrent with that of admin-
istrative courts. Finally, with respect to venue, article 59 of
the Code of Civil Procedure declares that personal actions are
to be brought before a court at the domicile of the defendant,
real actions at the situs of the property, and mixed actions
either at the domicile of the defendant or at the situs of the
property. The term real actions in this article has been narrowly
construed to mean immovable real actions. This was quite nat-
ural because according to nineteenth century notions movables
had no situs and followed the person of their owner.8 0 Since
the issue of classification of actions was most frequently raised
and discussed in connection with questions of venue,81 and real
actions in the light of article 59 could be only those relating to
real rights related to immovables, a tendency has developed to
limit application of the term real actions to immovable real
actions. Thus, language in the Code of Civil Procedure and in
special procedural statutes creates the impression that real ac-
tions are concerned with the protection of real rights related
to immovables and personal actions with the protection of per-
sonal rights and real rights related to movables.32 Commenta-
tors of the Civil Code and of the Code of Civil Procedure, how-
ever, have employed, quite consistently, analytically correct
terminology and have dispelled the confusion with the assertion
that in the framework of substantive and procedural law the
30. See 1 DEMOLOMBE, COUPS DE CODE NAPOLIION 105 (1874-82) ; 1 LAuRENT,
PRINCIPES DR DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 184 (1876). Actions involving determina-
tion of personal status were in rem actions in Roman law. However, the venue
provision of article 59 concerning real actions could not apply to such actions for
the same reason that it could not apply to movable property: status did not
have a situs according to nineteenth century notions. Actions for the determina-
tion of status, therefore, have been assimilated to personal actions for purposes
of venue and are to be brought before the court at the domicile of the defendant.
See text at note 124 infra.
31. See HBbraud, Real Actions in France, 29 TUL. L. REV. 673, 676 (1955).
32. See, e.g., FRENCH CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDuRE art. 2 (abrogated by Decree
No. 1284 of Dec. 22, 1958, art. 41) ; Law of May 25, 1838, art. 1; Law of July
12, 1905, art. 1; Law of April 11, 1838, art. 1. This tendency, though confusing,
did not involve practical difficulties because personal actions and movable real
actions are subject to identical procedural rules, distinct from those applicable
to immovable real actions.
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term real actions applies to both movable and immovable real
actions.83
.. The problem of classification of particular actions as per-
sonal or real has perplexed the courts and the commentators.
As neither the Civil Code nor the Code of Civil Procedure fur-
nishes any criteria for classification, the answer to this problem
has been sought in the traditional civilian sources. But the old
ways of thinking have undergone changes: whereas the Roman
jurists spoke of real and personal actions, civilians since the
Middle Ages have spoken of real and personal rights. Indeed,
the distinction of actions into personal and real gave rise to
the distinction between personal and real rights; and by a
curiously inverted process, this last distinction has been invoked
to furnish criteria for the classification of actions as personal
or real. It became thus settled in the course of the nineteenth
century that real actions relate to the enforcement of real rights
and personal actions to the enforcement of personal rights.
This solution seemed obvious so long as the distinction between
personal and real rights remained unchallenged. Controversies
arose over the question whether a particular right, rather than
a particular action, was personal or real; the nature of the
action depended entirely on the nature of the litigious right.
34
But when, as a result of the "personalist" approach, real rights
and personal rights came to be regarded as a single category
of patrimonial rights with a variable content,35 the distinction
between personal and real rights became blurred and seemed
to lose its raison d'etre. The idea was advanced that the notions
of real and personal actions had no scientific significance. But
it has been retorted that even if the distinction between personal
and real rights could no longer be fully acceptable in the frame-
work of substantive law, the distinction between personal and
33. See 2 DEMANTE, COURS ANALYTIQUE DE CODE CIVIL 377 (3d ed. 1896) ;
9 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITt DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 342 (1874-82) ; 1 GARSONNET
ET CltZAR-BRu 614-615; 1 GLASSON, TISSIER ET MOREL 476, 491; MOREL, TRAIT
LtIMENTAIRE DE PROOIDURE CIVILE 64 (2d ed. 1949).34. See 1 GARSONNET ET CPZAR-BRu 588, 597. This conceptual inter-depend-
ence of real rights and real actions has led certain writers to attribute to the
real actions characteristics belonging to real rights. Thus, it has been stated
that real actions avail against the world while personal actions avail against a
particular obligor; and the idea has been pressed that a judgment in a real
action has res judicata effect against the world whereas a judgment in a personal
action has res judicata effect only among the parties. See H6braud, Real Actions
in .France, 29 TUL. L. REv. 673, 675 (1955).
35. See Yiannopoulos, Real Rights in Louisiana and Comparative Law -
Part I, 23 LA. L. REV. 161, 171-73 (1963).
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real actions is still meaningful in the framework of procedural
law.3 1 The two species of actions will be discussed separately.
1. Real Actions
Since in spite of doctrinal controversies the nature of most
patrimonial rights as personal or real has been settled by the
jurisprudence, the nature of the corresponding actions for the
enforcement of these rights is no longer an open question. Today,
it is a generally accepted proposition that all actions for the
protection of the right of ownership, dismemberments of owner-
ship, and real security, are real actions - movable or immov-
able. Depending on whether protection is afforded to the right
itself or only to the possession and quasi-possession, real ac-
tions or distinguished into petitory and possessory.
a. Petitory Actions
All petitory actions share the same procedural characteris-
tics. Quite frequently, however, they are designated by tradi-
tional names as revendicatory (action en revendication) or con-
fessory actions (actions confessoire), negatory (action nega-
toire), depending on whether the purpose is recovery of prop-
erty, injunction against an attempted exercise of a real right
related to plaintiff's immovable, or exercise of a real right
related to another's immovable. These names are merely a
remnant of the past and do not correspond to any procedural
particularism. 3 7 Differences among these various actions are
explained as pertaining to the substance of the rights enforced.8"
i. Revendicatory Action.3 9 The revendicatory action cor-
36. See CucHE, Pa'QIS Dr, PROC]ADURE CIVILE ET COMMERCIALE 37 (12 ed.
(1960). For differences in procedural theory underlying, respectively, personal
and real actions, see 3 IHERING, GEIST DES RMISCIIEN RECHTS 191 (1871)
"[in real action] the defendant does not have to give the thing back; the plain-
tiff takes it; defendant's forbearance is nothing else than his refraining from
revolting against the legal order and authority"). This statement by Ihering
has been said to justify the distinction between personal and real actions in
contemporary French law. See HIBRAUD, Real Actions in France, 29 TUL. L.
REv. 673 (1955).
37. See 9 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITSt DE LA DISTINCTION DES BrENS 358 (1874-82);
H1braud, Real Actions in France, 29 TuI. L. REv. 673, 678 (1955).
38. Cf. Chung Han Kim, Real Actions in Korea and Japan, 29 TUL. L. REV.
713, 714 (1955).
39. See 2 AUDRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FANVAIS 505 (7th ed. Esmein 1961);
2 CARBONNIEI, DROIT CIVIL 223 (1955) ; 2 COLIN, CAPITANT ET JULLIOT DE LA
MORANDItRE, TRAiTM DE DROIT CIVIL 242 (1959) ; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt
PRATIQUE DE DROIT cnrm FRANQAIS 348 (2d ed. Picard 1952) ; Nerson, Revendica-
tlion No#. 1-72 in EWYOLmEDL DALoz, IV RERTOIRE DE DROIT CIVIL (1954).
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responds to the Roman rei-vindictio. However, it is a much
broader action than its Roman prototype. In principle, it is
available to a dispossessed owner against a possessing non-owner
and also, by analogy, to the holder of a real right other than
ownership for the restitution of this right. As the object of
the action is protection of a real right, whether ownership, dis-
memberments of ownership, or real security, the revendicatory
action is distinguishable from personal actions in which plain-
tiff seeks to enforce a personal right whether bearing on a
thing or not.
According to jurisprudence constante the revendicatory ac-
tion for the recovery of corporeal immovable property cannot
be lost by liberative prescription. 40 The ownership of corporeal
immovable property can be lost only by acquisitive prescription,
in which case the revendicatory action against the new acquirer
has no object. The revendicatory action for the recovery of
movable property, is, however, subject at most to a thirty-year
liberative prescription; the action is of no avail in this case,
even if the property has not been acquired by a third person
in accordance with the rules of acquisitive prescription.4 1
Finally, the revendicatory action for the recovery of a real right
other than ownership is lost by the ten-year prescription of non-
use. This prescription applies to both movable and immovable
real rights.
Revendication of immovables. In revendicatory actions for
the recovery of immovable property defendant is the actual
possessor. Quite frequently, revendication is preceded by pos-
sessory actions which determine the respective position of the
parties as plaintiff and defendant. But where the period for
bringing the possessory actions has expired, a possessor may
bring the revendicatory action against the person who also exer-
cises acts of physical control over the immovable.4 2 The action
may be brought against a mere detentor or precarious possessor,
but if the latter discloses the true possessor the plaintiff must
proceed against him.
40. Req. July 12, 1905, D.1907.1.141, S.1907.1.276. See also 3 PLANIOL r
RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN9AIS 349 (2d ed. Picard 1952).
41. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAISf
350 (2d ed. Picard 1952). But cf. 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS
159 (7th ed. Esmein 1961) ; 2 CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 255 (1955).42. See Cas., Dec. 4, 1901, S.1904.1.172. Cf. Civ., Feb.. 22, 1956, D. 1956,
Somm. 107.
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According to the general principle of article 1315 of the
Civil Code, the plaintiff in the revendicatory action must prove
his right of ownership in order to recover; it is not sufficient
for him to prove that the defendant has no right over the thing.
43
Since the ownership. of immovable property can be acquired
only by a chain of valid transfers from the original owner or
by acquisitive prescription, the plaintiff should introduce evi-
dence establishing his acquisition of the right of ownership in
either of these ways. However, this direct proof of acquisition
by original or derivative title is often difficult and at times
impossible (probatio diabolica). In the absence of direct proof
of the right of ownership, therefore, the courts are satisfied
by a showing, with the help of circumstantial evidence and in-
ferences drawn from proven facts (pr6somptions), of a pre-
ponderance of probabilities of ownership.
This system of proof revolves around the notions of posses-
sion and title. Where none of the parties has a valid title, i.e.,
a written instrument evidencing a juridical act sufficient to
transfer ownership, preference is given to the one who has civil
possession or at least a legally preferable possession (possession
mieux characterisge).44 The defendant is thus maintained in
possession if his possession is sufficient for the acquisition of
ownership by acquisitive prescription where his adversary is
unable to prove by title or by a completed acquisitive prescrip-
tion that he is the owner of the immovable. In this case a pre-
sumption of ownership is attached to civil possession. If the
defendant does not have the kind of possession leading to acqui-
sitive prescription, the plaintiff may obtain restitution by prov-
ing either a prior civil possession or circumstances giving rise
to inferences of ownership in his favor, such as those arising
from recordation or from the payment of land taxes.45 In the
43. See Appleton, De la revendication et de la publicienne en droit frangais,
18 REVUE CRITIQUE DE LtGISLATION ET DR JURISPRUDENCE 29 (1889) ; 2 AuBaY
ET RAU, DROIT CML FRANCAIS 506-13 (7th ed. Esmein 1961); 2 CARDONNIER,
DROIT CIVIL 224-26 (1955) ; 2 COLIN, CAPITANT ET JULLIOT DR LA MORANDIhBE,
TRAITII DR DROIT CIVIL 249-53 (1957) ; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITIt PRATIQUE
DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 351-61 (2d ed. Picard 1952).
44. Req., March 29, 1933, S. 1933.1.224; Req., May 27, 1936, Gaz. Pal.
1936.2.353; Req., April 19, 1937, S. 1937.1.368; Req., Oct. 24, 1938, Gaz. Pal.
1938.2.898; Req., April 28, 1941, S.1941.1.128.
45., Req., March 5, 1894, S. 98.1.439; Paris, Nov. 11, 1897, S. 1900.2.105;
Req., Aug. 6, 1900, S. 1901.1.397; Req., April 14, 1904, D. 1904.1.247, S.
1905.1.266;: Req., Oct. 25, 1911, D. 1913.1.119, S. 1913.1.394; Civ., March 1P
1953, 52 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 124 (1954)..
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last case any possession is taken into account and not only pos-
session leading to acquisitive prescription.
Where both parties produce titles which derive from a com-
mon author, the conflict is resolved by the priority of recorda-
tion.4 6 If the titles derive from different authors, the question
is decided according to the strength of the documents and the
circumstances of the case. Where the possession of the defend-
ant is uncertain, the judge may weigh the inferences invoked
by the parties and may find in the priority of titles a basis for
decision. Where the defendant's possession is certain, the de-
fendant is entitled to judgment, regardless of the priority of his
possession or of his title.47 But, as an exception to the rule,
plaintiff can prove that his author in title could have prevailed
over the defendant, and recover. 48  Where only the defendant
produces title, he is maintained in possession; where only the
plaintiff produces title, he recovers if his title is anterior to the
defendant's possession.
49
In revendicatory proceedings title is any act sufficient to
establish ownership, without distinction between tranlative and
declaratory acts.5° Thus, judgments and partitions, though
declaratory acts, are valid titles. Not only authentic acts but
also acts under private signature are titles which may be as-
serted against third parties. "Title" in this context is not re-
garded as a contract which, in general, cannot be asserted
against third parties51 but as a fact giving rise to an inference
of ownership.5 2
The jurisprudential solutions concerning proof of owner-
ship have been explained as based on the Publician action5"
of the Roman law. According to another view, the jurisprudence
46. See 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 511 (7th ed. Esmein 1961).
47. Civ., Nov. 12, 1907, D. 1908.1.313, Note by Ripert; Montpellier, Feb. 3,
1920, D. 1920.2.73, Note by Ripert.
48. Civ., Dec. 21, 1903, D. 1906.1.175.
49. Civ., June 22, 1864, D. 64.1.412, S. 64.1.349; Req., Nov. 15, 1897, D.
98.1.38, S. 98.1.337, Note by Wahl; Req., Jan. 2, 1907, D. 1907.1.125, S.
1913.1.542; Req., Oct. 24, 1938, Gaz. Pal. 1938.2.898.
50. Civ., Jan. 3, 1905, D. 1908.1.441, S. 1905.1.331. For the purpose of acquisi-
tive prescription, however, an act translative of title is indispensable. See 3
PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 357 (2d ed.
Picard 1952).
51. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1165.
52. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 359
(2d ed. Picard 1952).
53. See Appleton, De la revendication et de la publicienne en droit frangais,
18 REvUE CRITIQUE DE LEGISLATION ET DE JURISPRUDiNCE 29, 30 (1889).
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may be explained on the ground that ownership is a relative
right available against particular persons rather than against
the world. 5" This view may explain adequately the decisions
of the courts but conflicts with the fundamental precepts of the
Civil Code. Perhaps the best explanation is that the system
developed by the courts is merely a set of rules of evidence
relative to the object of proof: instead of proving his ownership
of the immovable, plaintiff merely proves the probability of his
ownership. 55 In order to do so, plaintiff must rebut the prob-
ability of ownership arising from the possession of his adver-
sary and must show a preponderance of probabilities in his
favor. These rules of evidence have been regarded as rules of
customary law; their application, therefore, is subject to revi-
sion by the Court of Cassation.56
In revendicatory actions courts are frequently asked to allo-
cate fruits produced by the immovable and expenses incurred
by the possessor. For the purpose of this allocation the good
or bad faith of the possessor is determinative. A possessor in
good faith is entitled to keep the fruits he has collected up to
the time of initiation of the action. 57 All other fruits, and all
products58 of the immovable, are restored to the owner. The
possessor in bad faith owes restitution, with interest, of all
fruits and products he has collected as well as damages for those
he has neglected to collect.59
An evicted possessor, regardless of good or bad faith, may
have a claim for reimbursement of expenses against the owner.60
Necessary expenses, namely those indispensable for the preser-
vation of the immovable, are recoverable in full; useful expenses,
54. See Ltvy, PREUVE PAR TITRE DU DROIT DE PROPRIITA IMMOBILIkRE 88, 114
(Diss. Paris 1896) ; of. id., Les droits sont des croyances, 23 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE
DE DROIT CIVIL 59 (1924).
55. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 361
(2d ed. Picard 1952).
56. See Ripert, Note, D. 1908.1.313.
57. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE, arts. 549, 550; Civ., May 3, 1869, D. 69.1.254;
Civ., Jan. 11, 1887, S. 87.1.225; Civ., Dec. 21, 1903, D. 1908.1.377, S. 1909.1.324;
Civ., Dec. 21, 1926, D.H. 1927.84, S. 1927.1.148; Civ., Jan. 8, 1936, S. 1936.1.106.
58. For the distinction between fruits and products see Yiannopoulos, Intro-
duction to the Law of Things, 22 LA. L. REV. 756, 786 (1962). Of. Req., Dec. 8,
1836, S. 37.1.76; Civ., April 2, 1878; D. 82.1.353, S. 79.1.261; Civ., April 30,
1890, D. 91.1.367.
59. See Civ., Feb. 9, 1864, D. 64.1.72, S. 64.1.137; Req., July 4, 1882, S.
83.1.105, D. 82.1.353
60. See 2 AunRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 515-18 (7th ed. Esmein
1961), 3 PLANIOL XT RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 362
(2d ed. Picard 1952). Of. Civ., Feb. 1, 1955, D. 1955, Somm. 76.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
which without being indispensable have augmented the value
of the immovable, are recoverable to the extent that there are
profits to offset them; and luxurious expenses, made for the
gratification of the possessor's personal predilections, are not
recoverable in any case.
Revendication of movables.6' The revendication of movables
is subject to rules strikingly different from those discussed,
as a result of the provisions of articles 2279 and 2280 of the
Civil Code. The first of these articles declares that "with re-
spect to movables possession is equivalent to title" (2279, § 1),
and, by way of exception to this rule, that the owner of a mov-
able which has been lost or stolen may revendicate it in the
hands of any possessor within a period of three years from the
date of the loss or theft (2270, § 2). Article 2280, section 1,
declares that if the possessor of a thing lost or stolen bought
it at a fair, or at a market, or at a public sale, or from a mer-
chant selling such things, the owner of the thing cannot obtain
restitution without returning to the purchaser the price he paid.
Article 2279 applies, in principle, to individual corporeal
movables in commerce; it does not apply, therefore, to uni-
versalities of things, things of the public domain, things in-
alienable by provision of law, and incorporeal movables. Certain
corporeal movables subjected to a regime of publicity, like ships
and airplanes, are also outside the scope of this article. The
revendication of these things does not involve difficulties, be-
cause the right of ownership can be ordinarily proved by
a title valid against any one. When article 2279 applies, it func-
tions either as a rebuttable presumption of ownership in favor
61. See 2 AIBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 147 (7th ed. Esmein 1961) ;
2 CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 249 (1955) ; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE
DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 363 (2d ed. Picard 1952) ; SALEILLES, DE LA POSSESSION
DES MEUBLES 67 (1907) ; Franklin, Security of Acquisition and of Transaction2
La Possession Vaut Titre and Bona Fide Purchase, 6 TUL. L. REv. 589 (1932).
It should be noted that even where article 2279 of the French Civil Code does not
apply, resort to the revendicatory action for the recovery of movables is seldom
made in practice. These proceedings are lengthy and slow moving and afford
the defendant an opportunity to dispose of the thing prior to final adjudication.
The saisie-revendication (Code of Civil Procedure article 826) has proved a much
more effective remedy. The claimant obtains a court order without the knowledge
of the defendant, authorizing the seizure of the movable in the hands of a
designated person. This leads eventually to a judgment as to the validity of
the seizure (Code of Civil Procedure article 831) and to a determination of the
rights of the claimant over the thing. Where the claimant is successful, the
court orders that the movable be restored to him. See 4 GLASSON, TISSIER LrT
MOREL, TRAITt THIORIQUE ET PRATIQUE D'OROANIZATION JUDICIAIRE, DE COM-
PItTENCE ET DE PROCtDURE CIVILE 466 (3d ed. 1932).
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of the possessor, or as a title of acquisition of ownership from
a non-owner (a non domino), in which case the revendication
is excluded.
The presumption of ownership may be invoked by any pos-
sessor, whether deriving his possession from a transfer by the
original owner or having acquired the possession from a non-
owner. It is most frequently invoked by persons asserting
ownership of the thing by virtue of a contractual relationship
with the original owner or his successors. To give rise to this
presumption, the possession of the defendant must be actual,
animo domini, and free of vice. 2 The presumption is rebutted
where the claimant proves that the possession of his adversary
is precarious, equivocal, clandestine, or the result of fraud. In
all cases in which the presumption either does not arise or is
successfully rebutted, the owner can bring a personal action
against the possessor for restitution. The admissibility of a
revendicatory action in these circumstances, except for things
stolen or lost, has been questioned by certain commentators. 8
The jurisprudence, however, is settled that the revendicatory
action can be brought, provided that the personal obligation of
the possessor to deliver the thing has been preliminarily estab-
lished.64 In the absence of such an obligation the possessor
would be in the same position as an acquirer from a non-owner
who is entitled to keep the thing on the strength of his title.65
Bringing the revendicatory action rather than a personal
action for the restitution of movables may involve advantages
for the claimant. A depositor or a mandator, for example, may
claim a movable either by a personal action founded on contract
or by the revendicatory action founded on the right of owner-
ship. By taking the second course, the depositor or mandator
avoids the risk of the possessor's insolvency. If there are unpaid
creditors, the claimant in the revendicatory action recovers the
full value of the thing, while in a personal action, as creditor,
he shares with other creditors. Further, there may be instances
62. Any possession is presumed to be animo domini. See text at note 68
infra. Precarious possessors, however, cannot benefit from this presumption
when their very title shows that their possession is not animo domini. See
Req., April 15, 1890, D. 91.1.388, S. 91.1.342; Civ., Aug. 5, 1890, D. 91.1.21,
S. 91.1.343; Req., March 12, 1918, D. 1921.1.148.
63. See 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 145-57 (6th ed. Bartin
1935).
64. See Civ., March 24, 1915, D. 1920.1.143.
65. See notes 67-70 infra.
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in which a personal action for restitution may not be available
and the revendicatory action affords the only remedy. This is
so where a movable is possessed precariously by an incompetent,
or where the usufructuary and the naked owner of a movable
derive their respective titles from a testament rather than a
contract. In the first case, the personal action is excluded be-
cause the incompetence of the defendant forms an obstacle to
the valid creation of an obligation of restitution, and, in the
second case, because there is no direct contractual relationship
between plaintiff and defendant. 66
In the absence of any contractual relationship between the
possessor of the movable and the original owner or his succes-
sors establishing an obligation of restitution, the possessor may
invoke article 2279 to show a title of acquisition of ownership
by transfer from a non-owner. This exception to the maxim "no
one can transfer a greater right than he himself has" has been
established in the interest of the security of transactions. In
order to benefit from article 2279, the possessor must be in good
faith and have actual possession. Good faith is, however, pre-
sumed ;67 this means that the burden of proof of bad faith is
placed on the claimant of the movable. The possession must be
animo domini, which again is presumed. 8 According to a settled,
though perhaps questionable, interpretation of article 2279, the
possession must also be continuous, peaceable, public, and un-
equivocal.69 It is not necessary for the possessor to have just
title. Where the requisite conditions are met, the possessor is
held to be owner of the thing by virtue of the title he claims and
the revendicatory action necessarily fails. Where these condi-
tions are not met, the revendicatory action succeeds and the
claimant obtains judgment. The action against the third pos-
sessor who cannot benefit from article 2279 is subject to the
thirty-year liberative prescription.7
There is much disagreement in France about the theoretical
foundation of the rule of article 2279, section 1. According to
one view which prevailed in the past, the possessor acquires
66. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITIt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS
377-78 (2d ed. Picard 1952).
67. Req., Nov. 21, 1927, D.H. 1927.553.
68. Civ., Aug. 5, 1890, D. 91.1.21, S. 91.1.343; Req., March 12, 1918, D.
1921.1.148.
69. Cf. 2 COLIN, CAPITANT ET JULLIOT DE LA MORANDIkaE, TuMT1k DE DROIT
CIVIL 266 (1959).
70. See note 76 infra.
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title by an instantaneous acquisitive prescription. 71 This idea
conflicts with the nature of acquisitive prescription as a method
of acquiring ownership by the lapse of time. According to a
second view, article 2279, section 1, establishes an irrebuttable
presumption of ownership, namely a presumption which does
not permit evidence of ownership in the claimant. Thus, as to
instances in which article 2279, section 1, applies, personal ac-
tions may be available, but not the revendicatory action. 2 Ac-
cording to a third view, article 2279, section 1, establishes merely
a method of acquisition of ownership ex lege; consequently, the
revendication is excluded only in instances in which the condi-
tions set out by the law for acquisition of ownership are met.78
finally, according to a fourth view, the function of the rule may
be explained as a method of acquisition of ownership ex lege
where the rule is invoked by a third possessor against a dis-
possessed owner, and as a rebuttable presumption of ownership
where the rule is invoked by a possessor deriving his possession
from the owner or his successors.7 4
Since article 2279, section 1, does not apply to movables lost
or stolen, the possessor of such movables, whether thief, finder,
or subsequent acquirer, has no standing to claim that he ac-
quired ownership; accordingly, revendication of these movables
is possible according to the provisions of articles 2279, section 2,
and 2280, section 1. Theft includes fraudulent dispossession,
but not dispossession as a result of abuse of confidence or viola-
tion of contract.7 5 Loss may be the result of fortuitous events,
irresistible force, or mere negligence. The revendicatory action
may be brought by the owner, possessor animo domini, pledgee,
or depositee of a movable against the actual possessor or de-
tentor, and also against one who transferred possession in order
to avoid revendication. The detentor may name the person for
whom he possesses and thus avoid litigation. The action against
71. See 2 COLIN, CAPITANT CT JULLIOT DE LA MORANDItRE, TRAITt DE DROIT
CIVIL 263 (1959) ; 9 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITt DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 535
(1874-82) ; 1.2 MARCAD]t, EXPLICATION DU CODE CIVIL 353 (1874).
72. See 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 147 (6th ed. Bartin 1935)
Planiol, Note D. 92.2.441.
73. See SALEILLES, DE LA POSSESSION DES MEUBLES 185-91 (1907). Of. 1
COLIN, CAPITANT ET JUILLIOT DE LA MORANDItRE, TRAITa DE DROIT CIVIL 264
(1959).
74. 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAJTt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANOAIS 388
(2d ed. Picard 1952).
175. See Req., Nov. 21, 1877, S. 78.1.407; Civ., March 25, 1891, S. 91.1.469;
Civ., June 19, 1928, D.H. 1928.448; Tr. Civ. Seine, Jan. 10, 1941, D.H. 1941.93,
Gaz. Pal. 1941.1.85.
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the thief, against the finder, and against subsequent acquirers
in bad faith is lost by a thirty-year liberative prescription."
In addition to the revendicatory action, the owner of a stolen
thing has against the thief a personal action which prescribes
in either three or ten years depending on the characterization
of the theft as simple or aggravated.17 The action against sub-
sequent acquirers in good faith of a thing lost or stolen pre-
scribes in three years. This prescription is an extinctive delay
rather than either liberative or acquisitive prescription. 78 Upon
the lapse of the three years the acquirer becomes owner ex lege
and his legal situation is the same as that of a possessor pro-
tected by article 2279, section 1. The revendication of lost or
stolen titles to the order of the bearer is subject to special rules.79
ii. Negatory Action. In addition to the revendicatory ac-
tion, the owner of an immovable has at his disposal a negatory
action fashioned after the Roman prototype.80 The object of
this action is the determination of the validity of claims con-
cerning the existence and scope of a servitude on the immovable.
The action is available against any person claiming a right of
servitude. Ownership is presumed to be free of burdens; ac-
cordingly, the owner need prove his ownership only. The burden
is on his adversary to prove the existence and scope of the servi-
tude.8 1 The action may be brought even if defendant obtained
judgment in his favor in a possessory action. Attempted exer-
cise of a servitude without right can be enjoined only by a pos-
sessory action. 2
iii. Confessory Action. The holder of a servitude has against
the owner of the servient estate a confessory action, correspond-
ing to the Roman cctio confessoria.s3 Object of the action is
the recognition of the existence, and determination of the scope,
of a servitude. This, in effect, is revendication of a servitude,
76. See Civ., Feb. 7, 1910, D. 1910.1.201, Note by Nast; S. 1910.1.225, Note
by Lyon-Caen. Cf. FRENCH Civil Code, art. 2262; text at note 41 supra.
77. See CODE D'INSTRUCTION CRIMINELLE arts. 637 and 638 (1908) ; FRENCH
CODE OF PENAL PROCEDURE art. 7 (1957).
78. See Trib. Civ. Seine, Jan. 23, 1950. Gaz. Pal. 1950.1.143.
79. See 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 164 (7th ed. Esmein 1961);
3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT]t PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 397 (2d ed.
Pieard 1952).
80. See Civ., June 23, 1890, D. 90.1.289, S. 93.1.519; 2 AUBRY ET RAU,
DROIT Civii. FRANVAIS 519 (7th ed. Esmein 1961).
81. See Agen, Nov. 23, 1857, S. 57.2.769.
82. See Civ., June 23, 1890, D. 90.1.289, S. 93.1.519; text at note 98 infra;
3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITI PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN9AI8 973 (2d ed.
Picard 1952).
83. Cf. text at note 15 supra.
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and rules applicable to the revendicatory action apply by analogy
to the confessory action. In case his action is successful, the
holder of the servitude may demand that the exercise of his
right be secured by an astreinte84 Holders of real rights other
than servitudes on both movables and immovables have in cer-
tain cases for the protection of their rights a quasi-confessory
action (action confessoire utile).s5
b. Possessory Actions
The possession of immovable real rights is protected in
France by a system of distinct real actions, the complainte,
ddnonciation de nouvel oeuvre, and r6int6grande.6 These pos-
sessory actions are the result of a combination of Germanic
institutions with Roman law and canon law remedies. Distinct
possessory protection is excluded in the case of movables by ar-
ticle 2279 of the Civil Code, which renders the issue of possession
inseparable from the issue of ownership.8 7 Since possession can
be exercised only on individual objects, possessory protection
cannot be accorded to universalities.8 Object of the possessory
actions is the elimination of disturbances or the recovery of a
lost possession. Exclusive competence ratione materiae and
jurisdiction ratione personae is vested in the juge d'instance
at the location of the immovable, and, upon appeal, in the Court
of Appeal at the same location.
8 9
Possessory actions cannot be cumulated with petitory actions
(Code of Civil Procedure, article 25). A judgment obtained in
84. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIIPERT, TRAITh PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANUAIS 967
(2d ed. Picard 1952).
85. Id. at 767; Civ., March 5, 1850, D. 50.1.78, S. 50.1.377.
86. See 1 GARSONNET Er CzAR-BIau 685; 1 GLASSON, TiSSIER ET MOREL
494; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITE PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 192 (2d
ed. Picard 1952).
87. See 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 178 (7th ed. Esmein 1961).
But Of. MOREL, TRAIT]t tLtMENTAIRE DE PROCEDURE CIVILE 65 (2d ed. 1949). In
the rare cases in which article 2279 does not apply, ownership rights and rights to
the possession of movables are ordinarily determined in saisie-revendication pro-
ceedings. See CUCJIE, PRftIS DE PROCtDURE CIVILE ET COMMERCIALE 40 (12th ed.
1960) ; note 61 supra.
88. See 1 GARSONNET ET CitZAR-BnTU 661; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITit
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN4AIS 193 (2d ed. Picard 1952). For the notion of
universalities, see Yiannopoulos, Introduction to the Law of Things, 22 LA. L.
Riv. 756, 781 (1962).
89. Decree No. 1284 of Dec. 22, 1958, arts. 7, 35. Prior to this enactment
exclusive competence ratione materiae and jurisdiction ratione loci was vested
in the Justice of the Peace at the location of the immovable, and upon appeal,
at the Court of the First Instance at the same location. See Law of May 25, 1838,
Art. 6; Law of July 12, 1905, Art. 7; FRENCH CODE OF CIVIL PRocEDURE, Art. 3.
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a possessory action, therefore, cannot prejudice the question
of ownership, nor can the right to possess be determined by
reference to the right of ownership. 0 The judge cannot dis-
miss the complaint on the ground that the action of the defend-
ant was the exercise of a right, nor can he relegate the parties
to another court for the determination of the question of owner-
ship. The judge must award possession to the person entitled to
it, but he cannot confer a new right on the possessor. The judg-
ment ought to be grounded primarily on material acts of enjoy-
ment, and only in the absence of such acts may the judge ex-
amine titles produced by the parties in order to determine the
nature of the parties' alleged possession.9 1 Where the validity
of the titles produced is contested, the powers of the judge vary
with the circumstances.
The parties in possessory proceedings can bring an action
for the protection of ownership only after the question of pos-
session is determined and they have fully complied with the
judgment92  This rule constitutes a dilatory exception.9 3 The
plaintiff in a petitory action is precluded from bringing a pos-
sessory action before determination of the question of owner-
ship (Code of Civil Procedure, article 26). By bringing a peti-
tory rather than a possessory action the plaintiff does not con-
cede possession to his adversary, but he is considered to have
tacitly renounced his right to bring a possessory action for dis-
turbances preceding the initiation of the petitory action.9 4 The
defendant in the petitory action is free to bring a possessory
action, whether he has been disturbed in his possession before
or after the initiation of the action against him.)" The judgment
in a possessory action does not have a res judicata effect in
subsequent proceedings for the determination of the question
90. See Civ., March 14, 1883, D. 83.1.445, S. 83.1.248; Civ., June 14, 1898,
D. 1904.1.199; Civ., March 22, 1899, D. 1905.1.245; Req., April 13, 1932, Gaz.
Pal. 1932.2.60; Civ., April 9, 1946, D. 1946.285.
91. See Civ., March 6, 1882, D. 83.1.104; Civ., March 14, 1883, D. 83.1.445;
Civ., March 12, 1913, D. 1913.1.192; Req., Oct. 17, 1928, D.H. 1928.509; Civ.,
May 26, 1930, S. 1930.1.302; Trib. Coy. Seine, March 21, 1956, D. 1957, Somm. 8;
Civ., Jan. 28, 1959, D. 1959.104.
92. See FRENCH CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 27. This article mentions only
the "defendant." According to a settled jurisprudence, however, it applies like-
wise to the plaintiff. Cf. Req., April 26; 1892, D. 93.1.121, S. 92.1.408.
93. See Req., Nov. 13, 1894, S. 96.1.122
94. See Civ., Nov. 15, 1865, D. 66.1.116, S. 66.1.97; Civ., Jan. 15, 1894,
D. 94.1.159; Civ., July 7, 1937, Gaz. Pal. 1937.2.678; Req., Oct. 18, 1937, Gaz.
Pal. 1937.2.795.
95. See Req., Dec. 16, 1874, D. 75.1.103, S. 75.1.64; Civ., Aug. 5, 1845, S.
46.1.46; Req., April 19, 1869, S. 69.1.265..
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-of :ownership." The person to whom possession is awarded is,
however, entitled to keep the fruits produced by the immovable
until the initiation of the revendicatory action. Possessory ac-
tions must be brought within a year from the day of disturbance
or dispossession (Code of Civil Procedure, article 23). The
term is in the nature of an extinctive delay and runs against
minors and incompetents. In case of a factual disturbance the
delay starts to run from the day on which the acts of adverse
possession are performed, and in case of a legal disturbance
from the day on which a juridical act contradicting plaintiff's
possession is completed.97
i. Complainte and Dgnonciation de Nouvel Oeuvre. The
complainte is brought by a possessor disturbed in the exercise
of his possession." The d4nonciation de nouvel oeuvre is a
variation of the complainte, subject to a number of specific
rules. Both actions are available to the holder of a real right
on an immovable, if his right is susceptible of possession. Prop-
erty of the public domain is insusceptible of possession by pri-
vate persons; therefore, immovables of the public domain cannot
be the object of either of these possessory actions brought
against the state or a political subdivision. On the other hand,
the state, its political subdivisions, and concessionaries of prop-
erty of the public domain have the quasi-possession of an ad-
ministrative real right and enjoy against usurpers the benefit
of possessory protection.9 Property of the private domain is
susceptible of possession and is protected by the possessory ac-
tions in the same measure as immovable property held by pri-
vate persons. Discontinuous non-apparent servitudes, unless
they are founded on title, are considered to be rights insus-
ceptible of possession, 100 and, accordingly, outside the scope of
96. Req., Jan. 26, 1869, D. 71.1.207; Req., June 19, 1889, D. 89.1.337.
97. See FRENCH CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 23; Law of May 25, 1838, art.
6; Civ., June 27, 1864, D. 64.1.336, S. 64.1.334; Civ., Aug. 18, 1880, D. 81.1.451,
S. 82.1.398; Civ. Dec. 16, 1929, Gaz. Pal. 1930.1.304; Req., Dec. 18, 1899,
D. 1900.1.131.
98. See 1 GARSONNET ET CItZAR-BRu, TRAITEt THrtORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE
PROCtDURE CIVILE ET COMMERCIALE 631, 640 (3d ed. 1912) ; 1 GLASSON, TIsSIER
ET MOREL, TRAITIt TH1tORIQUE ET PRATIQUE D'ORGANIZATION JUDICIAIRE, DE COM-
P] TENCE ET DE PROCIDURE CIVILE 501 (3d ed. 1925) ; MOREL, TRAITt ]LtMEN-
TAIRE DE PROCEDURE CIVILE 68 (2d ed. 1949) ; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 203 (2d ed. Picard 1952). Cf. Law of May
25, 1838, Art. 6; Law of July 12, 1905, Art. 7.
99. See Civ., Dec. 31, 1855, S. 56.1.209; Req., Jan. 9, 1872, D. 72.1.41, S.
72.1.225; Req., June 13, 1892, S. 93.1.196; MOREL, TRAITt fLtMENTAIRE DE
PROCtDURE CIVILE 67 (2d ed. 1949).
100. See Req., Dec. 26,.1865, S. 66.1.65; Civ., Dec. 6, 1871, S. 72.1.27; Civ.,
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possessory protection. In this context, however, the word title
has been construed broadly to include an apparent title based
on a legal provision or a destination du p re de famille.1 1
Disturbance is any voluntary act adverse to one's possession
infringing either on actual possession or on the right to pos-
sess.10 2 Damage, though it may give rise to personal action for
restitution, does not necessarily constitute a disturbance. The
,disturbance may be either factual or legal; factual disturbance
is a material act of aggression against another's possession, and
legal disturbance is a juridical act contradicting one's right to
possession. 103 In case the disturbance is merely an abuse or
violation of a contractual obligation, the proper remedy is a
personal or real action for the delivery of the thing, and not a
possessory action. 0 4 The disturbance may be a partial or com-
plete dispossession. If the dispossession is the result of violence,
the proper remedy is the rgintggrande.'0 5 Where the disturbance
results from public works the administrative courts have exclu-
sive jurisdiction, but if the disturbance amounts to expropria-
tion the civil courts have jurisdiction to determine the issue
of possession and the power to enjoin the continuation of the
works. Where private works are executed with the permission
of the administrative authorities, the general rules apply and
the civil courts have jurisdiction as well as the power to order
the destruction of the works.
A possessor may bring the complainte or the d~nonciation
de nouvel oeuvre only if he has possessed the immovable for at
least one year preceding the disturbance. 0 6 The acquisition of
possession may have been accomplished at any time in the past
and not necessarily in the year preceding the disturbance, since
June 26, 1888, D. 88.1.308; Req., July 9, 1918, S. 1920.1.115; Req., May 2, 1919,
S. 1920.1.184; Civ., March 13, 1950, D. 1950.415; Dec. 20, 1955, D. 1956.214.
101. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 694; Civ., June 17, 1885, S. 86.1.72; Civ.,
July 13, 1885, D. 86.1.316.
102. See Civ., Nov. 27, 1895, D. 96.1.247; Civ., Dec. 17, 1912, D. 1913.1.72,
Req., Feb. 17, 1914, D. 1917.1.194; Req., Jan. 4, 1925, Gaz. Pal. 1925.1.509; cf.
Civ., Jan. 11, 1910, D. 1911.1.312; Civ., July 19, 1911, D. 1913.1.316; Req., Oct.
29, 1924, S. 1925.1.8; Civ., May 5, 1925, D.H. 1925.427.
103. See Civ., Jan. 11, 1910, S. 1910.1.318; July 19, 1911, S. 1915.1.12. Cf.
'Civ., June 14, 1948, Gaz. Pal. 1948.2.69.
104. See Req., Nov. 17, 1847, D. 48.1.39, S. 48.1.305; Req., June 13, 1904,
D. 1906.1.188; Civ., Oct. 20, 1914, D. 1916, 1.188, S. 1915.1.8; Req., Oct. 21,
1929, Gaz. Pal. 1929.2.785; Civ., Jan. 18, 1949, S. 1950.1.147.
* 105. See text at note 112 infra.
106. Civ., Feb. 24, 1953, D. 1953.301; FRENCH CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
art. 23. See Civ., April 17, 1894, and March 7, 1898, S. 98.1.516.
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possession, once acquired, continues until voluntary abandon-
ment. The plaintiff's possession must be free of vice: it must
be continuous, peaceable, public, unequivocal, and not pre-
carious. 07 A simple tenant, therefore, cannot bring these ac-
tions. The plaintiff has the burden to prove his one year's
possession; in that regard, he may tack his possession to that
of his ancestors. 08 Both actions may be brought against the
author of the disturbance and his heirs. If the defendant has
acted for another person, he must name that person and im-
plead him as a warrantor. Insofar as the object of these actions
is the restoration of a pre-existing state of affairs, any person
possessing the immovable may be sued, whether in good or bad
faith and whether a successor by universal or by particular title.
Damages, however, may be awarded against such persons only
if their bad faith is proved.10 9
The judge may decree the removal of the disturbance but
he cannot confer new rights on the plaintiff. He may order the
destruction of works after expiration of a delay granted to the
defendant in order to bring the revendicatory action. The judge
may also award damages and impose an astreinte."0 In case
the judge is satisfied that both parties are in partial possession,
he may decree the preservation of the status quo or grant pro-
visory possession to one of the parties with obligation to account
after determination of the question of ownership.
Special rules applicable to the dinonciation de nauvel oeuvre
are derived from the purpose to be served by the action, namely
the suspension of works which, if completed, would constitute
a disturbance. Prerequisites of this action are that the works
are erected on the land of defendant and that they have not
been completed at the time of initiation of the action."' The
judge has authority to decree suspension of the works but not
their destruction. His judgment does not have the force of
res judicata in subsequent proceedings.
107. See Civ., Jan. 11, 1950, D. 1950.125, Note by Lenoan. Cf. Req., Dec. 13,
1904, D. 1905.1.194.
108. See Civ., March 27, 1929, S. 1929.1.207.
109. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITtA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS,
210 (2d ed. Picard 1952).
110. See Req., March 12, 1900, D. 1900.1.284; Req., July 18, 1900, D.
1902.1.191.
111. See Req., Feb. 4, 1856, D. 56.1.296, S. 56.1.433; Civ., April 7, 1875, D.
75.1.381; Req. civ., Feb. 21, 1910, D. 1912.1.65, S. 1913.1.385. Cf. CUCHE,
PRtkIS DE PROCLDURE CIVILE Err COMMERCIALE 47 (12th ed. 1960).
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ii. Rdintdgrande. This is a distinct action available to any
person evicted from an immovable by violent acts.112 It pro-
tects any possessor and detentor having physical control of an
immovable or of a real right susceptible of possession."13 The
control must be actual, peaceable, and public ;114 animus domini
is not required. Accordingly, the action may be brought by a
simple tenant. 1 5 The acts of violence must have occurred on
the land of plaintiff and must have resulted in actual eviction.
Possession of one year prior to violence is not a prerequisite
for this type of protection. 1 6 This action is much broader than
the other two possessory actions since it protects one having
physical control and not only one having legal possession. The
action is available only against the author of the violent acts
and his heirs, and, in that regard, it resembles personal actions.
The judge has power to decree restitution of the immovable or
restoration of the previous state of affairs. The judge may also
decree the destruction of works and award damages. The judg-
ment does not have a res judicata effect in a subsequent com-
plainte or ddnonciation de nouvel oeuvre. The jurisprudence i
firmly settled that the rdintdgrande may be joined with the
other two possessory actions.""
2. Personal Actions
Personal actions have been defined as those available for
the enforcement of personal rights.", Actions deriving from
the contract of lease, the revocatory actions of creditors, 1 9 and
112. See 1 GARSONNET E'P CtZAR-BRU, TRAITP, THtJORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE
PROC1tDURE; CIVILE ET COMMERCIALE 641, 629, 644-79 (3d ed. 1912) ; 1 GLASSON,
TISSIER ET MOREL, TRAIT!t TITORIQUE ET PRATIQUE D'ORGANIZATION JUDICIAIRE,
D COMPtTENCE ET DE PROCItDURE CIVILE 520 (3d ed. 1925) ; MOREL, TRAIT]k
IL] MENTAIRE D PROC~tDURE CIVILE 71 (2d ed. 1949) ; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT.
TRAITit PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 212 (2d ed. Picard 1952). Cf. Civ.,
May 13, 1952, D. 1952.775 (violence not indispensable).
113. See Civ., Feb. 14, 1912, D. 1913.1.176, S. 1.912.1.132 (tenant).
114. See Civ., April 7, 1958, D. 1958. Somm. 124.
115. See Civ., May 21, 1928, S. 1928.1.246; May 13, 1952, D. 1952.775; Lyon;
Jan. 6, 1953, S. 1953.2.93, Note by Laurent.
116. Req., March 1, 1932, Gaz. Pal. 1932.1.790.
117. See Civ., Aug. 4, 1913, D. 1917.1.66.
118. See 1 GARSONNET, ET COtZAR-BRU, TRAITI' THAORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE
PROC1tDURE CIVILE ET COMMERCIALE 596 (3d ed. 1912) ; 1 GLASSON ET TIssIER,
TRAITt THPORIQUE ET PRATIQUE D'ORGANIZATION JUDICIAIRE, DE COMPtITENCE ET
DE PROCEDURE CIVILE 477 (3d ed. 1925) ; JAPIOT, TRAIU ]LAMENTAIRE DE PRO-
CtDURE CIVILE ER COMMERCIALE 79 (3d ed. 1935) ; MOREL, TRAITt IfLtMENTAIRE
DE PROCIEDURE CIVILE 59 (2d ed. 1949). The determination of the nature of the
action is thus a matter of substantive law. Cf. Hdbraud, Real Action8 in France,
29 TUL. L. REV. 673, 678 (1955).
119. See Civ., July 30, 1884, D. 85.1.62. But cf. Civ., July 6, 1925, D. 1926.
1.25, Note by Cremieu; Grenoble, March 2, 1875, D. 77.2.208 (mixed action).
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actions for the recovery of future things are regarded as per-
sonal because the rights enforced are personal rights. Deter-
minative is the nature of the right exercised by the plaintiff.
Thus, the same action may be personal for one of the parties
and real or mixed for the other. In contracts of sale, the vendor's
action for the recovery of the price of an immovable is per-
sonal, 12 while the purchaser's action for the delivery of the
immovable sold is mixed. 12 1 As personal rights are frequently
connected with, and derived from, real rights, the source of the
right exercised is also taken into account. Accessory claims of
a personal nature attached to a real action do not change its
nature. Thus, a claim for damages accessory to an action for
the delivery of an immovable does not affect the classification
of the action as real; but a principal action for the recovery of
damages deriving from the violation of one's ownership rights
is a personal action.
122
The classification of certain actions involving enforcement
and protection of rights whose nature is controversial is still
unsettled. This is so in the case of actions to protect patents,
trade marks, and copyrights. The classification of these ac-
tions, however, involves only a theoretical problem, because
statutory provisions regulate expressly the most important ques-
tion of venue.-23 Actions for the recovery of an entire estate
were regarded as real actions in the nineteenth century; con-
temporary commentators, however, classify these actions, as all
actions for the recovery of a universality, as personal.1 24 Finally,
actions for the determination of status are assimilated to per-
120. See Civ., March 5, 1850, D. 50.1.102; Amiens, Jan. 7, 1948, D. 1948.1.121.
The vendor's resolutory action for non-payment of the purchase price is likewise
a personal action. Cf. Aix, March 18, 1903, D. 1904.2.252, S. 1903.2.121, Note
by Naquet; Paris, Oct. 14, 1911, D. 1912.2.310.
121. See Req., May 31, 1837, S. 37.1.631; Montpellier, Nov. 18, 1921, D.
1922.2.121. In general actions in nullity for lack of requisite form or vices of
consent, actions in resolution on account of lesion, and actions for the revocation
of donations are personal actions when they are brought by the vendor or donor
against the purchaser or donee. The same actions, however, may be classified
under certain circumstances as mi.Ted, and when they are brought against sub-
sequent acquirers, as real. See MOREL, TRAITt ItLtMENTAIRE DE PROCtDURE CIVILE
62 (2d ed. 1949).
122. See Civ., Aug. 28, 1877, D. 78.1.213.
123. See DESBOIS, LA PROPRIATt LI'ERAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE 54, 187 (1953);
1 RlouaIER, LE DROIT DE LA PROPRIIfTt INDUSTRIELLE 88, 147, 438-42 (1952).
1.. 24. See JAPIOT, TRAITt ]L1MENTAIRE DE PROCItDURE CIVILE ET COMMERCIALE
83 (3d ed. 1935). Cf. MOREL, TRAITA t LIMENTAIRE DE PROC.DURE CIVILE 60 (2d
ed. 1949). "
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sonal actions for procedural purposes, although according to
accurate analysis they are neither personal nor real. 12 5
3. Mixed Actions
Personal and real rights are at times so closely interwoven
that determination of the nature of a legal relationship, and
proper classification of the corresponding action as personal or
real, become increasingly difficult matters. In order to mini-
mize this difficulty, article 59 of the Code of Civil Procedure has
established the analytical category of (immovable) mixed ac-
tions.126 These actions may be brought at the option of the plain-
tiff either at the situs of the immovable property (as if they
were real actions) or at the domicile of the defendants (as if
they were personal actions). Since, ordinarily, it is in the in-
terest of the plaintiff to bring his action at the situs of the im-
movable rather than at the domicile of the defendant, the cate-
gory of mixed actions actually tends to broaden the scope of the
forum rei sitae by the inclusion of certain actions of contro-
versial nature. Further, it tends to secure a measure of flexibil-
ity in the application of the venue provisions by discouraging
potential disputes over the accuracy of classification. When the
defendant challenges the propriety of venue at the situs of the
immovable, the courts, quite naturally, are able to uphold their.
jurisdiction ratione personae with the assertion that the action
is "real or at least mixed."'1 27
In the absence of a legislative definition, the Court of Cassa-
tion has declared mixed actions to be those "which involve, simul-
taneously, a controversy as to a real right and a personal right
so that the judicial decision . . . as to the existence of the per-
125. See CUCHE, PR tIS DE PROCDURE CIVILE ET COMMERCIALE 36 (12th ed.
1960) ; Bordeaux, Oct. 28, 1947, Gaz. Pal. 1948.1.74.
126. Mixed actions are either movable or immovable. The movable mixed
actions constitute a category of merely theoretical interest: these actions are to
be brought along with movable real actions and personal actions, whether movable
or immovable, before the court at the domicile of the defendant. The category of
immovable mixed actions, however, involves practical interest in the light of the
venue option granted to plaintiff by Article 59 of the Code of Civil Procedure. See
CUCHE, PRatIs DE PROCtDURE CIVILE ET COMMERCIALE 38 (12 ed. 1960) ; 1 GAR-
SONNET ET C]IZAR-BRu, TIRAIT]t TITEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE PROCIIDURE CIVILE ET
COMMERCIALE 597 (3d ed. 1912) ; 1 GLASSON nT TissiER, TRAITt THEORIQUE ET
PRATIQUE D'ORGANIZATION JUDICIAIRE, DE COMP]tTENCE ET DE PROCPDURE CIVILE
480 (3d ed. 1925) ; MOREL, TRAITP ItLtMENTAIRE DE PROCtDURE CIVILE 60 (2d ed.
1949).
127. Paris, Feb. 11, 1931, Gaz. Pal. 1931.1.630, 30 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DR
DROIT CIVIL 645 (1931), Note by Japiot. Cf. McMahon, Jurisdiction under 'the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, 35 TuL. L. REv. 501 (1961).
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sonal right will also resolve the question of the existence of the
real right.'1 28 According to this definition mixed actions are, in
general, those brought for the performance of juridical acts in-
volving transfer of ownership or creation of real rights on im-
movables,' 29 as well as those brought to secure the annulment,
rescission, resolution, or revocation of such juridical acts.' 30 The
nature of actions for the partition of estates comprising both
movables and immovables,' 3 ' boundary actions, 3 2 and actions for
the enforcement of real security rights13 remains undetermined,
and the classification of these actions as mixed, controversial.
The notion of mixed actions as an analytical category has
128. Civ., July 6, 1925, D. 1926.1.25, Note by Cr6mieu, S.1925.1.159. See also
12 AUBRY ET RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN40AIS 70 (5th ed. Bartin 1922).
129. See Req., May 12, 1926, S. 1926.1.211; Montpellier, Nov. 18, 1921, D.
1922.2.121; Dax, June 15, 1922, D.1923.2.197. The courts have held that the ac-
tion of the purchaser of an immovable against the vendor for the performance of
the contract of sale is a mixed action where the ownership of the immovable has
been transferred to the purchaser. In this case the purchaser exercises simultane-
ously a real action based on his ownership and a personal action based on the
contract of sale. See Req., May 31, 1837, S. 37.1.631; Rouen, March 2, 1899, D.
99.2.285; Trib. Civ. Seine, June 11, 1913, Note by Japiot, 17 REvUE TRIMESTRI-
ELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 159 (1918) ; Dax, June 15, 1922, supra; Req., May 12, 1926,
supra. If ownership has not been transferred, the action of the purchaser is per-
sonal. Of. Aix, March 18, 1903, D. 1904.2.252, S. 1903.2.121, Note by Naquet. The
courts have also held to be mixed actions those brought for the removal of un-
authorized constructions (Paris, Feb. 11, 1931, Gaz. Pal. 1931.1.630), and those
brought against the co-owner of an immovable for contribution to the maintenance
of the property held in common (Chambry, Nov. 22, 1892, Gaz. Pal. 93.1.44).
Cf. Paris, Nov. 25, 1885, D. 86.2.189; Orlans, Nov. 13, 1856, D. 57.2.76; Trib.
Civ. Evreux, Jan. 29, 1954, Gaz. Pal. 1954.1.248, Note by 116braud et Raynaud,
52 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DU DROIT CIVIL 360 (1954).130. See Civ., April 8, 1862, D. 62.1.332; Nancy, June 10, 1871, S. 71.2.130;
Req., June 29, 1899, D. 1900.1.316; Civ., July 6, 1925, D. 1926.1.25, Note by Cr6-
mieu, S. 1925.1.159; Paris, March 8, 1939, D.H. 1939.278.
131. For the proposition that partition and boundary actions are mixed actions,
see 12 AUBBY ET RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 8 (5th ed. Bartin 1922) ;
Paris, Nov. 22, 1838, S. 39.2.210; Colmar, Dec. 27, 1848, D. 50.5.12. But cf. 1
GARSONNET ET CQZAR-BRU, TRAITb THtORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE PROCItDURE CIVILE
ET COMMERCIALE 592 (3d ed. 1912) (real actions) ; JAPIOT, TRAIT]t tLtMENTAIRE
DE PROCtDURE CIVILE ET COMMERCIALE 80 (3d ed. 1935) (personal actions).
132. Cf. note 131 supra. The Court of Cassation has held that boundary ac-
tions are real rather than mixed actions. Req., Feb. 4, 1885, S. 1886.1.212; Civ.,
Dec. 15, 1885, S. 86.1.156. The controversy as to the nature of boundary actions
and actions in partition is merely theoretical because special rules in the Civil
Code, the Code of Civil Procedure, or in special legislation regulate the questions
of venue and competence ratione aateriae. See MOREL, TRAITIk ALtMENTAIRE DE
PROCEDURE CIVILE 60 (2d ed. 1949).
133. According to the best view these actions should be classified as either per-
sonal or real depending on the right exercised by the plaintiff. The hypothecary
action for the foreclosure of a mortgage involves the exercise of a real right and
has been held to be a real action. See Civ., Dec. 21, 1859, D. 60.1.29; Req., June
3, 1863, D. 64.1.217; Req., March 21, 1894, D. 94.1.455. On the other hand the
action against the mortgage debtor for the payment of the debt without foreclosure,
being the exercise of a personal right, has been correctly classified as a personal
action. See Civ., Jan. 7, 1874, D. 74.1.13; Amiens, Nov. 9, 1909, S. 1910.2.111.
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given rise to doctrinal controversies and the question has been
asked how there can be mixed actions when there are no mixed
rights. 3 4 The Court of Cassation has explained that mixed ac-
tions involve the exercise of two distinct rights, and thus the
joinder of two distinct actions, one personal and one real. 13 5
Commentators suggest that in mixed actions there is a joinder
of two distinct demands 3 6 in a single action. 13 7
In the light of the preceding analysis it is apparent that real
actions and real rights are related concepts in French law, al-
though their relationship is one of correspondence rather than
filiation. Real actions are not indispensable correlatives of real
rights; indeed, according to certain commentators, real rights
related to movables are protected by personal rather than real
actions. But the classification of a given right as an immovable
real right determines the nature of the corresponding action for
its protection. In France, these immovable real actions display a
number of distinct procedural characteristics and are subject to
a number of specific rules, the most important of which concern
venue. Possessory actions are regulated by the Code of Civil
Procedure, whereas actions for the protection of ownership and
its dismemberments are regulated in part by the Civil Code and
in part by rules developed by the courts following traditional
sources.
C. LOUISIANA
Soon after the Louisiana Purchase, Edward Livingston was
appointed to draft a Code of Procedure for the Territory of
Orleans, and the draft he produced was adopted as law in 1805
under the title "An Act regulating the practice of the Superior
Court in civil causes."' 38 The cardinal feature of this act was
134. According to the classical doctrine action is "the right itself in move-
ment." See note 5 supra. This complete assimilation of right and action explains
the conceptual difficulty involved in the establishment of the category of mixed
actions. See 9 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITt DE LA DISTINCTIONS DES BIENS 349 (1874-82).
135. See Civ., July 6, 1925, D. 1926.1.25, Note by CrAmieu, S. 1925.1.159.
136. See 1 GARSONNET ET CIIZAR-BRu, TRAITII THIIHORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE
PROC~tDURE CIVILE ET COMMERCIALE 599 (3d ed. 1912).
137. MOREL, TRAITt ItLEMENTAIRE DE PROC]tDURE CIVILE 61 (2d ed. 1949). The
author suggests that "in reality there are no mixed actions but merely proceedings
which involve two demands: a personal demand against the vendor and a real
demand founded on the right of ownership of the purchaser for the delivery of the
immovable, the second demand being subordinated to the success of the first. Be-
cause of the existence of these two interrelated demands the plaintiff has the choice
of venue either at the domicile of the defendant or at the situs of the immovable.'
138. LAWS OF THE TERRITORY OF ORLEANS, ch. XXVI, p. 210, §1 (1805).:
"All suits in.th Superior Court shall be commenced-by petition, addressed to thel
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the adoption of one form of action for all cases. There was no
distinction in the act between personal and real actions, and no
mention of petitory and possessory actions. It thus became set-
tled law that "the petition need only state facts, and that the
courts will give the relief to which those facts show that the
petitioner is entitled under the law."1 39
The Spanish laws prevailing in Louisiana at the time of the
Purchase did, however, indicate the systematic distinctions of
actions into personal and real, movable and immovable, and peti-
tory and possessory.I40 It is not surprising, therefore, that these
distinctions are at times mentioned, and at times clearly implied,
in the Civil Code of 1808.141 Subsequently, mostly through
French influence, the same distincfions found their way into the
Civil Codes of 1825142 and 1870, the Codes of Practice of 1825
and 1870, and with certain modifications in the Code of Civil
Procedure of 1960. For the purpose of the present study, the
provisions of the Civil Code of 1870, of the Code of Practice of
1870, and of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1960 deserve par-
ticular attention.
In the Civil Code of 1870 actions are distinguished into mov-
ables and immovables, depending on the object of the rights pro-
tected. 4 .8 Reference is also made in the Code to personal and
real actions,14 4 without definition of these terms. This last dis-
tinction is obviously based on the nature of the rights protect-
ed.'4 5 Since the two distinctions of actions rest on different cri-
teria, it follows that under the Civil Code the terms real actions
court, which shall state the names of the parties, their places of residence, and the
cause of action, with the necessary circumstances of places and dates, and shall
conclude with a prayer for relief, adapted to the circumstances of the case."
139. Hubert, A Louisiana Anomaly -The "Writ" System in Real Actions, 22
TUL. L. REV. 459, 463 (1948).
140. See Asso Y MANUEL, INSTITUCIONES DEL DERECHO CIVIL DE CASTILLA
231 (1806) ; id., INSTITUTES OF THE CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN 305 (Johnston transl.
1825). Cf. LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, pt. 3, tit. 2, LL. 15, 16-24 (movables) ; L. 25
(immovables) ; LL. 27-30 (possessory and petitory actions) ; L. 31 (personal
actions).
141. See, e.g., LA. CIVIL CODE p. 481, arts. 27, 28 (possessory actions) ; p.
479, art. 26 (possessory and petitory actions distinguished) ; p. 99, art. 22 (im-
movable actions) ; p. 486, art. 65 (personal and real actions) (1808).
142. See, e.g., LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 463, 466 (movable and immovable actions)
art. 3501 (prescription of possessory action) ; art. 3508 (prescription of personal
actions) ; arts. 3512, 3513 (prescription of immovable real actions) (1825).
143. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 471, 474 (1870).
144. See id. arts. 3454, 3459, 3528, 3544, 3548.
145. See text at note 34 supra. For the distinction of rights into personal and
real, see Yiannopoulos, Real Rights in Louisiana and Comparative Law: Part I,
23 LA. L.I RV. 161, 177 (1963).
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and immovable actions are not synonymous and that movable
and immovable actions can be either personal or real.146 The
Civil Code establishes also the distinction between "possessory
actions" and "actions for the ownership.,' 1 47 i.e., petitory actions,
and determines the prerequisites for the protection of posses-
sion. In that regard no distinction is made between movables
and immovables and the clear implication is that the possessory
protection was intended to apply to all species of corporeal prop-
erty. Two immovable real actions are regulated by the Civil
Code in considerable detail: the action of boundary I48 and the
action for the prohibition of new works.1 49
In the Codes of Practice of 1825 and 1870 the single action
with a right of recovery based on the facts alleged was
retained. 150 At the same time, several distinctions were reiter-
ated,"' 1 some of which were already obsolete by 1870. Still im-
portant were the classifications of actions as personal, real, and
mixed ;112 movable and immovable;1S and possessory and peti-
146. Cf. text at note 33 supra.
147. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3456 (1870).
148. See id. arts. 663, 823-855.
149. See id. arts. 856-869.
150. See LA. CODE OF PRACTICE arts. 170, 171, 172 (1870).
151. See id. arts. 2, 5, 6, 8, 11. Cf. PROJET OF TEl CODE OF PRACTICE OF 1825,
2 LA. LEGAL ARCHIVES 3 Comment by the Redactors (1937) : "Quoique parmi
nous, it ne soit pas necessaire d'exprimer le nom de l'action qu' on intente et de
s'astreindre 4 de certaines formules; quoi'il suffise de'exprimer clairement ce que
'on demande, it n'en est pas moins tr~s-iinportant pour prendre des conclusions,
juste8 et convenables sur les actions qu' on forne, de connaitre la nature des prin-
cipales actions civiles." See also McMahon, The Case against Fact Pleading in
Louisiana, 13 LA. L. REV. 369 (1953); Tucker, Proposal for Retention of the
Louisiana System of Fact Pleading, Exposd des Motifs, 13 LA. L. REV. 395
(1953).
152. See La. Code of Practice art. 2 (1870) : "Actions are divided into several
kinds: the first division of actions is into personal, real, and mixed." Id. art. 3:
"A personal action is that by which a person proceeds against one who is person-
ally bound towards him, either by a contract or by virtue of the law, in order to
compel him to pay what he owes to him or to perform what he had promised. This
action is called personal, because it is attached to the person bound and follows
him everywhere." Id. art. 36: "A personal action lies against him who has bound
himself towards another, personally and independently of the property which he
possesses." Id. art. 4: "A real action is that which relates to claims made on
immovable property, or to immovable rights to which they are subjected. The
object of this action is the ownership or the possession of such property ; and they
are therefore subdivided into petitory and possessory." Id. art. 41: "A real action
lies against him who, without having contracted any obligation towards the plain-
tiff, is nevertheless bound towards him, as possessor of the immovable property
of which that plaintiff claims the ownership or the possession, or on which he
claims to exercise some immovable right." Id. art. 7: "A mixed action is one
which in its nature partakes both of the real and of the personal action, such as
a claim for the ownership of real property, and also for the fruits it has produced,
or their value."
153. See id. art. 11 : "Actions, with respect to their object, are divided into two
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tory.15 4 These distinctions carried significant legal conse-
quences. 155 In the Civil Code the concepts of real actions and
immovable actions were kept distinct; in contrast, these con-
cepts were blurred in the Code of Practice. 156 Indeed, according
to the Code of Practice real actions were those relating to im-
movable property, whereas personal actions were those relating
to movable property and to personal rights.157 Possessory protec-
tion was available for immovable property only.158 While the
origin of these provisions is "conjectural,"' 5 9 they seem to have
their source in the treatise of Domat' 60 and the French Code of
Civil Procedure.' 6'
In the Code of Civil Procedure of 1960 civil actions 62 may
be classified as "personal, real, and mixed.' 63 According to ar-
classes; those by which movables, and those by which immovables are claimed";
id. art. 12: "Although incorporeal rights be not in reality movables nor immov-
ables, they are nevertheless placed by law in one of those two classes. Actions
tending to recover an immovable, or a real right, or an universality of things, such
as an inheritance, are considered as real; while actions for the recovery of a mov-
able or for a sum of money, though accompanied with a mortgage, are not real
actions." A substantial error in translation ought to be noted. In the English
version, the words "action mobiliaire" have been translated as "real action," and
the words "action immobiliaire" as "not a real action." See note 157 infra.
154. See LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 5 (1870) : "The petitory action is that
by which he who has the property of a real estate, or of a right upon or growing
out of it, proceeds against the person having the possession, in order to obtain
the possession of the immovable property, or the enjoyment of the rights upon it,
to which he is entitled." Id. art. 6: "A possessory action is that by which one
claims to be maintained in the possession of an immovable property, or of a right
upon or growing out of it, when he has been disturbed; or to be reinstated to that
possession, when he has been divested or evicted."
155. See, e.g., id. art. 163 (venue in real actions) ; art. 60 (possessory protec-
tion available only for immovables) ; art. 576 (delivery of movable property) ; art.
1063 (jurisdiction of the justice of the peace).
156. This blurring of the concepts may be partly the result of erroneous trans-
lation. See, e.g., id. art. 12, quoted note 153 supra.
157. See id. art. 4, quoted note 152 supra. The French text of this article.
does not lend itself to confusion of ideas. It reads: "Les actions qui tendent d la
revendicatiom d'un immeuble ou d'un droit rdel, ou d'une universalitd des biens8
coiarne une succession, sont considerdes comme imnmobiliaires, tandis que les de-
mandes en revendication d'immeuble ou en payement d'une somme d' argent,
quoique accompagndes d' hypothdques, ne sont considerdc8 que comme des actions
mobiliaires."
158. See id. art. 60.
159. Hubert, A Louisiana Anomaly-- The "Writ" System in Real Actions, 22
TUL. L. REV. 459, 466 (1948).
160. See PROJET OF THE CODE OF PRACTICE OF 1825, 2 LOUISIANA LEGAL AR-
CHIVES 3 (1937). Cf. 2 DOMAT, THE CIVIL LAW IN ITS NATURAL ORDER: To-
GETHER WITH THE PUBLICK LAW 672 (transl. Strahan, 1737) : "There are two
principal kinds of actions, Personal and Real. Mixt actions are those which par-
take of the nature of both Personal and Real."
161. See text at notes 29-30 supra.
162. A civil action is defined in article 421 as "a demand for the enforcement
of a legal right."
163. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 422 (1960). Real actions are
further distinguished into petitory and possessory. See text at notes 212, 229 infra.
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ticle 422 "a personal action is one brought to enforce an obliga-
tion against the obligor, personally and independently of the
property which he may own, claim or possess. A real action is
one brought to enforce rights in, to, or upon immovable prop-
erty. A mixed action is one brought to enforce both rights in,
to, or upon immovable property, and a related obligation against
the owner, claimant, or possessor thereof." These definitions
would conform with the terminology of the Civil Code and would
establish fully acceptable analytical divisions, if the term "real
actions" were defined to include those brought for the protection
or enforcement of real rights related to movables. 164 As enacted,
article 422 of the Code of Civil Procedure renders real actions
synonymous uith immovable real actions and leaves room for
speculation on the nature of actions "brought to enforce rights
in, to, or upon" movables.165 These actions are not strictly speak-
ing "personal," because they are founded on ownership and
other real rights rather than on an obligation ;166 and they are
not "real" under the Code of Civil Procedure, because they do
not involve protection of immovable real rights. Actions for the
protection of ownership, real rights other than ownership, and
possession of movables remain thus innominate under the Code
of Civil Procedure. For the purpose of the present discussion
the term real actions will apply to actions for the enforcement
or protection of real rights, whether relating to movables or im-
movables. Real actions relating to immovable property will be
termed "immovable real actions," and real actions relating to
movable property, "movable real actions." Conversely, personal
actions relating to immovable property will be termed "immov-
able personal actions," and personal actions relating to movable
property, "movable personal actions."
The civilian classification of actions as personal, real and
mixed, does not, it should be noted, correspond to "the actions
164. Cf. supra text at note 33.
165. For a similar confusion of concepts in France, see text at note 32 supra.
166. Of. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 422(1) (1960) ; Warren v. Salten-
berer, 6 La. Ann. 351, 354 (1851) : "Our Code of Practice is extremely meagre
in its provisions as to actions for movable property, although they are so numer-
ous .... In defining . . . personal actions, it is with difficulty the definitions can
be.construed to embrace a suit for a specific thing"; Bouchard v. Parker, 32 La.
Ann. 535, 537 (1880) : "Now an action of this kind, [for the recovery of mov-
ables] although it might not be defined to be a real action according to the defi-
nition of our Code of Practice, since. a real action proper, by the terms of the
Code, would seem to be confined to suits for the recovery of land or a real right,
yet it.is a species of action closely allied to such action, and fully recognized in
the ,French jurisprudence, from, which we derive our system of practice."
[Vol. XXV
REAL ACTIONS IN -LOUISIANA
in personam, in rem, and quasi in rem- concepts which were
brought into the procedure of Louisiana through the jurisdic-
tional requirements of due process of law and full faith and
credit under the federal constitution.' 167 This last, constitution-
ally-inspired distinction, rather than the civilian classification,
is determinative for the solution of questions relating to juris-
diction, i.e., "the legal power and authority of a court to hear
and determine an action or proceeding involving the legal rela-
tions of the parties, and to grant the relief to which they are
entitled."'168 Jurisdiction in actions in personam is thus based
upon article 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in actions in rem
upon article 8, and in actions quasi in rem upon article 9.169
In contrast to France, where the most important practical
consequences of the division of actions into personal, real and
mixed relate to questions of venue, 1 70 in Louisiana the charac-
terization of an action as personal, real, or mixed is not by itself
determinative of the venue. Under the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure venue is determined by the nature of the property
involved in litigation rather than by the nature of the right exer-
cised. In general, an action against "an individual who is domi-
ciled in the state shall be brought in the parish of his domi-
cile.'1 71 This is the forum generale for all movable actions,
whether personal or real. In addition, the Code establishes a
number of special venues, either permissive or mandatory. A
permissive venue is established in article 72 for "an action in
which a sequestration is sought, or an action to enforce a mort-
gage or privilege by an ordinary proceeding." Such an action
"may be brought in the parish where the property, or any por-
tion thereof, is situated.' 72 According to an accompanying com-
ment by the redactors, this provision applies "to all property,
movable and immovable." A mandatory venue is established in
article 80 for actions involving immovables.1 7 This mandatory
167. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 422, Comment b (1960).
168. Id. art. 1.
169. Article 6 declares that "jurisdiction over the person is the legal power
and authority of a court to render a personal judgement against a party to an
action or proceeding." Article 8 provides that "a court which is otherwise com-
petent under the laws of this state has jurisdiction to enforce a right in, to, or
against property having a situs in this state, claimed or owned by a nonresident
not subject personally to the jurisdiction of the court."
170. See text at note 29 supra.
171. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 42(1) (1960) ; Comment, 21 LA. L.
REv. 182 (1960).
172. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PRocEDURE art. 72 (1960).
173. Id. art. 80: "The following actions shall be brought in the parish Where
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forum rei is appropriate not only for immovable real actions but
also for immovable personal actions. Mixed actions, for purposes
:of venue, are expressly assimilated with immovable real ac-
tions. 174 The category of mixed actions has thus limited pro-
cedural significance in Louisiana. In contrast with French law,
under which the plaintiff in a mixed action has a choice of fo-
rum, 175 under Louisiana law the plaintiff in a mixed action must
utilize the venue of article 80(1). Analytically, therefore, the
category of mixed actions is almost meaningless and fully dis-
pensable in Louisiana.
The distinction between personal and real actions is also im-
portant in the light of the provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code
of 1870 pertaining to the prescription of actions. The Code con-
tains an enumeration of personal actions prescribing in stated
periods of time,'716 and a catch-all provision that "in general, all
personal actions, except those before enumerated, are prescribed
by ten years" (article 3544). There is no corresponding general
provision in the Code with respect to real actions. It is specific-
ally provided that the action of the possessor for the protection
of his possession prescribes in one year (article 3456), that "the
rights of usufruct, use and habitation, and servitudes are lost by
non-use for ten years" (article 3546), and that "all actions for
immovable property, or for an entire estate, or a succession, are
prescribed by thirty years" (article 3548).177 The interpreta-
the immovable property is situated: (1) An action to assert an interest in im-
movable property, or a right in, to, or against immovable property, except as
otherwise provided in Articles 72 and 2633; and (2) An action to partition im-
movable property, except as otherwise provided in Articles 81, 82, and 83. If the
immovable property, consisting of one or more tracts, is situated in more than one
parish, the action may be brought in any of these parishes." Improper venue, how-
ever, is waived unless timely exception is interposed. See id. arts. 44, 925, 928.
174. See id. art. 3652(3) : "A petitory action shall be brought in the venue
provided by Article 80 (1), even when the plaintiff prays for judgment for the
fruits and revenues of the property, or for damages." According to comment (c)
accompanying this article "under the third paragraph of this article, venue is
limited to the parish of the situs of the immovable; but if the action is brought
in an improper venue, the defendant must except timely thereto, otherwise the
objection is waived. See arts. 44, 925, supra. Express provision is made in this
.paragraph for the venue of the mixed action."
175. See text at notes 126-127 supra.
176. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3534-3543 (1870). Provisions concerning the
-prescription of certain actions may be also found in the Revised Statutes. See LA.
R.S. 9:5681, 5701 (1950); 33:3746 (1950).
177. A substantial error in the English translation of the French text ought
to be noted. The word "for" following the words "all actions" should be "in reven-
dication of the ownership of." The English text of article 3548 is obscure and in
latent conflict with article 3546. Strictly speaking, the revendicatory action of the
owner of an immovable is never lost as a result of the prescription of article
.3548. The Louisiana Supreme Court has correctly held in Labarre v. Rateau, 210
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tion and application of these articles has not given rise to diffi-
cult questions concerning the precise classification of partic-
ular actions as personal or real.
Louisiana courts, while avoiding unnecessary generalizations
and concentrating on the solution of concrete problems, have had
no difficulty subjecting to the ten-year prescriptive period of
article 3544 a number of actions involving enforcement of per-
sonal rights,178 such as actions for accounting,1 79 settlement of
partnershipi s° and usufruct accounts, 81 and actions on unjust
enrichment, 8 2 negotiorum gestio'88 and quasi contracts in gen-
eral.1s4 Quite naturally, Louisiana courts have applied the same
prescriptive period to personal actions arising out of legal trans-
actions directly involving corporeal movables and immovables.
Thus, actions for the payment of the price of immovable prop-
erty, 85 for the recovery of the price of the sale in case of im-
La. 34, 26 So. 2d 279 (1946) that the owner's action prescribes only when a third
possessor acquires the immovable by acquisitive prescription.
178. See Louis Werner Saw Mill Co. v. White, 205 La. 242, 17 So. 2d 264
(1944) ; Succession of McCloskey, 144 La. 438, 80 So. 650 (1919) ; Kirby Lum-
her Co. v. Hicks, 144 La. 473, 80 So. 663 (1919); Eichelberger v. Pike, 22 La.
Ann. 142 (1870) ; Barelli v. Riviere, 3 La. Ann. 46 (1848) ; Lacoste v. Benton,
3 La. Ann. 220 (1848) ; Goddard's Heirs v. Urquhart, 6 La. 659 (1834). In most
cases, the question before Louisiana courts has been which particular prescription
applies to the action at hand rather than the question of the classification of the
action as personal or real. In exceptional cases only Louisiana courts felt com-
pelled to avoid application of the ten-year prescriptive period of article 3544 by
declaring that the action in question was "not personal but real." The Code does
not pose a dilemma since it does not provide for a single prescription applicable
to all real actions. Thus, a determination that an action is not subject to article
3544 does not necessarily mean that the action is subject to article 3548.
179. See Warnock v. Roy, 217 La. 224, 46 So. 2d 251 (1950) ; Succession of
Porche, 187 La. 1069, 175 So. 670 (1937). An action for accounting has been held
not to be subject to the ten-year prescription where several persons had bought a
tract of land in the name of one of themselves and thus became subject to the
action of partition. Aiken v. Ogilvie, 12 La. Ann. 353 (1857). See also Watson
v. Succession of Barber, 105 La. 456, 29 So. 949 (1901) (action for supplemental
partition).
180. See Joyner v. Williams, 197 La. 43, 200 So. 815 (1941) ; King's Heirs
v. Wartelle, 14 La. Ann. 740 (1859); cf. Browder v. Hook, 24 La. Ann. 200
(1872) (the action to compel a person to reimburse what has been paid for it on
account of the purchase of lands prescribes in ten years).
181. See Burdin v. Burdin, 171 La. 7, 129 So. 651 (1930) ; Ashbey v. Ashbey,
41 La. Ann. 102, 5 So. 539 (1889) ; Cochran v. Violet, 38 La. Ann. 525 (1886).
182. See Whitten v. Monkhouse, 29 So. 2d 800 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1947) ; Inter-
state Trust & Banking Co. v. Alfano, Or]. Rep. No. 7557 (La. App. 1919) ; Pru-
dential Soc. v. Gondolf, Orl. Rep. No. 7169 (La. App. 1917).
183. See Gaud6 v. Gaud4, 28 La. Ann. 181 (1876) ; Devot v. Marx, 19 La.
Ann. 491 (1867).
184. See Roussel v. Railways Realty Co., 165 La. 536, 115 So. 742 (1928)
Imboden v. Richardson, 15 La. Ann. 534 (1860) ; Garland v. Scott's Estate, 15
La. Ann. 143 (1860) ; Succession of Savant, 15 La. App. 396 (1st Cir. 1931)
Greenfield Box Co. v. Independence Veneer & Box Mfg. Co., 4 La. App. 690 (1st
Cir. 1926).
185. See Scionneaux v. Waguespack, 32 La. Ann. 283 (1880).
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possibility of performance, 1' for the reformation of deeds in
case of erroneous description, 8 7 for the annulment or rescission
of sales'" or mortgages,8 9 and actions among co-owners for rents
and revenues'9 0 have been consistently held to be personal ac-
tions governed by the prescription of article 3544. With respect
to movables, the same rule has been applied by the courts to
actions for the recovery of the value of things sold wrongfully' 91
or in good faith9 2 by persons other than the true owner, actions
by the vendor for the payment of the price of materials sold, 98
and actions for the repayment of moneys deposited. 9 4
In interpreting and applying article 3548, on the other hand,
the Louisiana courts have correctly limited application of the
thirty-year prescription to immovable real actions involving
either "revendication of the ownership of"'" 5 immovables, i.e.,
186. Raines v. Lyons, 6 So. 2d 364 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1942) ; see Ford v.
Russel, 13 La. App. 390, 128 So. 310 (Orl. Cir. 1930).
187. See Agurs v. Holt, 232 La. 1026, 95 So. 2d 644 (1957) ; Mims v4 Sample,
191 La. 677, 186 So. 66 (1938) ; Louisiana Oil Ref. Corp. v. Gandy, 168 La. 37,
121 So. 183 (1929) ; Sharpe v. Hayes, 171 So. 862 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1937).
188. See Louisiana Truck & Orange Land Co. v. Page, 199 La. 1, 5 So. 2d 365
(1941) ; Latour v. Latour, 134 La. 342, 64 So. 133 (1914) ; Southwestern Im-
provement Co. v. Whittington, 193 So. 483 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1940). The ten-
year prescription of article 3544 has been also applied to an action for the recov-
ery of a tract of land by a vendor claiming fulfillment of a resolutory condition.
It seems that the action should be classified as petitory. See text at notes 195,
212 infra. The court, however, reasoned that "the action to enforce the resolutory
condition is an action to enforce a part, whether expressed or implied, of a con-
tract" and held that "the action, although it may result in the recovery of immov-
able property, is regarded as a personal action, and is barred by the prescription,
liberandi causa, of ten years." R. E. E. de Montluzin Co. v. New Orleans &
N.E.R.R., 166 La. 822, 828, 118 So. 33, 35 (1928). "Contracts to sell, where the
title remains in the vendor are not personal actions subject to the ten year pre-
scription." Delta Farms Co. v. Davis, 202 La. 445, 453, 12 So. 2d 213, 216 (1943).
The ten-year prescription does not run where the vendor is in possession of the
land. Hamilton v. Moore, 136 La. 631, 67 So. 523 (1915). See also Delta Farms
Co. v. Davis, 202 La. 445, 12 So. 2d 213 (1943). It has been also held that an
action to set aside a transaction void ab initio is not subject to the ten-year pre-
scription. Ackerman v. Larner. 116 La. 101, 40 So. 581 (1906).
189. See Ashbey v. Ashbey, 41 La. Ann. 102, 5 So. 539 (1889); Cochran v.
Violet, 38 La. Ann. 525 (1886).
190. See Juneau v. Laborde, 228 La. 410, 82 So. 2d 693 (1955).
191. See Kempt v. Kelly, Gunby's Dec. 65 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1885).
192. See Gaty v. Babers, 32 La. Ann. 1091 (1880) ; Rizzio v. Moriarity, 1
Orl. App. 150 (La. App. 1904). But cf. Importsales Inc. v. Lindeman, 231 La.
663, 92 So. 2d 574 (1957) ; Martin v. Texas Oil Co., 150 La. 556, 90 So. 922
(1921).
193. See Miller v. Krouse, 177 So. 472 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937). Of. Philip
Werlein, Ltd. v. Forstall, 1 Orl. App. 249 (La. App. 1904).
194. See Brard v. Boagni, 30 La. Ann. 1125 (1878).
195. See Mussina v. Alling, 11 La. Ann. 568 (1856); Wilson Motor Co. v.
McDonald, 69 So. 2d 91 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954). The words in quotation marks
are part of the French text of article 3548, inadvertently omitted from the English
text. See note 177 eupra.
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petitory actions, or the recovery of an entire estate. Actions for
the recovery of undivided shares in lands,196 actions to compel
conveyance of immovables, 197 an action by the administrator of
an insolvent estate that certain property be decreed to belong to
the succession, 19 an action by a judgment creditor for the re-
covery of his debtor's immovables in the hands of third per-
sons,19 and an action to compel the surrender of immovables
sold under a bond for deed with title remaining in the vendor 2°0
have been held to be petitory actions. Claims to a portion of an
estate,20 1 in contrast to claims for the payment of legacies,
20 2
have been held to be subject to the thirty-year prescription. And
an action to set aside a dation en paiement and a sale as not sup-
ported by consideration has been held to be "clearly ...not a
personal action, as it is brought on behalf of an entire estate to
have set aside conveyances of property and the property returned
to the mass of the succession. '20 8
Since for real actions there is no provision in the Code cor-
responding to article 3544, in cases involving the issue of pre-
scription of real actions other than those specifically mentioned
in the Code, the courts have either resorted to analogy or have
declared an occasional action to be imprescriptible. In actions
involving revendication of movables by the rightful owner in the
hands of third party possessors Louisiana courts have applied
the prescription of article 3544 by regarding these actions as
quasi-contractual.2 0 4 In an action upon a street paving certifi-
cate the court declared that "paving claims are strictly claims in
rem," and holding that the action was outside the scope of ar-
ticle 3544 and imprescriptible.2 0 5 The hypothecary action, i.e.,
the action for the enforcement of a mortgage, has been held to
196. See Pearlstine v. Mattes, 223 La. 1032, 67 So. 2d 582 (1953) ; Labare v.
Rateau, 210 La. 34, 26 So. 2d 279 (1946) ; Da Ponte v. Ogden, 161 La. 378, 108
So. 777 (1926); Peterson v. Moresi, 191 La. 932, 186 So. 737 (1939).
197. See State ex rel. Hyam's Heirs v. Grace, 197 La. 428, 1 So. 2d 683
(1941).
198. See Judson v. Connolly, 4 La. Ann. 169 (1849).
199. See Spencer v. Goodman, 33 La. Ann. 898 (1881).
200. See Louisiana Delta Farms Co. v. Davis, 202 La. 445, 12 So. 2d 213
(1943).
201. See White v. White, 50 La. Ann. 104, 23 So. 95 (1898).
202. See Succession of Ball, 43 La. Ann. 342, 9 So. 45 (1891); Nolasco v.
Lurty, 13 La. Ann. 100 (1858).
203. Welch v. Courville, 99 So. 2d 487, 490 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1957).
204. See Faison v. Patout, 212 La. 37, 31 So. 2d 416 (1947) ; Kramer v. Free-
man, 198 La. 244, 3 So. 2d 609 (1941). Cf. text at notes 380, 399 infra.
205. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. King, 130 La. 788, 789, 58 So. 572, 573
(1912).
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be a "real action" whose "duration is contingent upon the ex-
istence of the right from which it springs" and, as such, not sub-
ject to an independent prescription.20 6 The action for the en-
forcement or protection of a right of servitude (corresponding
to the Roman actio confessori) has been held to be barred by
the ten-year prescription for non-use 20 7 or by the ten-year ac-
quisitive prescription running in favor of a bona fide possessor
of the land burdened with the servitude .20  Finally, the owner's
action to have his land free of unauthorized rights of servitude
(corresponding to the Roman actio negatori) has been held to
be lost by the ten-year 20 9 (article 765) or thirty-year 210 (article
3504) acquisitive prescription of the servitude.
1. Protection of Immovable Real Rights
Immovable real rights (i.e., the ownership of immovable
property and dismemberments thereof) and their posession are
protected in Louisiana by several innominate real actions211 as
206. Gentes v. Blasco, 20 La. Ann. 403, 405 (1868). See also Smith v. John-
son, 35 La. Ann. 943 (1883) ; Lanusse v. Minturn, 11 La. 256 (1837) ; cf. Wis-
dom v. Parker, 31 La. Ann. 52 (1879).
207. See Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939) ; Thompson v. Mey-
ers, 34 La. Ann. 615 (1882). Cf. Bonnabel v. Police Jury, Parish of Jefferson,
216 La. 798, 44 So. 2d 872 (1950) ; Goldsmith v. McCoy, 190 La. 320, 182 So. 519
(1938).
208. See Sample v. Whitaker, 171. La. 949, 132 So. 511 (1930) ; cf. Randazzo
v. Lucas, 106 So. 2d 490 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1958).
209. See Webster Sand, Gravel & Constr. Co. v. Vicksburg, S & P.R.R., 129
La. 1096, 57 So. 529 (1912) ; Ellis v. Blanchard, 45 So. 2d 100 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1950) ; Fuller v. Washington, 19 So. 2d 730 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1944) ; Greco v.
Frigerio, 3 Ua. App. 649 (Orl. Cir. 1926) ; Kennedy v. Succession of McCollam,
34 La. Ann. 568 (1882) ; Vincent v. Michel, 7 La. 52 (1834). See also Hale v.
Hulin, 130 So. 2d 519 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961); Guesnard v. Bird's Executors,
33 La. Ann. 796 (1881); Levet v. Lapeyrollerie, 39 La. Ann. 210, 1 So. 672
(1887) ; cf. Macheca v. Avegno, 25 La. Ann. 55 (1873) ; Delahoussaye v. Judice,
13 La. Ann. 587 (1857) ; New Orleans & C.R.R. v. Town of Carrollton, 3 La.
Ann. 282 (1848) ; Comment, Acquisitive Prescription of Servitudes, 15 LA. L.
REv. 777 (1955). A claim for damages for the unauthorized establishment by a
railroad company of a servitude of passage is subject to the prescription of ten
years. See Brewer v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 128 La. 544, 54 So. 987 (1911). The
same prescription applies to the claim for compensation of a landowner who per-
mits a railroad company to build and operate a road upon his land. See Mc-
Cutchen v. Texas & P. Ry., 118 La. 436, 43 So. 42 (1907). The landowner's
action for the removal of a railroad track laid without authorization ought to be
regarded as a real action barred by the ten or thirty year acquisitive prescription
of the servitude.
210. See Viering v. N. K. Fairbanks Co., 156 La. 592, 100 So. 729 (1924). It
has been held that the prescription of article 765 applies to a bona fide possessor
and that of article 3504 to a possessor in bad faith. See Kennedy v. Succession
of McCollam, 34 La. Ann. 568 (1882) ; Randazzo v. Lucas, 106 So. 2d 490 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1958).
211. Cf. text at notes 268-278 infra. On real actions in Louisiana, see, in gen-
eral, Hubert, A Louisiana Anomaly -The "Writ" System in Real Actions, 22
1965] REAL ACTIONS IN LOUISIANA
well as by four nominate real actions regulated in the Code of
Civil Procedure: the petitory action, the possessory action, the
action of boundary, and the hypothecary action.
a. The petitory action, an indirect descendant of the Roman
rei-vindicatio, is defined in the Code of Civil Procedure as an
action "brought by a person who claims the ownership, but who
is not in possession, of immovable property or of a real right,
against another who is in possession or who claims the. owner-
ship thereof adversely, to obtain judgement recognizing the
plaintiff's ownership. 21 2 It is essential for the admissibility of
the petitory action that the plaintiff be not in possession of the
disputed property or real right.213 The petitory action may be
brought by a person who claims "the ownership of only an un-
divided interest in the immovable property or real right, or
whose asserted ownership is limited to a certain period which
has not yet expired or which may be terminated by an event
which has not yet occurred. ' ' 214 In order to set aside any doubts,
the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the petitory action
TUL. L. REV. 459 (1948) ; Johnson, Real Actions, 35 TUL. L. REV. 541 (1961) ;
McMahon, Real Actions, Louisiana Legislative Symposium: 1960 Regular Session,
21 LA. L. REV. 1, 46 (1960) ; Riseman, The Possessory Action in Louisiana, 20
TUL. L. REV. 524 (1946) ; Zengel, The Real Actions -A Study in Code Revision,
29 TUL. L. REV. 617 (1955) ; Comment, Real Actions To Determine Ownership or
Possession Under the Proposed Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, 20 LA. L. REV.
92 (1959). And for a comparative study of the concept and function of the real
actions, see LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, CODE OF PRACTICE REVISION,
Expos6 des Motifs No. 19 (1954).
212. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3651 (1960) ; Matthews v. Carter, 138
So. 2d 205 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962). The term "real rights" in the framework of
the Code of Civil Procedure applies exclusively to real rights on immovable prop-
erty. In the framework of the Civil Code, however, the term "real rights" applies
to both movable and immovable property. See Yiannopoulos, Real Rights in Lou-
isiana and Comparative Law -Part I, 23 LA. L. REV. 161, 180 (1963).
213. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3651, Comment (a) (1960).
Upon revision, the role of possession as an arbiter of the form of action used
under the Code of Practice was criticized and the elimination of the "separate,
nominated and labeled real action" was proposed on the ground that "it is pos-
sible to have one real action, and to preserve the present substantive effect of
possession." LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, CODE OF PRACTICE REVISION,
Exposd des Motifs, No. 19, at 5, 9 (1954). See also Hubert, A Louisiana
Anomaly - The "Writ" System in Real Actions, 22 TuL. L. REV. 459, 469
(1948). This proposal for the adoption of a single real action, with possession
merely serving as arbiter of the burden of proof, was rejected after lengthy
debate. For a capsuled explanation, see LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Book VII,
Title II, Introduction (1960). For extensive argument by Professor McMahon
against the proposal, see LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, CODE OF PRACTICE
REVISION, Expos6 des Motifs No. 19, Recommitted Materials, Book VII, Title II,
Meeting of the Council on Oct. 3 and 4, 1958 (mimeographed).
214. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3652 (1960); cf. LA. CIvI CODE
art. 556 (1870).
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may also be brought by a person who holds a mineral servitude,
mineral lease, or mineral royalty.215
This action may be brought against an adverse claimant of
ownership or of a real right who is in possession, against a pos-
sessor who does not assert any adverse claim, and finally,
against an adverse claimant of ownership or of a real right who
is not in possession. 21 The plaintiff may join in the action as a
defendant "a lessee or other person who occupies the immovable
property or enjoys the real right under an agreement" with the
adverse claimant.217 He may want to do so, for example, in the
case of a long term lease in order to have his right of ownership
established against the adverse claimant and his right of pos-
session against the lessee.218 The action cannot be brought
against the lessee alone, since, according to the substantive law,
the lessee does not possess for himself but only for the lessor.2t 9
The plaintiff is likewise permitted to join a mineral lessee as a
party defendant. This joinder is not required but is advisable
as a practical matter. Since the mineral lessee is protected by
the recordation laws, a plaintiff bringing the petitory action
against a mineral lessor should always join the mineral lessee
in order to safeguard his interests.220 Action may be brought
against the mineral lessee without the joinder of the mineral
lessor, because, in contrast to the lessee of a predial lease, the
mineral lessee possesses both for himself and for his lessor.22'
Possession, in addition to being important for the determina-
tion of the admissibility of the petitory action, is determinative
of the burden of proof imposed on the plaintiff. 222 The relevant
possession is "corporeal possession . . ., or civil possession ...
215. See LA. COD OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3664 (1960) ; Scott v. Hunt Oil
Co., 160 So. 2d 433 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
216. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3651, comment (a) (1960).
217. Id. art. 3652(2). After the commencement of the action, the thing can-
not be alienated and a judgment in favor of the plaintiff can be enforced against
any person deriving title from the defendant. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2453
(1870), as amended by La. Acts 1878, No. 3. This article applied to both mov-
ables and immovables. In connection with actions affecting title to immovables,
however, arts. 3751-3753 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure establish the
procedures to be followed in recording the notice of lis pendens as to constitute
notice to third persons.
218. Id. art. 3652, comment (b).
219. Id. art. 3656; art. 3651, comment (b).
220. See Johnson, Real Actions, 35 TUL. L. REV. 541, 545 (1961) ; Hasslocher
v. Recknagel, 160 So. 2d 421 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
221. See LA. CODE OF CIvIL PROCEDURE art. 3664, comment (b) (1960).
222. Id. art. 3653 and comments under this article.
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preceded by corporeal possession. '2 8 If the defendant is in pos-
session of the immovable property or real right, the plaintiff
"must make out his title," that is, he must rely on the strength
of his own title and not on the weakness of the title of the de-
fendant.224 Where neither party is in possession of the disputed
property or real right, the plaintiff in order to recover need only
prove a "better title. '225
Quite properly, the defenses to the petitory action are not
specifically stated in the Code of Civil Procedure. The only de-
fenses which could have been enumerated in the Code were tech-
nical procedural objections. These have been deliberately sup-
pressed in order to permit a decision based on the facts and sub-
stantive law. Certain defenses, however, are indicated indirect-
ly in articles 3651 and 3653; other defenses are available under
the articles of the Code relative to ordinary proceedings and
under the prior jurisprudence which has been deliberately and
advisedly retained, except to the slight extent it is changed ex-
pressly in the new code articles. 226 The action must be brought
in the venue provided for immovable property, although claim
is made accessorily for fruits, revenues, and damages.
227
223. Id. art. 3660; cf. Comment, The Louisiana Mineral Lease as a Contract
Creating Real Rights, 35 TUL. L. REV. 218, 229 (1960). Plaintiff's possession
may be tacked to that of his ancestors in title. See infra text at note 245.
224. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3653 (1960); Schexnayder v.
Duhon, 163 So. 2d 393 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964) ; Burt v. Valois, 144 So. 2d 196
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1962) ; Mestayer v. Cities Service Development Co., 136 So. 2d
513 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) ; Dupuy v. Shannon, 136 So. 2d 111 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1961) ; Young v. Miller, 125 So. 2d 257, 258 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) : "The
title of the defendant is not at issue until plaintiff has proved a valid title in
himself." Where the plaintiff is unable to establish his title to the immovable
property or real right by acquisitive prescription, "as between claimants to real
property acquired from a common source, preference is given him whose title is
more ancient." Burt v. Valois, supra.
225. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3653 (1960) and comment (b)
under this article. Cf. Note, 18 LA. L. REV. 360 (1958). When the issue of
ownership of immovable property is not raised in a petitory action but in an
action for a declaratory judgment, or in a concursus, expropriation, or similar
proceeding, the right to possession is correspondingly determinative of the burden
of proof. Where one of the parties would be entitled to the possession of the
immovable property or real right in a possessory action, this party will be en-
titled to judgment unless the adverse party makes out his title. Where neither
party would be entitled to the possession in a possessory action, judgment will
be obtained by the party who proves better title. The same rules as to the
burden of proof apply to cases involving the issue of the ownership of funds
deposited in the registry of the court and which belong to the owner of the
immovable property or of the real right. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art.
3654 (1960).
226. But see Johnson, Real Actions, 35 TuL. L. REV. 541, 546 (1961).
227. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3652 (1960).
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. It is indicated in the Code of Civil Procedure that a judgment
in favor of the plaintiff in a petitory action shall recognize plain-
tiff's ownership of the immovable property or real right.228 But
there is no provision in the Code corresponding to article 3662,
which specifies in detail the relief that can be granted to the
successful plaintiff in the possessory action. This is quite under-
standable. In the broadened possessory action of the Code of
Civil Procedure was merged the former possessory action and
the action in jactitation; further, the procedure of the jactitory
action was made applicable to the broadened possessory action,
technicalities were eliminated, and the procedure was stream-
lined. These were radical changes, which could be effected only
through a detailing of the relief available to a successful plain-
tiff. In the broadened petitory action, however, a single change
was made, and that not a radical one: the requirement that the
defendant be in possession was changed to a requirement that
the plaintiff be out of possession, so as to permit the use of the
action in cases where neither party is in possession. This slight
change needed no further implementation.
Following determination of the right of ownership, the courts
are frequently faced with the questions of apportionment of eco-
nomic advantages derived from the thing2 29 and of compensation
of the possessor for expenses. In these cases, the rights and
duties of the parties vary with the good or bad faith of the pos-
sessor.
In general, civil and natural fruits2 30 and all products23' of
the thing belong to the owner "although they may have been
228. Id. arts. 3651, 3653.
229. In this matter, no distinction is made between movables and immovables.
The relevant articles of the Louisiana Civil Code apply to all things. Cf. text at
notes 378-79 infra.
230. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 409, 500, 501, 545, 3453 (1870). The word
"fruits" has been declared to mean things produced without depletion of the
substance of the principal thing. See Harang v. Bowie Lumber Co., 145 La. 96,
81 So. 769 (1919); Elder v. Ellerbe, 135 La. 990, 66 So. 337 (1914); cf.
Yiannopoulos, Introduction to the Law of Things: Louisiana and Comparative
Law, 22 LA. L. REV. 756, 785 (1962).
231. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 502 (1870). French courts distinguish between
fruits and products. See Yiannopoulos, supra note 230, at 786. Louisiana courts,
however, have held that the word "products" in article 502 of the Civil Code has
the same meaning as fruits. See Harang v. Bowie Lumber Co., 145 La. 96, 114,
81 So. 769, 775 (1919): "Between the alternatives, therefore, of having to give
the word 'fruits' the broad and comprehensive meaning of all kinds of products
of land, or give the word 'products' the restricted meaning of fruits, properly so
called, we adopt the latter."
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produced by the work and labor of a third person. '232 A bona
fide possessor, however, is entitled "to gather for his benefit the
fruits of the thing, until it is claimed by the owner, without be-
ing bound to account for them, except from the time of the claim
for restitution. '233 Bona fide possessor is one "who possesses
under'a title translative of property and not defective on its
face. ' 23 4 Possessor in bad faith, on the other hand, is one "who
possesses as master, but who assumes this quality, when he well
knows that he has no title to the thing, or that his title is vicious
and defective. 2 35  This possessor must account to the revendi-
cating owner for all fruits.23 6
For the reimbursement of the possessor for expenses, dis-
tinction is made in civil law among necessary, useful, and lux-
urious expenses. 23 7 Thus, French courts and writers, relying on
an uninterrupted civilian tradition and on scattered provisions
in the Civil Code, allow recovery for all necessary expenses and
232. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 501 (1870).
233. Id. art. 3453. See also arts. 501, 502; Roussel v. Railways Realty
Co., 165 La. 536, 115 So. 742 (1928) ; Delouche v. Rosenthal, 143 La. 581, 78
So. 970 (1918) ; Adkins v. Cason, 170 So. 366 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1936). Good
faith ceases upon commencement of the petitory action. The good or bad faith
of the possessor is thus particularly important for the apportionment of fruits
produced prior to revendication. Woodcock v. Baldwin, 110 La. 270, 34 So. 440
(1902). Under the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808 good faith ceased upon judicial
determination rather than commencement of the action. See Donaldson v. Winter,
8 Mart.(N.S.) 175 (La. 1829).
Timber and minerals (as well as bonuses, delay rentals, and royalties derived
from mineral rights) are not fruits. See Harang v. Bowie Lumber Co., 145 La.
96, 81 So. 769 (1919) ; Elder v. Ellerbe, 135 La. 990, 66 So. 337 (1914) ; Steib
v. Joseph Rathborne Land Co., 163 So. 2d 429 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964). Even
a good faith possessor, therefore, must account to the owner for all values
received from timber or mineral operations. See notes 239, 241 infra.
234. New Orleans v. Gaines, 82 U.S. 624 (1872) ; Vance v. Sentell, 178 La.
749, 758, 152 So. 513, 516 (1934). See also LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3451 (1870) :
"The possessor in good faith is he who has just reason to believe himself the
master of the thing which he possesses, although he may not be in fact; as
happens to him who buys a thing which he supposes to belong to the person
selling it to him, but which, in fact, belongs to another." Cf. id. art. 503.
235. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3452 (1870). Cf. id. art. 503.
236. The possessor in bad faith is liable for such fruits as he might have
obtained with ordinary good management. Actual production may not be the
measure of damages in all cases. See Winter v. Zacharie, 6 Rob. 466 (La. 1844).
Cf. Harang v. Gheens Realty Co., 155 La. 68, 98 So. 760 (1924) ; Litton v. Litton,
36 La. Ann. 348 (1884) (fair rental value) ; J. Bodinger Realty Co. v. Tulane
Investment Co., 3 La. App. 261 (Or]. Cir. 1926).
237. See 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 515 (7th ed. Esmein 1961).
See also LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1256 and 1257 (1870) contrasting "expenses which
have improved the estate" with "the necessary expenses . . . incurred for the
preservation of the estate"; arts. 2509 and 2510 contrasting "useful improve-
ments" with "all expenses, even embellishments of luxury"; art. 2314 providing
that: "He to whom property is restored must refund to the person who possessed
it, even in bad faith, all he had necessarily expanded for the preservation of the
property." Cf. id. arts. 2587, 2175.
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for useful expenses to the extent they can be offset by profits,
but exclude reimbursement for luxurious expenses. 233 In Louisi-
ana, article 3453 of the Civil Code, which has no equivalent in
the French Code, provides that the bona fide possessor has the
right "in case of eviction from the thing reclaimed, to retain it
until he is reimbursed the expenses he may have incurred on it."
This article seems to imply that the bona fide possessor is entitled
to recover all his expenses. The courts, however, have consis-
tently applied a restrictive interpretation and have allowed re-
imbursement of bona fide possessors for useful and necessary
expenses only.230 The bona fide possessor may also be entitled
to reimbursement for "improvements" under article 508 of the
Civil Code. This article provides that if "plantations, edifices
or works have been made by" a bona fide possessor, the land-
owner has "his choice either to reimburse the value of the ma-
terials and the price of workmanship, or to reimburse a sum
equal to the enhanced value of the soil. ' '24o
238. See text at note 60 8upra.
239. See Bishop v. Copeland, 222 La. 284, 62 So. 2d 486 (1953) ("It is, of
course, fundamental that a good faith possessor is entitled to reimbursement
for the expense he has incurred in improving the property") ; Orr v. Talley, 84
So. 2d 894 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956); Beaulieu v. Monin, 50 La. Ann. 732, 23
So. 937 (1898) (expenses "for the preservation of the property or which add to
its value") ; Litton v. Litton, 36 La. Ann. 348 (1884) ; Davenport v. Knox, 35
La. Ann. 486 (1883) ; Laizer v. Generes, 10 Rob. 178 (La. 1845) ; Bourguignon
v. Destrehan, 5 La. 115 (1833) ; Donaldson v. Winter, 8 Mart.(N.S.) 175 (La.
1829).
Unauthorized persons engaging in timber or mineral operations, regardless
of their good or bad faith, must account to the owner for all values received. See
note 234 supra. According to the jurisprudence, however, persons engaging in
timber or mineral operations in good faith, are entitled to reimbursement of their
production costs. In effect, therefore, these persons, if in good faith, occupy the
same position with respect to liability for profits and reimbursement of expenses
as ordinary bad faith possessors. As to timber operations, see Bell & Bro. Lumber
Co. v. Simms Lumber Co., 121 La. 627, 46 So. 674 (1908) ; Guarantee Trust &
Safe Deposit Co. v. E. C. Drew Co., 107 La. 251, 31 So. 736 (1902) ; Gardere
v. Blanton, 35 La. 811 (1883); Watterston v. Jetche, 7 Rob. 20 (La. 1844).
As to mineral operations, see Huckabay v. Texas Co., 227 La. 191, 78 So. 2d 829
(1955) ; Allies Oil Co. v. Ayers, 152 La. 19, 92 So. 720 (1922) ; Cook v. Gulf
Refining Co., 135 La. 609, 65 So. 758 (1914) ; Martel v. Jennings-Heywood Oil
Syndicate, 114 La. 351, 38 So. 253 (1905) ; Arkansas Fuel Oil Corp. v. Weber,
149 So. 2d 101 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963). Recovery of expense in these circum-
stances is said to rest on the principle of unjust enrichment. See Scott v. Hunt
Oil Co., 152 So. 2d 599 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
240. See Venta v. Ferrara, 195 La. 334, 196 So. 550 (1940); Lothrop v.
Goudeau, 142 La. 342, 76 So. 794 (1914); Gibson v. Huchins & Vaughan, 12
La. Ann. 545 (1857) ; Greenfield v. Manning, 7 La. 56 (1834) ; Daquin v. Coiron,
8 Mart. (N.S.) 608 (La. 1830) ; Gregory v. Kedley, 185 So. 105 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1938) ; Edmiston v. Tulane Investment Co., 9 La. App. 112, 119 So. 75 (Orl.
Cir. 1928).
A predial lessee does not qualify as a good faith possessor under article 508
"for the sole reason that he is not a possessor at all," Alexius v. Oertling, 13
Orl. App. 216, 218 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1916). Accordingly, he cannot "compel
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A possessor in bad faith is entitled to reimbursement for ex-
penses incurred for the production of fruits, 241 and for necessary
expenses incurred for the preservation of the property.242 With
respect to improvements, article 508 of the Civil Code provides
that a possessor in bad faith who erected "plantations, construc-
tions and works" may claim reimbursement "of their value and
of the price of workmanship, without any regard to the greater
or less value which the soil may have acquired thereby" only if
the owner elects to keep the works.248 According to the same
the owner to reimburse the value of [inseparable] improvements placed upon the
land." Ibid. In effect, a predial lessee erecting improvements, whether in good
or bad faith, occupies the same position as a bad faith possessor. See note 243
infra. He may remove all separable improvements unless the owner elects to keep
them, in which case the lessee may claim their value and retain the property until
he is reimbursed. Hammonds v. Buzbee, 170 La. 573, 128 So. 520 (1930) ; Elrod
v. Hart, 146 So. 797 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933).
241. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 501 (1870). However, persons engaging in
timber or mineral operations in bad faith are not entitled to compensation for
production costs. As to claims for reimbursement of expenses, therefore, the
legal situation of these persons is worse than that of ordinary bad faith possessors
accounting for fruits. See Nabors Oil & Gas Co. v. Louisiana Oil Ref. Co., 151
La. 361, 91 So. 765 (1922) (reversed on other grounds) ; State v. F. B. Williams
Cypress Co., 131 La. 62, 58 So. 1033 (1912) ; Comment, Measure of Damages for
Unauthorized Production of Oil and Gas; the Role of Good and Bad Faith, 15
TUL. L. REv. 291 (1941).
242. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2314 (1870) ; Green v. Moore, 44 La. Ann. 855,
11 So. 223 (1892) ; Heirs of Wood v. Nicholas, 33 La. Ann. 744 (1881) ; Beard v.
Morancy, 2 La. Ann. 347 (1847). See also Voiers v. Atkins Bros., 113 La. 303,
333, 36 So. 974, 985 (1903) : "[A] possessor in bad faith can claim compensation
... for such expenses as have been incurred in the preservation of the property"
but not for useful expenses. The court, however, conceded that "cases may be
found here and there in our Reports where the strong magnet of equity has
swerved the court from the straight line of the rule." Id. at 342, 36 So. at 989.
Indeed, it has been held in Pearce v. Frantum, 16 La. 423 (1840) that under
the regime of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808 a possessor in bad faith was
entitled to reimbursement for both necessary and useful expenses. "In respect to
the right to be reimbursed for useful expenses," the court declared, "the Code
makes little or no distinction between the possessor in good or bad faith." Id. at
430. The case, however, has been expressly overruled in Gibson v. Huchins &
Vaughan, 12 La. Ann. 545, 548 (1857) as "in marked contrast" with "the juris-
prudence of the federal courts and those of our sister States."
243. See Quaker Realty Co. v. Bradbury, 123 La. 20, 24, 48 So. 570, 571
(1909) ("Compensation for improvements cannot be claimed by a possessor in
bad faith until the owner elects to retain them") ; Labrie v. Filiol, 9 Mart.(O.S.)
348 (La. 1821). In interpreting this article Louisiana courts have drawn a dis-
tinction between separable and inseparable improvements. As to the latter, the
rule is that "a possessor in bad faith ...is entitled to nothing for improvements
which cannot be removed." Davidson v. McDonald, 131 La. 1047, 1053, 60 So.
679, 681 (1913) ; Voiers v. Atkins Bros., 113 La. 303, 36 So. 974 (1903) ; Ferrier
v. Mossler, 23 So. 2d 341 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945). As to separate improvements?
it has been held that the "possessor in bad faith .. . is entitled to compensa-
tion ...only in the event that the owner elects to keep them." Davidson v. Mc-
Donald, supra; Heirs of Wood v. Nicholas, 33 La. Ann. 744 (1881). A possessor
in bad faith, however, "may offset the claim for fruits and revenues by a claim
for enhanced value resulting from land clearing and other improvements in-
separable from the soil." Quaker Realty Co. v. Bradbury, 123 La. 20, 25, 48 So.
570, 571 (1909).
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article, the owner may elect to demand the demolition of the
works at the expense of the bad faith possessor and damages for
the prejudice sustained, in which case no compensation is due to
the possessor.244
b. The possessory action, an indirect descendant of the Ro-
man interdicta, has been defined in the Code of Civil Procedure
as an action "brought by the possessor of immovable property
or of a real right to be maintained in his possession of the prop-
erty or enjoyment of the right when he has been disturbed, or
to be restored to the possession or enjoyment thereof when he
has been evicted. ' 245 According to the definition, the possessory
244. See Brown v. Tauzin, 185 La. 86, 101, 168 So. 502, 507 (1936) (The
landowner was "entitled to decline the improvements and therefore not required
to pay for them") ; Larido v. Perkins, 10 Orl. App. 19 (La. 1912). Application
of article 508 is limited to "possessors." See Falgoust v. Inness, 163 So. 429
(La. App. OrI. Cir. 1935) (a person placing on the premises a garage with the
permission of the owner is not a possessor).
245. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3656 (1961) ; of. LA. CIVIL CODE
arts. 3454 (2), 3455 (1870). The possessory action of the new Code of Civil
Procedure is a combination of the former action of the same name and of the
former jactitory action, "with some of the latter's procedural rules made ap-
plicable to the new possessory action." LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Book VII,
Title II, Introduction (1960). Under the prior law, the possessory action was
available to "a person entitled to possession against a person who physically dis-
turbed that possession, to have the plaintiff maintained or restored to possession."
The jactitory action was available to "a person in possession against a person
whose pretensions of ownership legally disturbed plaintiff's possession, to force
the defendant to assert his pretensions in a petitory action." Ibid.
The former possessory action was largely fashioned after the model of the
French Code of Civil Procedure of 1806. Articles 23-27 of that Code afford a
sufficiently broad remedy to cover both disturbances in fact and disturbances in
law. See text at notes 101-102 supra. In Louisiana, however, the definition of
disturbance in law in article 52 of the Code of Practice, which had no equivalent
in the French Code, proved too narrow and too confusing to permit utilization
of French solutions in cases involving this type of disturbance. Under the circum-
stances, it was quite natural for early Louisiana courts to look for solutions in
Spanish procedural law and to fashion a remedy based on the Spanish jactitory
action. Cf. LAS SIETE PARTIDAS 3.2.46; Livingston v. Jeerman, 9 Mart.(O.S.)
656 (La. 1821) ; CRoss, PLEADING IN COURTS OF ORDINARY JURISDICTION 215-19
(1885). The action was retained even after the Great Repealing Act of 1828 and
the adoption of the Codes of Practice of 1825 and 1870. The need for its retention
is explained in Comment (b) under article 3659 of the new Code of Civil Pro-
cedure.
Under Spanish law, the action lay to prevent defamation of person or prop-
erty, whether movable or immovable. In Louisiana, the action was confined to
the protection of the possession of immovable property in case of a disturbance
in law. The object of the action was to force the defendant to desist from the
slander or set forth his title in the answer or in another suit. See Young v. Town
of Morgan City, 129 La. 339, 56 So. 303 (1911). Slander was any conceivable
claim prejudicial to the plaintiff's rights in immovable property. Thus physical
acts, declarations made orally or in writing, statements in a previous lawsuit,
and even assertions made to a third person have given rise to this action. See
Comment, 20 LA. L. REV. 92, 100-02 (1959) ; Comment, 12 TUL. L. REV. 254
(1938). The broadening of the definition of the possessory action in article 3659,
of the Code of Civil Procedure makes it possible for the new possessory action
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action may be brought only by a "possessor," i.e., one who "pos-
sesses for himself." 24 6
The Code indicates that "a person entitled to the use or usu-
fruct of immovable property, and one who owns a real right
therein, possesses for himself"; and, accordingly, this person
may be plaintiff in a possessory action. 247 In order to set aside
doubts as to the nature of the rights of a "mineral lessee or sub-
lessee, owner of a mineral interest in immovable property, owner
of a mineral royalty, or any right under an obligation resulting
from a contract to reduce oil, gas, and other minerals to pos-
session" of the Code declares in article 3664 that these are real
rights. Accordingly, these rights "may be asserted, protected,
and defended in the same manner as the ownership or possession
of immovable property, and without the concurrence, joinder,
or consent of the owner of the land. ' 248 A person possessing
through his lessee, through another person under agreement with
him or his lessee, or through a person who has the use or usu-
fruct of the immovable property, is clearly a possessor entitled
to bring the possessory action. 249 A predial lessee, however, in
contrast to a mineral lessee, "possesses for and in the name of
his lessor, and not for himself.' ' 250 It follows, therefore, that a
predial lessee is not entitled to bring the possessory action.
The possessory action may be brought against a person who
has caused a disturbance of possession. 25 1 The disturbance may
"to perform also the functions of the former jactitory action." See LA. CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3659, Comment (b) (1960).
246. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3656 (1960). It has been suggested
that the possessory action only rarely protects "mere possession where no issue
of ownership is ultimately involved" and that the action is ordinarily "a skirmish
ground in cases in which ultimate ownership is involved." Hubert, A Louisiana
Anomaly -The "Writ" System in Real Actions, 22 TUL. L. REV. 459, 469 (1948).
247. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3656 (1960). Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE
-art. 556 (1870).
248. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3664 (1960). See also comments
under article 3656; Comment, The Louisiana Mineral Lease as a Contract Creat-
ing Real Rights, 35 TuL. L. REV. 218 (1960).
249. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3660 (1960).
250. Id. art. 3656. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3441 (1870).
251. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3656 (1960). The possessory
action may be combined with a demand for damages. See Roge v. Kuhlman, 136
:So. 2d 819 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) ; Gillian v. ,Tones, 157 So. 2d 598 (La. App.
:2d Cir. 1963). Plaintiff may recover "for the mental anguish and humiliation
.used by being wrongfully dispossessed of his property" but he may not recover
attorney fees. Roge v. Kuhlman, supra.
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be one in fact 25 2 or in law. 258 The action must be brought in the
parish of the situs of the immovable property, even if claim is
made accessorily for damages or for the fruits or revenues of
the property. Improper venue, however, is waived unless excep-
tion is timely taken.
The plaintiff in the possessory action must allege and prove
that he had possession of the immovable property or real right
at the time of the disturbance; that he and his ancestor had a
quiet and uninterrupted possession for more than one year im-
mediately preceding the disturbance, unless evicted by force or
fraud; that the disturbance was one in fact or in law; and that
the suit was instituted within one year of the disturbance.254
The possession protected by the possessory action is "a cor-
poreal possession" or "civil possession ... preceded by corporeal
possession. '25 5 Good or bad faith is, in that regard, immate-
rial.2516
The possessory action prescribes in one year from the time
of the disturbance. 257 Where the disturbance is one in fact, the
prescription starts to run from the commencement rather than
the completion of the disturbance.258 In cases involving disturb-
252. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3659 (1960) : "A disturbance in
fact is an eviction, or any other physical act which prevents the possessor of
immovable property or of a real right from enjoying his possession quietly, or
which throws any obstacle in the way of that enjoyment."
253. Id. art. 3659: "A disturbance in law is the execution, recordation, reg-
istry, or continuing existence of record of any instrument which asserts or im-
plies a right of ownership or to the possession or immovable property or of a
real right, or any claim or pretension of ownership or right to the possession
thereof except in an action or proceeding, adversely to the possessor of such prop-
erty or right." Cf. Voisin v. Luke, 142 So. 2d 815 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
254. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3658 (1960) ; of. Mount Pleasant
Primitive Baptist Church v. Zion Hill Missionary Baptist Church, 126 So. 2d 852
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
255. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3660 (1960). Article 3658 "makes
no change in the law" and article 3660 is "declaratory of the established juris-
prudence." Cf. Missouri Pacific Co. v. Littleton, 125 So. 2d 37 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1961); Mount Pleasant Primitive Baptist Church v. Zion Hill Missionary
Baptist Church, 126 So. 2d 852 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
256. The possessory action may be brought by a possessor of bad faith, or
even by a usurper. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3660 (1960); cf.
Smith v. Grant Timber & Mfg. Co., 130 La. 471, 474, 58 So. 153, 154 (1912).
257. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3658 (1960) ; cf. LA. CIVIL CODE
art. 3456 (1870).
258. See Vermilion Parish School Board v. Muller, 92 So. 2d 77 (La. App.
1957) (possessory action instituted more than a year after the commencement
of the disturbance by the erection of a fence, held, was barred by the one year
prescription although the action was brought within one year from the completion
of the fence).
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ance in law it has been held that the action does not prescribe so
long as the slanders remain of record.259
The possession of the plaintiff in the possessory action may
be tacked to that of his ancestors in title.26 According to the
jurisprudence the two possessions may be tacked only if there is
a "privity of contract" between the present possessor and his
ancestors in title.261 Privity of contract has been interpreted to
include universal succession. 262
As in the case of the petitory action, the Code does not indi-
cate directly the defenses available to the defendant in a posses-
sory action. The defenses available in ordinary proceedings and
those available under the jurisprudence which has not been
superseded ought to be considered as still applicable.268 The ex-
ception of "want of possession" 26 has been abolished as "un-
necessary and unworkable. ' 265 Under the Code, therefore, the
issue of the possession of the plaintiff will be considered by the
court in the trial on the merits and not in a preliminary hear-
ing. The defendant may reconvene and pray for any relief
which is available to the plaintiff.26
The right of ownership is not at issue in the possessory ac-
tion. Evidence of ownership is relevant and admissibleonly to
show that a party possesses as owner, the extent of possession,
and the length of time the immovable or right has been pos-
sessed.26 T Whenever the defendant raises or interjects the issue
of ownership through his answer the possessory action is con-
verted into a petitory action.268 The consent of the plaintiff is
259. See Dixon v. American Liberty Oil Co., 226 La. 911, 77 So. 2d 533
(1955).
260. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3658 (1960). Tacking is imple-
mented by article 3661(3) which indicates that the ownership or title of the
parties can be offered in evidence in order to show the length of time that a
party and his ancestors in title have had possession of the property or right.
See article 3661, comment (d).
261. See Johnson, Real Actions, 35 TUL. L. REV. 541, 552 (1961). Cf. Stan-
ford v. Robertson, 144 So.2d 747 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
262. See Noel v. Jumonville Pipe & Machinery Co., 245 La. 324, 158 So. 2d
179 (1963).
263. See Johnson, Real Actions, 35 TUL. L. REV. 541, 553 n. 84 (1961).
264. See LA. R.S. 13:5063-5064 (1950).
265. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3657 comment (g) (1960).
266. Id. art. 3662, comments (a) and (c) ; cf. McDaniels v. Miller, 136 So. 2d
763 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962) (reconventional demand for fixing of boundary).
267. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3661 (1960) cf. LA. CIVIL CODE
art. 3455 (1870).
268. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDUEE art. 3657 (1960); Roy v. Elmer, 153
So. 2d 209 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963) ; Stamper v. Bienville Parish Police Jury,
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not required for this conversion. Conversion may be effected
also by separate action, by a reconventional demand, or a sup-
plemental answer filed after the judgment ordering the defend-
ant to bring a petitory action.26 9
The plaintiff in the possessory action has the burden of proof
as to all requisite allegations. 270 Where the defendant converts
the possessory action into a petitory action he is considered as
having judicially confessed plaintiff's possession; accordingly,
the burden of proof of ownership is on the defendant.271
Article 3662 of the Code of Civil Procedure contains a de-
tailed description of the contents of a judgment rendered in fa-
vor of the plaintiff. This judgment should, in the first place,
recognize plaintiff's right to the possession of the immovable
property or real right and should restore him to possession, if
evicted, or maintain him in possession, if the disturbance has
not been an eviction. If the plaintiff has especially prayed for
such relief, the court shall order the defendant to commence a
petitory action within a delay of sixty days after the judgment
becomes executory; and if the defendant should fail to do so, he
should be precluded from asserting in the future his ownership
of the property or right.2 72
The possessory action and the petitory action cannot be cu-
mulated or pleaded alternatively. If the plaintiff does so, he is
considered to have waived the possessory action in favor of the
petitory action. If the plaintiff brings the possessory action and
then brings a petitory action before judgment in the possessory
action, the possessory action is abated.273 If the defendant in a
153 So. 2d 503 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963) ; Phillips v. West, 144 So. 2d 173 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1962).
269. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3657 (1960) and comment (e)
under this article.
270. Id. art. 3658.
271. Id. art. 3653, 3657. See also Roy v. Elmer, 153 So. 2d 209 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1963) ; Phillips v. West, 144 So. 2d 173 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
272. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3662, comment (b) (1960)
Voisin v. Luke, 142 So. 2d 815 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962). This period fixed by
the court within which the defendant must file the petitory action is a period of
peremption rather than one of prescription. Cf. Canada v. Frost Lumber Indus.,
9 So. 2d 338 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942). A suspensive appeal from the judgment
rendered in a possessory action must be taken within fifteen days and a devolu-
tive appeal within thirty days of the applicable date. See LA. CODE OF CIvIL
PROCEDURE art. 3662 (1960).
273. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3657 (1960); cf. Coleman's Heirs
v. Holmes' Heirs, 147 So. 2d 752 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962). The possessory action
does not abate when a petitory action concerning the same property is brought in
another. state. See Gillian v. Jones, 157 So. 2d 598 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
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possessory action brings a separate petitory action against the
plaintiff in the possessory action prior to executory judgment in
that action, the defendant is considered as having judicially con-
fessed plaintiff's possession.274 The purpose of these provisions
is to keep the trial of the issues of possession and ownership. as
separate as possible and to encourage the determination of the
issue of possession before the bringing of the petitory action.2 75
In contrast to prior jurisprudence, under the Code the plaintiff
may have the suit dismissed without prejudice in the case of an
improper cumulation of actions rather than be considered as
having confessed judicially the possession of the defendant. He
may therefore renew his possessory action in a second suit.276
Two of the changes brought about by the Code in this area
are definite contributions to the science of civil procedure and
deserve additional comment. Under French procedure, if the
lawful owner of immovables is sued in a possessory action
brought by the actual possessor, the owner may not assert his
title as a defense, or even institute a separate petitory action.
He must await the termination of the possessory action, satisfy
whatever judgment may have been rendered against him in that
proceeding, and then institute the petitory action to seek recov-
ery of the damages he has sustained as owner, including the very
damages he paid to the successful plaintiff in the possessory
action. This was the law of Louisiana under articles 55 and 56
of the Code of Practice, at least until 1920. In that year, article
55 was amended in an abortive effort to solve the problem, but
this amendment was productive of nothing more than confusion
and distortion of the underlying procedural theory. Upon re-
vision, the old procedural rules did not withstand the reporter's
critical evaluation; and the Law Institute adopted the proposed
changes. Under the new Code, if the possessory action is brought
against the non-possessing lawful owner on the ground that he
274. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3657 (1960), comment (a).
275. Id. art. 3657, comment (a). Cf. LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, CODE
OF PRACTICE REVIsION, Expos6 des Motifs No. 19, p. 4 (1954) : "The issue of
possession must be kept separate from the issue of title or property because:
(1). It is necessary to discourage self help, which leads to breaches of the peace;
(2). The settling of the issue of possession frequently facilitates proof of owner-
ship; (3). The matter of possession should not be subject to the delays ordinarily
inherent in the issue of ownership." LA. R.S. 13:5061 (1950) which provided
for the automatic cumulation of the possessory and petitory actions when the
state or any of its subdivisions was sued in a possessory action has been repealed
by La. Acts 1960, No. 32.
276. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3657, comment (c) (1960).
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has committed a disturbance of possession, the lawful owner
may immediately convert the proceeding into a petitory action.
If his title is recognized judicially, this is a complete bar to the
assessment of any damages against him, because of the dis-
turbance of the possession of the original plaintiff (Code of Civil
Procedure article 3657). Of course, when he converts the pro-
ceeding into the petitory action, he confesses judicially the pos-
session of the plaintiff in the possessory action.
The second contribution concerns the scope of the possessory
action. Under French procedure, an adverse claim to a regis-
tered immovable constitutes a disturbance in law and the pos-
sessor may immediately institute the possessory action to have
his right to the possession recognized, and recover whatever
damages he may have suffered. However, the validity of the
adverse claim is not, and cannot be, adjudicated in the posses-
sory action; and there is no way under French law for the pos-
sessor to obtain an adjudication of the invalidity of the adverse
claim, unless and until the adverse claimant brings the petitory
action. If there is any merit to the adverse claim, this may keep
the property out of commerce until prescription runs against
the adverse claim. Under the Spanish jactitory action, on the
other hand, the plaintiff could not only have his right to posses-
sion judicially recognized, but he could obtain a judgment order-
ing the defendant to assert his pretensions of ownership within
a limited time or be forever precluded from doing so. Under the
broadened possessory action of the Code of Civil Procedure, this
feature of the former jactitory action has been advisedly re-
tained (article 3662 (2)).
c. A third nominate real action under the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure is the action of boundary. Following the language of ar-
ticle 823 of the Civil Code, article 3691 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure provides that "if two contiguous lands have never been
separated, or have never had their boundaries determined, or if
the bounds which have been formerly fixed are no longer to be
seen, or were wrongly placed, the owner of one of the contiguous
lands may bring an action against the other to compel the fixing
of the boundary." This article has been placed in the Code "to
overrule legislatively the cases holding that questions of title and
ownership cannot be determined in an action of boundary. 27T
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The boundary action is subject to the rules governing ordinary
proceedings.27 8
d. The fourth and last nominate real action regulated in the
Code of Civil Procedure is the hypothecary action, i.e., the action
for the enforcement of a mortgage. The Code provides that a
conventional mortgage may be enforced by ordinary or executory
proceedings 27 9 and that all mortgages, legal, judicial, or conven-
tional, may be enforced without reference to any alienation or
transfer from the original debtor. 280 On the basis of this statu-
tory pact de non alienando the mortgage creditor can seize and
sell the property in the hands of a third person, as if it were
still in the hands of the original debtor.28 ' In this case, the
mortgage creditor must have notice of the seizure served upon
the original debtor and the present owner of the property sub-
ject to mortgage. 8 2 The third possessor may arrest the seizure
or threatened seizure and judicial sale of the property by injunc-
tion and intervention, on the ground of enumerated defenses. 28 8
In addition to the remedies available to the owner of immov-
able property or holder of an immovable real right under the
nominate real actions of the Code of Civil Procedure, relief is
also available under numerous innominate actions based on the
Civil Code, the Code of Civil Procedure, or the jurisprudence of
the courts. Thus, protection of immovable real rights is involved
in actions founded on the Civil Code articles dealing with of-
fenses and quasi-offenses, new works,28 4 and servitudes imposed
by law.2s 5 Under the Code of Civil Procedure the owner of im-
movable property and the holder of immovable real rights have
at their disposal the remedies of sequestration, 28 6 declaratory
277. Id. art. 3693, comment. Cf. LOUISIANA LAW INSTITUTE, CODE OF PRAC-
TicE REVISION, Exaposd des Motifs No. 19, p. 14 (1954).
278. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3693 (1960).
279. Id. art. 3821.
280. Id. art. 3741.
281. Id. art. 3741, comment (a).
282. Id. art. 3742.
283. Id. art. 3743.
284. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 856-869 (1870). For the protection of real
rights by means of delictual action for damages, see note 292 infra.
285. Id. arts. 664-674.
286. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDuRE art. 3663 (1960).
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judgment,287 and injunction s. 2 8  Injunction is available either as
an ancillary remedy during the pendency of a possessory action
or as an appropriate remedy under an injunction suit brought
to enjoin trespassers from interfering with the immovable or
real rights. 289 Finally, ownership and real rights on immovables
may be adjudicated in a number of non-statutory "fringe" 290 or
"quasi-real"' 291 actions, such as the action of trespass,29 2 the
action to remove a cloud from title,293 and the action of specific
performance ." 4
287. See Lincoln Parish School Board v. Ruston College, 162 So. 2d 419 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1964). Actions for declaratory judgments are similar in nature with
petitory actions. Cf. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3654, comments (b),
(c), (d); art. 1871 (1960) ; Note, Declaratory Judgments Act - Use in Real
Actions, 31 TUL. L. REV. 197 (1956). See also LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE,
CODE OF PRACTICE REVISION, Expos6 des Motifs No. 19, p. 19 (1954) : "In a sense
all real actions . . . are merely declaratory of rights." Adjudication of the owner-
ship of immovable property may also take place in summary proceedings to show
cause. See Successsion of Seals, 243 La. 1056, 150 So. 2d 13 (1963).
288. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3663 (1960) and comment (b)
under the same article; Winningham v. Hill, 164 So. 2d 384 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1964).
280. In many instances real rights can be completely protected by injunctive
relief alone. See LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, CODE OF PRACTICE, Exposd
des Motifs No. 19, p. 18 (1954). Under the regime of the Code of Practice a
plaintiff could proceed under the injunctive articles and ignore the real actions.
See Riseman, The Possessory Action in Louisiana, 20 TUL. L. REV. 424, 525 n.7
(1946). For similar solutions under the Code of Civil Procedure, see Matassa
v. Finazzi, 159 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964) ; Williams v. Beverly, 160
So. 2d 291 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964) ; Mitchel v. James, 144 So. 2d 435 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1962).
290. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE title II, Introduction: "No attempt
has been made to include in this Title certain of the fringe actions which bear
some resemblance to the real actions, such as the action of trespass, the action
to remove title, and the action of specific performance."
291. See Johnson, Real Actions, 33 TUL. L. REV. 541, 543 (1961).
292. Under the regime of the Code of Practice, Louisiana courts have handled
the actions for damages as an independent category of actions, distinguished from
the nominate real actions. See Bossier's Heirs v. Jackson, 114 La. 707, 38 So.
525 (1905) ; Feshee v. Kirby Lumber Co., 212 La. 44, 31 So. 2d 419 (1947);
Bagents v. Cromwell Long Leaf Lumber Co., 20 So. 2d 641 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1945) (all cases involving demands for damages for the cutting down of timber).
See also the following cases decided under the Code of Civil Procedure: Stoufflet
v. United Gas'Pipe Line Co., 162 So. 2d 828 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964) (damages
to land resulting from the operation of an authorized servitude) ; East v. Pan-
American Petroleum Corp., 168 So. 2d 426 (La. 1964) and Juncker v. T. L. James
& Co., 148 So. 2d 795 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) (damages for unlawful removal of
dirt) ; Fontenot v. Central Louisiana Elec. Co., 147 So. 2d 773 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1962) (claim for damages for cutting branches of trees).
293. See JOHNSON, GUIDE TO LOUISIANA REAL ACTIONS 67-87 (1961). Sev-
eral Louisiana decisions have recognized an action to remove a cloud from title.
This action differs from the petitory action in that the plaintiff need not allege
title in himself. The only relief granted under this procedure has been the can-
cellation of a recorded instrument from the public records. See Exchange Nat'l
Bank v. Head, 155 La. 909, 99 So. 272 (1924) ; Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Kendall,
161 La. 337, 108 So. 664 (1926) ; Parish of Jefferson v. Texas Co., 192 La. 934,
189 So. 580 (1939). It might be expected that under the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure this nonstatutory action would fall into oblivion. The Louisiana Supreme
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2. Protection of Movable Real Rights
Movable real rights, 295 i.e., the ownership of corporeal mov-
ables and rights to possession and enjoyment thereof, are tra-
ditionally protected in civil law by rules of the law of property
and rules of the law of obligations. The law of property accords
to the owner or person entitled to the possession and enjoyment
of corporeal movables a revendicatory action for the recovery of
movables in kind in the hands of any unauthorized possessor.
This action, based on title, is termed "real" action because it is
available for the protection and enforcement of a real right.2
6
The law of obligations likewise affords actions for the recovery
of movables in kind, and, in addition, actions for damages, and
actions for restitution in accordance with the principle of unjust
enrichment. Actions for the recovery of movables in kind may
be based on any obligation, contractual, delictual, quasi-contrac-
tual, or quasi-delictual. Actions for damages may be based on
delictual and quasi-delictual obligations (i.e., offenses and quasi-
Court, however, granted a new lease on life to this action in Walmsley v. Pan-
American Petroleum Corp., 244 La. 513, 153 So. 2d 375 (1963). The case in-
volved an action against the State Mineral Board for the cancellation of a min-
eral lease and the issue was whether plaintiff's petition stated a petitory action,
in which case the state should be an indispensable party, or merely the non-
statutory action to remove a cloud from title, in which case the joinder of the
state could be dispensed with since plaintiff did not allege title in himself. The
court decided that the petition stated an action to remove a cloud from title, two
justices dissenting. For a critique, see Hardy, Mineral Rights, 24 LA. L. REV.
315, 229-236 (1964).
294. In a number of cases, actions to compel the conveyance of immovables
have been classified as real actions. See Mussina v. Alling, 11 La. Ann. 568
(1856) ; Peterson v. Moresi, 191 La. 931, 186 So. 737 (1939) ; State ex rel.
Hyam's Heirs v. Grace, 197 La. 427, 1 So. 2d 683 (1941). However, this classi-
fication was not made for procedural purposes but in order to determine the
applicable prescription. See text at note 197 supra. Immovable real rights are
also affected by adjudications in actions to annul sales of immovables. Louisiana
courts have held, however, that these actions are not real actions. See Reid v.
Federal Land Bank, 193 La. 1017, 192 So. 688 (1939) ; Winsor v. Tyler, 167
La. 169, 118 So. 876 (1925). It has been observed that "since the judgment
affects title and ownership of real estate, it is difficult to follow the distinction."
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, CODE OF PRACTICE REVISION, Expos6 des
Motifs No. 19, p. 12 (1954).
295. Contemporary Louisiana lawyers may, perhaps, consider the category of
"movable real rights" as an abstraction of questionable validity. Indeed, legal
usage in the state tends to associate the term "real rights" with rights in im-
movable property exclusively. This, however, was not the usage at the time the
first Louisiana Civil Code was enacted; "real rights" could exist in both movables
and immovables. And under the Civil Code of 1870 the right of pledge, as well
as the ownership, use, and usufruct of movables have all the substantive char-
acteristics of real rights. See Yiannopoulos, Real Rights in Louisiana and Com-
parative Law: Part 1, 23 LA. L. REV. 161, 180 (1963).
. 296. See text at notes 33, 39, 61 supra; 1 PLANIOL, RIPERT ET BOULANGER,
TBAITt tL]MENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL 1108-14 (1948) ; 9 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITt DE
LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 342, 348, 358 (1874-82).
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offenses). Actions for restitution are based on the unjust en-
richment of the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff (i.e.,
on a quasi-contractual obligation). All actions based on obliga-
tions are termed "personal" actions because they correspond to
personal rights.297 A detailed examination of the relevant pro-
visions of the Louisiana Civil Code and of the solutions reached
by Louisiana courts in the interpretation and application of
these provisions is appropriate here.
a. Louisiana Civil Code
The Louisiana Civil Code contains a number of provisions
dealing with or presupposing the revendication of movables,
i.e., the right of the owner to recover corporeal movables in kind
by merely asserting title. Articles 3507 and 3508, for example,
contemplate the "reclamation" (revendication) of movables
stolen or lost. According to article 3507, if the possessor of a
thing lost or stolen "bought it at public auction or from a person
in the habit of selling such things," the owner can recover it only
by returning to the possessor the price he paid.298 Article 3508
excludes the revendication of "stray animals which have been
sold in conformity with the regulations of police, or other mov-
able objects lost or abandoned which are sold by authority of
law." These articles give rise to an argument a contrario that
in all other cases revendication is permissible, without any obli-
gation to reimburse the bona fide purchaser. 299 The owner's
right to revendicate corporeal movables is also clearly contem-
plated in articles 3453 and 3454 of the Civil Code which, tech-
nically, deal with the rights and duties of the possessors of
things revendicated.3°°
Revendication is also authorized by the Code in article 2138
which provides that "if the debtor give a thing in payment of his
obligation, which he has no right to deliver.., the owner of the
297. See text at note 118 supra.
298. Louisiana courts have held that article 3507 applies only if the require-
ments of the preceding article 3506 are fulfilled, i.e., where "a person has pos-
sessed ... a movable thing, during three successive years without interruption."
Security Sales Co. v. Blackwell, 167 La. 667, 673, 120 So. 45, 46: (1928). See
also Davis v. Hampton, 4 Mart.(N.S.) 288 (La. 1826).
299. The fact that the Louisiana Civil Code has no article corresponding to
article 2279 of the French Code leads to the same conclusion. See Franklin,
Security of Acquisition and Transaction: La Possession Vaut Titre and Bona.Fide
Purchase, 6 TUL. L. REV. 589, 601 (1932).
300. See also LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 501, 502 (1870).
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thing may reclaim it in the hands of the creditor" unless the ob-
ject paid is money or a consumable thing which no longer exists.
Finally, it ought to be mentioned that article 60 of the Code of
Practice made an allusion to the "revendication" of movables3 01
The new Code of Civil Procedure does not have a corresponding
reference, and, therefore, the action for the revendication of
movables under this code must be regarded as an innominate
action. The issue of the ownership of movables is ordinarily de-
termined under the Code of Civil Procedure in proceedings fol-
lowing the issue of a writ of sequestration.3 0 2 This broad remedy
has proved to be an effective means for the protection of the
right of ownership and possession of movables. Recovery in
these proceedings may be predicated on any contractual or own-
ership right.
Apart from the owner, any person entitled to the possession
of movables, for example, a usufructuary, a depositary, or a
pledgee, may bring an action for the recovery of possession. The
Louisiana Civil Code provides expressly in article 556 that the
"usufructuary can maintain all actions against the owner and
third persons, which may be necessary to insure him the pos-
session, enjoyment and preservation of his right." The right of
action of the depositary for the recovery of movables found in
the hands of third persons is implied in the Code.303 With re-
spect to the rights of the pledgee, articles 3157 and 3158, in com-
bination with article 3173, are sufficiently broad to cover the
situation. 0 4
301. See LA. CODE OF PRACTiCE art. 60 (1870) : "Possessory actions cannot
be maintained for personal property, the action in revendication for that species
of property having nothing in common with the extraordinary privileges secured
to the owners of real estate, or of real rights, when they are disturbed in their
enjoyment."
302. See LA. CODE OF CML PROCEDURE art. 3571 (1960) : "When one claims
the ownership or right to possession of property . . . he may have the property
seized under a writ of sequestration, if it is within the power of the defendant
to conceal, dispose of, or waste the property or the revenues therefrom, or remove
the property from the parish, during the pendency of the action." According to
comment (a) under Article 3501 "the petition for a writ . . . of sequestration
must contain allegations to support the principal cause of action as well as the
provisional remedy." For corresponding developments in France, see note 61
supra.
303. See LA. CrvIL CODE arts. 2926-2971 (1870); of. Douglas v. Haro, 214
La. 1099, 1102, 39 So. 2d 744, 745 (1949) ("a depositary has a sufficient interest
to maintain an action for the possession of a deposit wrongfully taken from him").
See also Lannes v. Courege, 31 La. Ann. 74 (1879) (recovery of notes by
depositary in the hands of third persons); Newman v. Wilson, 1 La. Ann. 48
(1846) (recovery of movables by a sheriff of another state).304. Cf. LA. CMvL CoDE art. 3397(3) (1870) : "[I]f the mortgaged thing goes
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Quite apart from the revendicatory action, movables may be
recovered in kind under the Louisiana Civil Code by personal
actions accorded by the law of obligations. Thus, the right of
recovery may be based on conventional obligations deriving from
such contracts as sale (article 2462), lease (article 2727), loan
for use (article 2906), deposit (articles 2944, 2961), pledge (ar-
ticle 3164), or, in general, obligations to do or not to do (articles
1926, 1927). Under these conventional obligations the owner of
the thing may claim it in kind, and if the thing cannot be re-
turned, he may claim damages for the violation of the contract.
The right of the recovery of the thing in kind may also be based
on delictual and quasi-delictual obligations, i.e., the wrongful
dispossession of the owner (article 3507), and on the quasi-con-
tractual obligation of the payment of a thing not due (article
2312). Article 2312 provides specifically that "if the thing un-
duly received is a . ..corporeal movable, he who has received
it is bound to restore it in kind, if it remain."
Where the owner does not desire recovery of movables in
kind, or where recovery in kind is impossible, the Louisiana Civil
Code accords rights of action for damages and for restitution.
Actions for damages are authorized in the case of unlawful in-
terference with the ownership or right to the possession of mov-
ables by the broad language of article 2315. These actions are
predicated on delictual obligations incurred by the wrongdoer
through his fault. Actions for restitution are predicated on
quasi-contractual obligations deriving from the unjust enrich-
ment of the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff. The Lou-
isiana Civil Code, while recognizing the principle of unjust en-
richment,3 0 5 has not institutionalized the rules governing restitu-
tion. Following the model of the French Civil Code, the Louisi-
ana Code merely regulates one instance of unjust enrichment,
the payment of a thing not due. Article 2301 states that one re-
ceiving something not due incurs an obligation to return it, and
article 2302 makes the right of recovery conditional on "pay-
ment" through "mistake."
Theories of recovery, as outlined, ought to be kept distinct
not only for the achievement of clarity of thought but also for
out of the debtor's hands, the creditor may follow it in whatever hands it may
have passed."
305. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1965 (1870) : "[N]o one ought to enrich himself
at the expense of another."
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the solution of a number of practical problems. The conditions
for the availability of a particular remedy differ, and, depend-
ing on the circumstances of each case, there may be or may not
be a concurrence of remedies. The owner who is in a contrac-
tual relationship with the defendant may be entitled to the re-
covery of a movable on the basis of either the revendicatory
action or the action deriving from the contract. In certain cases,
for example, where the defendant has become bankrupt, the
owner may have a special interest to bring the revendicatory
action. 3 6 Again, an owner who has delivered a movable by mis-
take may reclaim it by an action in revendication or by one in
quasi-contract. But since recovery on the ground of quasi-con-
tract may be limited to the amount of defendant's enrichment,
the owner may have a particular interest to bring the revendica-
tory action. Where a movable has been lost or stolen, the owner
may bring against the thief the revendicatory action or the ac-
tion in delict for damages, depending on whether his object is
recovery of the movable in kind or damages for the unlawful
interference with his property. Persons other than the owner
entitled to the possession and enjoyment of movables may bring
the appropriate actions for the protection and enforcement of
their own rights.
b. Louisiana Jurisprudence
Louisiana courts have not always distinguished clearly
among the various theories of recovery, nor have they succeeded
in developing an entirely consistent pattern for the protection
of movable real rights. This may be partly due to the lack of
systematic elaboration on the provisions of the Civil Code by
Louisiana writers and partly due to the gradual adoption of
common law remedies. Borrowings from that system of law in
this area may well amount to something more substantial than
interstitial seepage. As a result, the law "is presently in a state
of confusion," which should be expected, because the common
law remedies "are based on an entirely different conceptual
framework of property protection. 3 0 7
306. Cf. Plaquemines Equip. & Machine Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 245 La. 201,
157 So. 2d 884 (1963) ; Mortec v. Roach's Syndic, 8 La. 81 (1835) ; Hall v. Mul-
hollan, 7 La. 383 (1834). The advantage is obvious: by the revendicatory action
the plaintiff will be entitled to the recovery of his very movable while by an
action in tort, in contract, or restitution, he will have to share as creditor with
other creditors.
307. Note, 37 TUL. L. REv. 843 (1963).
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A survey of the Louisiana jurisprudence discloses that the
ownership of movables and rights to the possession and enjoy-
ment thereof are protected in practice by actions for the recov-
ery of the movables in kind,308 actions for restitution of their
value, 09 and actions for damages.,10
308. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Gulf States Finance Corp., 226 La. 1008, 78 So. 2d
(1955) (automobile); Donnell v. Gray, 215 La. 497, 41 So. 2d 66 (1949) (oil
well equipment) ; Kramer v. Freeman, 198 La. 244, 3 So. 2d 609 (1941) (jew-
elry) ; Jennings & Heywood Oil Syndicate v. Houssiere-Latreille Oil Co., 127 La.
971, 54 So. 318 (1911) (oil) ; Daniels v. Taubenblatt, 120 La. 349, 45 So. 273
(1908) (staves); Kellar v. Victoria Lumber Co., 45 La. Ann. 476, 12 So. 511
(1893) (lumber) ; Bouchard v. Parker, 32 La. Ann. 535 (1880) (bonds) ; Pritch-
ett v. Coyle, 22 La. Ann. 57 (1870) (personal property) ; Draper v. Richards, 20
La. Ann. 306 (1868) (household furniture) ; Warren v. Saltenberer, 6 La. Ann.
351 (1851) (furniture) ; Newman v. Wilson, 1 La. Ann. 48 (1846) (lumber) ;
Campbell v. Nichols, 11 Rob. 16 (La. 1845) (carriage) ; Perryman v. Demaret,
11 La. 347 (1837) (cattle) ; Caro v. McCallef, 144 So. 2d 133 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1962) (cows) ; Trumbull Chevrolet Sales Co. v. Maxwell, 142 So. 2d 805 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1962) (automobilh' ; Daigle v. Fournet, 141 So. 2d 406 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1962) (diamond ring) ; tisciotta v. Du Saules, 125 So. 2d 181 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1961) (clock) ; Lusco v. McNeese, 86 So. 2d 226 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1956) (counters and stainless steel coffee urn hood) ; Schutzman v. Munson, 51
So. 2d 125 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951) (cattle) ; Crain v. Crain, 29 So. 2d 404 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1947) (mule); Sibley v. Lester, 8 So. 2d 320 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1942) (furniture); Averett v. Southall, 8 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942)
(household effects) Dunkelberg Farms v. Madding, 6 So. 2d 801 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1942) (diamond ear screws) ; Roberts v. Bertrand, 174 So. 201 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1937) (cattle) ; Chachere v. Moses George & Son, 165 So. 522 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1936) (store fixtures) ; Muse v. Sharp, 155 So. 300 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1934) (skidder and tractor) ; Dunkelberg Farms v. Mays, 19 La. App. 106, 138
So. 224 (1931) (diamond ear screws); Holloway v. Ingersoll Co., 133 So. 819
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1931) (cotton); Anders v. Lee-Rogers Chevrolet Co., 7 La.
App. 481 (1928) (automobile); Cobb & Dobson v. Ray, Gunby's Dec. 23 (La.
App. 1885) (raft of saw-logs).
309. See, e.g., Miller v. Krouse, 177 So. 472 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937) (ma-
terial) ; Rizzio v. Moriarity, 1 Orl. App. 150 (La. App. 1904) (action against
the seller of movables belonging to plaintiff) ; Gaty, McCune & Co. v. Babers, 32
La. Ann. 1091 (1880) (machinery) ; King v. Cressap, 22 La. Ann. 211 (1870)
(furniture and household effects) ; Kempt v. Kelly, Gunby's Dec. 65 (La. App.
1885) (mule). Quite frequently plaintiff claims certain movables in kind and,
in the alternative, their value. See, e.g., Freeport & Tampico Fuel Oil Corp. v.
Lange, 157 La. 217, 102 So. 313 (1924) (scrap iron or value) ; Grant Timber &
Mfg. Co. v. Gray, 131 La. 865, 60 So. 374 (1913) (timber or value) ; Dangerfield
v. Fauver, 19 La. Ann. 171 (1867) (mule or value); Young v. LeBlanc, 144
So. 2d 905 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) (diamond ring or value) ; Fontenot v. John-
son, 77 So. 2d 82 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954) (railroad jacks or value) ; Curry v.
Cailler, 37 So. 2d 863 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1948) (movables or value) ; Goodstein
v. Millikin, 14 So. 2d 94 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1943) (cattle or value) ; Luening v.
Natal, 11 So. 2d 649 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1943) (computing scale or value) ; Orlesh
v. Fairchild Auto Co., 13 Or]. App. 303 (La. App. 1916) (automobile or value).
In these cases the pecuniary condemnation is made in the alternative, i.e., if the
defendant cannot return the movable in kind.
310. See, e.g., Importsales, Inc. v. Lindemann, 231 La. 663, 92 So. 2d 574
(1957) (merchandise) ; Hitt v. Herndon, 166 La. 497, 117 So. 568 (1928) (cat-
tle and equipment) ; Carter Allen Jewelry Co. v. Overstreet, 165 La. 887, 116 So.
222 (1928) (ring) ; Martin v. Texas Co., 150 La. 556, 90 So. 922 (1921) (oil) ;
Chamberlain v. Warrell, 38 La. Ann. 347 (1886) (cotton) ; Burch v. Willis, 21
La. Ann. 492 (1869) (cotton) ; Davis v. American Marine Corp., 163 So. 2d 163
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1964) (swivel) ; A. B. C. Oil Burner & Heating Co. v. Palmer,
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i. Recovery of Movables in Kind: The Revendicatory Action.
In France, the dispossessed owner or other person entitled to the
possession and enjoyment of corporeal movables may avail him-
self of all personal actions and of the revendicatory action in
cases where article 2279 of the Civil Code does not apply.3 11 In
Louisiana, however, in spite of the provisions of the Civil Code
according the revendicatory action and the conspicuous absence
of a rule corresponding to article 2279 of the French Code, 3 1 2
the courts are still groping for solutions in cases involving re-
vendication of movables.
The question of the nature of the action for the recovery of
movables in kind by virtue of title of ownership has proved par-
ticularly perplexing. Strictly speaking, the action cannot be
termed either "real" or "personal" in the light of the Code of
Civil Procedure3 13 or the corresponding provisions of the Code
of Practice.3 1 4 The difficulties concerning the determination of
the nature of the action in revendication of movables are illus-
trated in the case of Bouchard v. Parker,3 1 . involving the recov-
ery of identifiable bonds. The court declared aptly that "an ac-
tion of this kind, although it might not be defined to be a real
action proper according to the definition of our Code of Practice,
28 So. 2d 462 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1946), air conditioning equipment); Edwards
v. MacThieme Chevrolet Co., 191 So. 569 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939) (truck and
trailer); cf. Tolbird v. Cooper, 243 La. 306, 143 So. 2d 80 (1962) (truck). In
these cases the courts have allowed damages in the measure of the value of the
movables. This tends to confuse actions for damages which in the above cases
have been correctly held to be ex delicto with actions for the value of movables
which have been held to be quasi-contractual. The measure of damages ought to
be any pecuniary prejudice suffered by the plaintiff as a result of wrongful dis-
possession. Quite frequently actions for damages are combined with actions for
the recovery of movables in kind. See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Du Saules, 125 So. 2d 181
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1961) ; Roberts v. Bertrand, 174 So. 201 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1937) (action for the recovery of cattle and damages) ; Chachere v. Moses George
& Son, 165 So. 522 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936) (action for the recovery of store
fixtures and damages); Orlesh v. Fairchild Auto Co., 13 Orl. App. 303 (La.
App. 1916) (automobile or its value and damages) ; J. A. Bel Lumber Co. v.
Stout, 134 La. 987, 64 So. 881 (1914) (logs or damages).
311. See text at note 72 supra.
312. See Franklin, Security of Acquisition and of Transaction: La Possession
Vaut Titre and Bona Fide Purchase, 6 TUL. L. REv. 589, 601 (1932).
313. See text at note 166 supra. However, actions for the recovery of mov-
ables based on a contractual right rather than ownership are clearly personal
actions. See, e.g., Faison v. Patout, 212 La. 37, 31 So. 2d 416 (1947) (deposit) ;
Berard v. Boagni, 30 La. Ann. 1125 (1878) (deposit) ; cf. Plaquemines Equip. &
Machine Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 245 La. 201, 157 So. 2d 884 (1963) (sale) ; Bill
Garrett Leasing, Inc. v. General Lumber & Supply Co., 164 So. 2d 364 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1964) (lease); Young v. LeBlanc, 144 So. 2d 905 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1962 (pledge).
314. See text at note 316 infra.
315. 32 La. Ann. 535 (1880).
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since a real action, by the terms of the Code, would seem to be
confined to suits for the recovery of land or a real right, yet it
is a species of action closely allied to such action, and fully recog-
nized in the French jurisprudence from which we derive our
system of practice." In another case, Warren v. Saltenberger ,316
involving an action for the recovery of certain pieces of furni-
ture, the court observed that "our Code of Practice is extremely
meagre in its provisions as to actions for movable property, al-
though they are so numerous.... In defining ... personal ac-
tions, it is with difficulty the definition can be construed to em-
brace a suit for a specific thing." In order to obviate this termi-
nological difficulty, it has been suggested that the action be
termed an innominate real action. 17
Following the example of France, the possession of movables
is not protected in Louisiana by a distinct possessory action:
under both the Code of Practices ' s and the Code of Civil Proce-
dure1 9 possessory protection has been confined to immovable
property. This reflects perhaps a justified belief that there is
no need for a speedy determination of the issue of possession of
movables independently of the question of the right to possess.320
A usurper or thief, therefore, has no standing to claim the re-
covery of movables in the hands of third possessors. The own-
er, however, may always bring the revendicatory action for the
recovery of movables and persons other than the owner entitled
to possession may bring the appropriate actions for the protec-
tion and enforcement of their real or contractual rights.
21
316. 6 La. Ann. 351 (1851).
317. See text at note 166 supra.
318. See LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 60 (1870).
319. See text at note 245 supra.
320. It is merely in this sense that "possessory" actions are disallowed. Ac-
tions directed to the recovery of the possession of movables by virtue of ownership
or other rights are clearly admissible. See text at notes 321, 323-25 infra. If it
is true that the primary function of the possessory action available to the holder
of an immovable real right is to determine the respective position of the parties
as plaintiff and defendant in a subsequent petitory action (see note 246 supra),
then a distinct possessory action is not needed in the case of movable real rights
because possession is here readily ascertainable.
321. See, e.g., Douglas v. Haro, 214 La. 1099, 39 So. 2d 744 (1949) (action
by "depositary") ; Lannes v. Courege, 31 La. Ann. 74, 76 (1879) (recovery of
notes by depositaries in the hands of third persons; "the allegations showing plain-
tiff's right of possession and the wrongful possession of the defendant . . . are
sufficient to maintain" the action) ; Draper v. Richards, 20 La. Ann. 306 (1868)
(action by administratrix) ; Newman v. Wilson, 1 La. Ann. 48 (1846) (action
by a sheriff of another state to recover movables fraudulently taken out of his
possession).
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This subtle analysis of the nature of the revendicatory action,
and of the relationship between this action and possessory pro-
tection, has not been always clearly grasped by litigants in Lou-
isiana. In at least two cases, therefore, an argument drawn
from the nature of the revendicatory action has been advanced
for the purpose of questioning the availability of the action
under Louisiana procedural law. In Levert v. Hebert,322 in-
volving the recovery of certain movables which plaintiff had
allegedly purchased, the defendant argued that an action of
this nature was a "possessory" action disallowed by the Code
of Practice. The court observed that "if, on the trial of the
cause, it had developed that plaintiffs were advancing their
claims merely as holders, and not as owners, of the articles,
the action would have properly failed." 23 Since, however, plain-
tiff had established his right of ownership, he was allowed to
recover.
A similar line of argument was developed several decades
later in Lusco v. McNeese, 24 involving an action for the recovery
of three counters and a stainless steel coffee urn hood allegedly
removed from plaintiff's premises by defendant. The defendant
in his answer stated that "the action must be a possessory or
petitory action since for the ownership or possession of prop-
erty, and therefore plaintiff has no cause of action herein
(where movable property is concerned) since these actions are
by definition restricted to claims made on immovable prop-
erty. . . . To the contrary, of course, since the subject matter
herein is movable property, this action cannot possibly be a
real action (possessory or petitory or otherwise)." In strict
logic, and in the light of the provisions of the Code of Practice,
defendant's argument had, perhaps, some merit. Defendant,
however, overlooked the fact that the revendicatory action for
the recovery of the possession of movables, though not known
by name in Louisiana judicial practice and not mentioned in
the Code of Civil Procedure, has persisted through the centuries
322. 51 La. Ann. 222, 25 So. 118 (1899).
323. This may be merely a dictum indicating that a possessor of movables is
not entitled to protection qua possessor. He may be entitled to protection, how-
ever, by virtue of ownership or any other right. See cass cited note 321 aupra.
In the past, possessory protection was accorded in matters involving slaves. See,
e.g., Sears v. Wilson, 5 La. Ann. 689 (1850) Adams v. Stuart, 4 Rob. 180
(1843) ; Preston v. Zabrisky, 2 La. 226 (1831); Kemper's Heirs v. Hulick, 1
La. 44 (1840).
324. 86 So. 2d 226 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956).
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as an innominate real action. And the court quite properly
allowed recovery of the movables in kind referring to the "multi-
tude of cases concerning recovery of movable property allegedly
improperly retained by another ... in which the owner recov-
ered possession of the property from the possessor.
32
The revendicatory action may be brought by the dispossessed
owner against any possessor of the movables.3 26 This rule was
formally recognized in the early case of Warren v. Salten-
berger,327 involving an action against the administratrix of an
estate for the recovery of certain pieces of furniture. The ques-
tion was whether the defendant could be sued personally as
possessor and not necessarily as administratrix. The court ob-
served that "in this State, the action for movable property
has generally been brought against the possessor of the prop-
erty. . . . Thus we sue the keeper of the livery stable for the
horse stolen from us, and not the purchaser from the thief"
and allowed the action by applying "by analogy" provisions
governing the recovery of immovables. The rule has been fol-
lowed implicitly in all subsequent cases.
The owner of things lost or stolen may reclaim them not
only in the hands of the finder or thief but also in the hands of
subsequent acquirers, even bona fide purchasers for value.
328
325. See also cases cited note 308 8upra.
326. For the determination of which things are movables, see Yiannopoulos,
Movables and Inmovables in Louisiana and Comparative Law, 22 LA. L. REv.
517, 559-66 (1962). An owner may sue for the recovery of movables which were
formerly component parts of an immovable. See, e.g., Ducros v. St. Bernard Cy-
press Co., 164 La. 787, 114 So. 654 (1927) (timber) ; Foley v. Bush, 13 La. Ann.
126 (1858) (timber); Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate v. Houssiere-Latreille
Oil Co., 127 La. 971, 54 So. 318 (1911) (action for the recovery in kind of oil
unlawfully extracted from plaintiff's land). Where the value of these things is
demanded, or damages, the corresponding actions are sometimes termed "actions
for trespass." See text at note 292 supra. Cf. Liles v. Producers' Oil Co., 155 La.
385, 99 So. 339 (1924) ; Liles v. Banhart, 152 La. 419, 93 So. 490 (1922) ; Shields
v. Whitlock & Brown, 110 La. 714, 34 So. 747 (1903).
327. 6 La. Ann. 351, 355 (1851).
328. See, e.g., Security Sales Co. v. Blackwell, 167 La. 667, 120 So. 45 (1928)
(automobile) ; Holton v. Hubbard, 49 La. Ann. 715, 22 So. 338 (1897) (rice) ;
Davis v. Humpton, 4 Mart.(N.S.) 288 (La. 1826) (horse) ; Schutzman v. Mun-
son, 51 So. 2d 125 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951) (cattle) ; Muse v. Sharp, 155 So. 300
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1934) (tractor and skidder). It has been held that payment
of the price of a sale by a worthless check is equivalent to theft. Accordingly, the
purported sales is void ab initio and the seller is protected even as against a sub-
sequent purchaser of good faith. See Fisher v. Bullington, 223 La. 368, 65 So. 2d
880 (1953) ; Hub City Motors v. Brock, 71 So. 2d 700 (La. App. 1954) ; Smith,
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1956-1957 Term - Particular
Contracts, 18 LA. L. REV. 10, 43 (1957). More recent cases, however, seem to
indicate that the acceptance of a check suffices to "convert" the transaction into a
"credit sale" so that the buyer acquires title "notwithstanding that the check [is]
[Vol. XXV
1965] REAL ACTIONS IN LOUISIANA
The same rule applies where the things are in the hands of a
bona fide purchaser as a result of the violation of a confidential
relationship or obligation by a person entrusted with the pos-
session of the movables . 29 Where the lost or stolen things are
no longer in defendant's possession, the revendicatory action
abates ;830 the owner, however, may have available a delictual
action for damages or a quasi-contractual action for restitu-
tion.8 31 The bona fide purchaser who bought lost or stolen mov-
ables "at public auction or from a person in the habit of selling
such things"33 2 has a right for reimbursement from the revendi-
cating owner if he "has possessed a movable thing, during three
successive years without interruption.3 83 3 In all other cases,
the bona fide purchaser has a remedy for reimbursement and
damages exclusively against his vendor.3 34
Where movables are in the hands of a bona fide purchaser
not as a result of loss, theft, or violation of an obligation, but
as a result of a voidable transaction accomplished by the owner
for the purpose of transferring ownership, revendication seems
to be excluded according to a number of Louisiana cases. This
subsequently dishonored." See Flatte v. Nichols, 233 La. 171, 96 So. 2d 477
(1957) ; cases cited note 335 infra. The question of whether a movable is "stolen"
is determined with reference to civil law standards rather than the provisions of
the penal law. See Jeffrey Motor Co. v. Higgins, 230 La. 857, 89 So. 2d 369
(1956).
329. See, e.g., Freeport & Tampico Fuel Oil Corp. v. Lange, 157 La. 217, 102
So. 313 (1924) ; Holloway v. Ingersoll Co., 133 So. 819 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931) ;
Campbell v. Nichols, 11 Rob. 16 (La. 1845) ; Perryman v. Demaret, 11 La. 347
(1837). See also Packard Florida Motors Co. v. Malone, 208 La. 1058, 24 So. 2d
75 (1945) (recovery of automobile, bought by bona fide purchaser from a person
who had fraudulently taken delivery from the owner) ; Security Sales Co. v. Black-
well, 167 La. 667, 120 So. 45 (1929). In this case, action was brought against a
bona fide purchaser automobile originally sold by plaintiff under a conditional
sales agreement in Mississippi and subsequently resold by the defaulting purchaser
in Louisiana. The Louisiana Supreme Court declared that the first purchaser
converted the automobile and that subsequent sales could not pass a valid title
vis-a-vis the rightful owner.
330. See Joyce v. Poydras de la Lande, 6 La. 277 (1834). This follows for the
nature of the revendicatory action which is directed to the recovery of movables
in kind. Cf. Caro v. McCallef, 144 So. 2d 133 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) (action
for the recovery of two cows; when the cows died in the course of litigation the
question of ownership became moot).
331. See text at notes 382-86, 387-89 infra.
332. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3507 (1870).
333. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3506 (1870). Louisiana courts have read in the text
of article 3507 a limitation stated in the preceding article 3506. See Security
Sales Co. v. Blackwell, 167 La. 667, 120 So. 45 (1928) ; Davis v. Hampton, 4
Mart. (N.S.) 288 (La. 1826); Comment, Prescription of Movables -- Stolen or
Lost Things, 4 TUL. L. REV. 78 (1929).
334. See Schutzman v. Munson, 51 So. 2d 125 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951) ("His
remedy is against the one who sold the cattle to him for reimbursement of the
price with damages.").
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happens, typically, when the owner delivers a movable to a
purchaser who fails to pay the purchase price and who subse-
quently sells the movable to innocent third persons.335 These
cases have been interpreted as involving recognition by Louisi-
ana courts of the common law bona fide purchaser doctrine.3 e
This may be a questionable explanation of the jurisprudence.
The issue in these cases was whether the original purchaser
had acquired ownership so as to be in a position to transfer to
subsequent purchasers a title valid against the revendicating
owner. In that regard, the courts liberalized the rules of sales
and held that the original purchaser acquired the ownership of
the movables in question, although the vendor did not receive
payment or was dispossessed as a result of fraud practiced by
the purchaser. This is consistent with the rule that the unpaid
335. See Flatte v. Nichols, 233 La. 171, 96 So. 2d 477 (1957) (action by Texas
dealer for the recovery of an automobile in the hands of a Louisiana dealer. The
automobile had been originally sold by the Texas dealer to a Mississippi dealer
who failed to pay the purchase price. The court held that the title of the Louisi-
ana dealer, a bona fide purchaser, was good and valid against the original owner) ;
Jeffrey Motor Co. v. Higgins, 230 La. 857, 89 So. 2d 369 (1956) (action by the
original owner of an automobile for recovery and unpaid vendor in the hands of
a bona fide purchaser. The court decided that the automobile had not been
"stolen" within the meaning of the penal law, LA. R.S. 14:67 (1950), and that
the sale to the bona fide purchaser's ancestor in title had been completed upon
the acceptance of a subsequently dishonored draft) ; Trumbull Chevrolet Sales
Co. v. Maxwell, 142 So. 2d 805, 806 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962). Plaintiff dealer in
this case brought an action for the recognition of his right of ownership of an
automobile, now in the hands of a bona fide purchaser. The automobile in ques-
tion had been delivered by plaintiff to another dealer pursuant to a sales agree-
ment. The latter issued a check which was subsequently dishonored and had sold
the automobile on the basis of forged documents. The court held that plaintiff
could not recover. "By its delivery of the vehicle in question" the court said, "and
the acceptance of a check in payment therefor, it completed the necessary formali-
ties of a sale, and, therefore, was solely responsible for the subsequent allegedly
fraudulent transactions." The rule was said to rest on the equitable principle that
"where two innocent parties must suffer loss through the fraud of another the
burden of such loss is imposed upon the one who most contributed thereto." Cf.
Thomas v. Mead, 8 Mart.(N.S.) 341 (La. 1829) (action for the recovery of two
slaves; the court allowed defendant, a bona fide purchaser, to keep the slaves
although his title derived from a fraudulent conveyance. That transaction, the
court indicated, could be set aside by direct action of the aggrieved party but
could not be collaterally attacked) ; James v. Judice, 140 So. 2d 169 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1962). In this case, plaintiff, owner of an automobile, had placed it for
sale at a lot and the lot owner sold it to a bona fide purchaser. The court held
that the purchaser's title was based on a valid sale by the "agent" of the owner.
The bona fide purchase doctrine has been traditionally applied to negotiable in-
struments endorsed prior to maturity. See Sagory v. Metropolitan Bank, 42 La.
Ann. 627, 7 So. 633 (1890). Under the conditions of LA. R.S. 30:106 (1950),
the purchaser of minerals unlawfully extracted from the ground is protected from
claims by the owner of the land. The owner's remedy is an action against the pos-
sessor of the land. See State ex rel. Muslow v. Louisiana Oil Ref. Corp., 176 So.
686 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937).
336. See Note, 17 LA. L. REv. 854, 857 (1957) ; Note, 25 TUL. L. REV. 146
(1950) ; Franklin, Security of Acquisition and of Transactions: La Possession
Vaut Titre and Bona Fide Purchase, 6 TUr. L. REv. 589, 604 (1932).
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vendor cannot exercise the resolutory action where the movables
sold are no longer in the possession of the purchaser.3 7
The plaintiff in the revendicatory action has the burden of
proof of his ownership,3 38 and if he fails to carry this burden
his claim is dismissed.83 9 But, "as against a naked possessor
without title, plaintiff, in a suit for the ownership of personal
property, need not make a title good against the world; he is
only required to repel the slight presumption of ownership
resulting from mere possession. 8 40  In contrast with French
law, the possession of movables in Louisiana is not "equivalent
to title."'8 4 1 Therefore, the defendant who is assisted merely by
"a slight presumption of ownership," should, and ordinarily
does, offer evidence of his own right to the possession of the
movables in order to combat plaintiff's allegations of title and
proof.842
337. See Yiannopoulos, Real Rights in Louisiana and Comparative Law: Part
I, 23 LA. L. REV. 161, 231 (1963).
338. See Daniels v. Taubenblatt, 120 La. 349, 45 So. 273 (1908) ; Levert v.
Hebert, 51 La. Ann. 222, 25 So. 118 (1899); Sagory v. Metropolitan Bank, 42
La. Ann. 627, 7 So. 633 (1890) ; Draper v. Richards, 20 La. Ann. 306 (1868) ;
Crane v. Allen, 11 La. Ann. 493 (1856) ; Lusco v. McNeese, 86 So. 2d 226 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1956) ; Crain v. Crain, 29 So. 2d 404 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947) ;
Averett v. Southall, 8 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942) ; Muse v. Sharp, 155
So. 300 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1934) ; of. Pritchett v. Coyle, 22 La. Ann. 57 (1870)
("plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title" rather than the weak-
ness of the title of his adversary). Since the possession of movables is not pro-
tected as such, it follows that the plaintiff must prove his right of ownership or
a contractual or quasi-contractual right entitling him to the possession of the
movable.
339. See Daniels v. Taubenblatt, 120 La. 349, 45 So. 273 (1908) ; Pritchett
v. Coyle, 22 La. Ann. 57 (1870) ; Moody v. Gossen, 125 So. 2d 264 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1960) ; Dunkelberg Farms v. Madding, 6 So. 2d 801 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942) ;
Roberts v. Bertrand, 174 So. 201 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1937) ; Dunkelberg Farms
v. Mays, 19 La. App. 106, 138 So. 224 (2d Cir. 1931) ; cf. Sibley v. Lester, 8 So.
2d 320 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942) (action for the recovery of furniture allegedly
included in a sale of immovable property. The court held that where the deed
mentioned merely "improvements" oral testimony to correct the deed was not ad-
missible). The question of ownership has been said to be "entirely a question of
fact." Caro v. McCallef, 144 So. 2d 133 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962). This merely
means that the decision of lower courts will not be upset, "unless it is found that
the conclusions reached by said Court are manifestly erroneous." Ibid.
340. Rawls v. Clay, Gunby's Dec. 55 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1885). See also Suc-
'cession of Boisblanc, 32 La. Ann. 109, 111 (1880) : "in general, possession is pre-
'sumptive evidence of ownership"; Robinson v. Taylor, 6 La. 393 (1834) ; Lee v.
Palmer, 18 La. 405 (1841).
341. See Averett v. Southall, 8 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942) ; Holloway
v. Ingersoll Co., 133 So. 819 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931). See also Donnell v. Gray,
215 La. 497, 41 So. 2d 66, 68 (1949) (action for the recovery of oil well equip-
ment; the court declared that "defendant, with no legal claim of ownership, is
without right to question the validity of plaintiff's title which is evidenced by a
deed").
342. See Schutzman v. Munson, 51 So. 2d 125 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951) ; Crain
v. Crain, 29 So. 2d 404 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947) ; Averett v. Southall, 8 So. 2d
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The possessor may defend the action on the basis of any
personal or real right he may have for the possession and en-
joyment of the movable. He may thus claim that he is entitled
to retain the movable by virtue of any contractual arrangement
with the owner 343 or by virtue of his right of usufruct or owner-
ship of the movable. 344 His right of ownership, in particular,
may derive from a valid transfer by the owner or his agent, 45
from acquisitive prescription,346 or from rules of law concerning
accession 347 and immobilization by nature or destination.3 48
These defenses, based on the possessor's own right of ownership,
may also be regarded as the consequence of the loss of the right
of ownership by the original owner.
The exclusion of the revendicatory action in case a movable
becomes an immovable by nature or by destination requires
some discussion for the purpose of clarification of seemingly
inconsistent judicial decisions. 349  Under the Louisiana Civil
Code the ownership of the soil extends, in principle, to immov-
ables by nature, i.e., crops, trees, buildings and other struc-
tures, 350 and immovables by destination, i.e., movables per-
manently attached to an immovable351 or placed thereon by the
owner for its service and improvement.352 Contention is thus
141 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942) ; Roberts v. Bertrand, 174 So. 201 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1937) ; cf. Young v. LeBlanc, 144 So. 2d 905 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) (defend-
ant entitled to keep a diamond ring delivered to him as a gift).
343. See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Du Saules, 125 So. 2d 181 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961)
(deposit) ; Roberts v. Bertrand, 174 So. 201 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1937) (payment
of debt) ef. Faison v. Patout, 212 La. 37, 31 So. 2d 416 (1947) (deposit)
Chachere v. Moses George & Son, 165 So. 522 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936) (lease)
Holton v. Hubbard, 49 La. Ann. 715, 22 So. 338 (1897) (pledge).
344. See, e.g., Daigle v. Fournet, 141 So. 2d 406 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962)
(gift) ; Young v. LeBlanc, 144 So. 2d 905 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) (gift) ; Curry
v. Cailler, 37 So. 2d 863 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1948) (inheritance) ; Crain v. Crain,
29 So. 2d 404 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947) (sale) ; Averett v. Southall, 8 So. 2d 141
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1942) (sale) ; Sibley v. Lester, 8 So. 2d 320 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1942) (sale) ; Dunkelberg Farms v. Madding, 6 So. 2d 801 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1942) (exchange) ; Rickets v. Duble, 177 So. 838 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1938)
(gift) ; Decuers v. Bourdet, 10 La. App. 361, 120 So. 880 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1929) (gift).
345. See James v. Judice, 140 So. 2d 169 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) and cases
cited note 335 supra.
346. See Rio Hondo Land Co. v. Gibbs, 49 So. 2d 76 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950)
(action for the recovery of cash register and a pair of scales; held, inadmissible
where defendant acquired ownership by the acquisitive prescription of three and
ten years).
347. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 499-501, 504, 521, 526-29 (1870).
348. See text at notes 358-62 infra.
349. Cf. Yiannopoulos, Movables and Immovables in Louisiana and Compara-
tive Law, 22 LA. L. REV. 517, 541 (1962).
350. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 464, 465, 467, 507 (1870).
351. Id. art. 469.
352. Id. art. 468.
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frequently made by landowners that all movables immobilized
by nature or by destination belong to them by virtue of their
ownership of the immovable and that whatever rights other
persons may have to the movables are extinguished by immobili-
zation. Recognition of the possibility of separate ownership of
the soil and of movables immobilized by nature or by destina-
tion, by virtue of contractual arrangements altering the rule
of the Civil Code, has been slowly achieved in Louisiana.353
Disputes, however, continue to arise.
A typical class of cases involves disputes between vendors
and vendees of immovable property over the ownership of cer-
tain movables not expressly covered by the act of sale. Deter-
mination of the conflicting claims in these cases is ostensibly
made on the basis of the rules of the Civil Code governing im-
mobilization. Thus, in the light of the applicable tests, it has
been determined that venetian blinds, 354 chandeliers, 55 bricks
lying in the premises, 35 6 and certain staves357 remained movables.
Accordingly, these things could be reclaimed by the vendor. On
the other hand, certain household fixtures,35 8 an iron safe ,3 9
a corn mill, 360 a hot water heater,3 61 and certain pieces of ma-
chinery 62 were found to be immobilized and therefore acquired
by the vendee along with the immovable. It would seem that
in a modern legal system these conflicting claims to the owner-
ship of movables should be determined with reference to the
act of sale, the intention of the parties, and all surrounding cir-
cumstances rather than with reference to abstract tests of im-
mobilization. And this is precisely what some Louisiana courts
have done while at the same time paying lip service to the obso-
lete rules of the Code.3 63
353. See Yiannopoulos, note 349 supra, at 525.
354. See Kelieher v. Gravois, 26 So. 2d 304 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1946).
355. See McGuigin v. Boyle, 1 Orl. App. 164 (1904).
356. See Key v. Woolfolk, 6 Rob. 424 (La. 1844).
357. See Nimmo v. Allen, 2 La. Ann. 451 (1847).
358. See Scovel v. Shadyside, 137 La. 918, 69 So. 745 (1915).
359. See Folger v. Kenner, 24 La. Ann. 436 (1872).
360. See Bigler v. Brashear, 11 Rob. 484 (La. 1845).
361. See Scott v. Brennan, 161 La. 1017, 109 So. 822 (1926).
362. See Maginnis v. Union Oil Co., 47 La. Ann. 1489, 18 So. 459 (1895).
363. Loss of the ownership of movables as a result of their immobilization may
be justified in exceptional circumstances, i.e., where the movables are no longer
identifiable or are so closely associated with the immovable that separation is
economically wasteful. In these cases, however, the owner of the movables should
have against the landowner a claim for compensation.
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Another class of cases involves disputes between purchasers
of immovable property and third persons over the ownership
of certain movables on the premises. The claim of the pur-
chasers derives either from an express provision in the act of
sale covering the movables in question or from the rule of the
Civil Code that in the absence of other indication accessories
are included in the sale. The claim of the third persons derives
either from a transfer of title to the movables by the landowner
prior to the sale of the immovable or from their original and
separate ownership of the movables. Again, determination of
the conflicting claims is ostensibly made on the basis of whether
the movables in question are immobilized or not. Certain pieces
of machinery, 364 a derrick,3 65 a hot water heater,366 an automatic
sprinkler system, 67 and a butane gas tank3 68 have been found
to be movables which could be reclaimed by their owner in the
hands of the purchaser of the immovable. On the other hand,
a small wooden house,6 9 a butane gas tank,37° certain "improve-
ments,"' 871 a building,37 2 an advertising display sign,373 and a
bulk milk tank 74 have been found to be immovables by nature
or destination which, though originally belonging to third per-
sons, were acquired by the purchaser of the immovable. It would
seem that in a modern legal system the acquisition or loss of
the ownership of movables should not depend exclusively on a
mechanical application of tests of immobilization.3 75 Owners of
movables placed on another's immovable with his consent should
be entitled to assert their rights of ownership against any suc-
cessor of the landowner, at least where their interests are
recorded. This may be the "true" rule applied by Louisiana
courts. It is submitted that quite a few Louisiana cases may
indeed be rationalized as giving effect to a public records doc-
364. See Folse v. Loreauville Sugar Factory, 156 So. 667 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1934).
365. See Jones v. Conrad, 154 La. 860, 98 So. 397 (1923).
366. See Appel v. Ennis, 34 So. 2d 415 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1948).
367. See Richardson v. Item Co., 172 La. 421, 134 So. 380 (1931).
368. See Edwards v. S. & R. Gas Co., 73 So. 2d 590 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954).
369. See Vaughn v. Kemp, 4 La. App. 682 (1926).
370. See Holicer Gas Co. v. Wilson, 45 So. 2d 96 (1950). The case has been
overruled legislatively. See LA. R.S. 9:1106 (Supp. 1960).
371. See Polhman v. De Bouchel, 32 La. Ann. 1158 (1880).
372. See Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 154 So.
760 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1934).
373. See Industrial Outdoor Displays v. Reuter, 162 So. 2d 160 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1964).
374. See Chestnut v. Hammatt, 157 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
375. Of. note 363 supra.
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trine: A purchaser is entitled to all movables on the premises,
when the public records are silent concerning interests of third;
persons. 7
6
The successful plaintiff in the revendicatory action is en-
titled to the recognition of his ownership and recovery of the
possession of the movable.3 77 He is also entitled to all the nat-
ural or civil fruits produced by the movable since the initiation
of the action in any case and since dispossession in the case of a
bad faith possessor.8 78 Depending on his good or bad faith, the
possessor may be entitled to claim reimbursement for useful
expenses or necessary expenses incurred for the preservation
of the movable.379
The Louisiana Civil Code does not provide for a period of
liberative prescription applicable to the revendicatory action.
for the recovery of movables. It could be argued, therefore,
that the action is imprescriptible under the Civil Code and that
it merely becomes without object when a third person acquires
the ownership of the movable by acquisitive prescription. Lou-
isiana courts, however, have classified the revendicatory action
for the recovery of movables as one in contract or quasi-
contract380 and have accordingly applied to it the ten-year libera-
tive prescription. 8 ' Analytically, this means that the revendica-
tory action may be barred even if the possessor has not acquired
the ownership of the movable by acquisitive prescription. This
is obviously an anomaly: the owner cannot enforce his right
of ownership even against a bad faith possessor!
376. See, e.g., Industrial Outdoor Displays v. Reuter, 162 So. 2d 160 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1964) ; Chestnut v. Hammatt, 157 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
377. See cases note 308 supra.
378. See Goodstein v. Millikin, 14 So. 2d 94 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1943) (recov-
ery of cattle and increase) ; Dangerfield v. Fauver, 19 La. Ann. 171 (1867) (re-
covery of mule and value of its services) ; cf. Crane v. Allen, 11 La. Ann. 493
(1856) (slaves and natural increase) ; text at notes 230-33, 236 supra. But see
Derouen v. LeBleu, 18 So. 2d 207 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1944). In this case the low-
er court had ordered defendant, a possessor in good faith, to return to the owner
of a cow a calf born during defendant's possession of the cow; the court of appeal
questioned the correctness of the lower court's judgment but did not pass on it
as defendant failed to appeal that issue.
379. See Cobb & Dobson v. Ray, Gunby's Dec. 23 (La. App. 1885). Cf. text
at notes 239-42 supra.
380. See Kramer v. Freeman, 198 La. 244, 3 So. 2d 609 (1941) ; notes 401-
402 infra.
381. See Aegis Ins. Co. v. Delta Fire & Cas. Co., 99 So. 2d 767, 785 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1958) ("The prescription applicable for the recovery of a movable which
has been stolen, even in the hands of an innocent third purchaser, is ten years").
Cf. text at note 204 supra. The petitory action for the recovery of immovable
property, however, is not lost merely by the lapse of the period of liberative pre-
scription. See note 177 supra.
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ii. Restitution: The Quasi-Contractual Action. The dispos-
sessed owner of a movable may have, apart from the revendica-
tory action, a claim for the return of the movable or its value
under the rules of the Civil Code governing the payment of a
thing not due. 8 2 Louisiana courts have liberalized the rules of
the Code by paying little or no attention to the requirements of
payment by the plaintiff8 8 3 through error 8 4 and by construing
receipt to include taking by force.38 5 Thus, it may be said that
the courts have fashioned in Louisiana, on the basis of the Code,
a general remedy for unjust enrichment. Anyone enriched un-
justly at the expense of another is under a quasi-contractual
obligation to restore corporeal movables, if they "remain," and
if they no longer exist, to account for his enrichment. The con-
tours of the remedy have not as yet been precisely defined and
the solutions reached by French courts in the application of
the corresponding provisions of the French Civil Code could
be particularly useful as guideposts. It ought to be noted, how-
ever, that unjust enrichment is not only a distinct ground for
recovery but also a remedy allowing a special measure of re-
covery: traditionally, plaintiff's recovery is limited by the
amount of defendant's enrichment at the time of the initiation
of the action.8 8
iii. Damages: The Delictual Action. Apart from the reven-
dicatory action and the action of unjust enrichment, an unlaw-
fully dispossessed owner of movables may bring an action de-
riving from an offense or quasi-offense. This delictual action
is predicated on fault. It is directed either to the recovery of
the movable in kind 87 with damages for the wrong suffered,3 88
382. See text at note 305 supra.
383. See Smith v. Phillips, 175 La. 198, 143 So. 47 (1932) ; Standard Oil Co.
v. Sugar Prod. Co., 160 La. 763; 107 So. 566 (1926) ; Roney v. Payton, 159 So.
469 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935). Cf. Reeves v. Smith, 1 La. Ann. 379 (1846). Ar-
ticle 2301 provides that "he who receives what is not due to him, whether he re-
ceives it through error or knowingly, obliges himself to restore it to him from
Whom he has unduly received it." Although it is expressed in terms of receiving,
the article clearly envisages that the defendant has received the thing or sum
through payment by the plaintiff. This becomes apparent in the light of the fol-
lowing articles 2302-2310 all of which speak of payments.
384. See Jung v. Gwin, 174 La. 111, 139 So. 774 (1932).
385. See Kramer v. Freeman, 198 La. 244, 3 So. 2d 609 (1941).
386. See Bender v. Looney, 22 La. Ann. 488 (1870) ; and, in general, Nicholas,
Unjustified Enrichment in the Civil Law and Louisiana Law, 36 TIUL. L. REv.
605 (1962).
. 387. See Reynolds v. Reiss, 145 La. 155, 81 So. 884 (1919) ; Pisciotta v; Du
Saules, 125 So. 2d 181, 185 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961) ("the plaintiff is entitled
to recover the property itself").
388. See Dangerfield v. Fauver, 19 La. Ann. 171 (1867) ; Muse v. Sharp,
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or to damages only, when the owner has no longer interest in
the return of the movables 8 9
Delictual actions deriving from unlawful interference with
the ownership or possession of movables are frequently termed
in Louisiana actions for "conversion.""" 0 Despite this denomina-
tion, they are only rarely completely identifiable with actions
based on the common law tort of conversion. It should be kept
in mind that conversion in common law is an intentional tort
giving rise to strict liability and that an action for conversion
is directed to the recovery of the value of a chattel.39 ' In civil
law, on the other hand, the corresponding delictual action is
based on fault and may be directed to the recovery of the mov-
able in kind. Most Louisiana cases involving recovery for con-
version are reconcilable with the precepts of the civil law rather
than those of the common law. There are exceptional cases,
however, which seem to have incorporated into Louisiana law
the common law tort of conversion. 392 In this area, therefore,
155 So. 300 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1934) (recovery of movables plus nominal dam-
ages) ; cases cited note 310 supra; cf. Roberts v. Bertrand, 174 So. 201 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1937) ; Anders v. Lee-Rogers Chevrolet Co., 7 La. App. 481 (2d Cir.
1928) (recovery of automobile; damages not proved) ; Orlesch v. Fairchild Auto
Co., 13 Orl. App. 303 (La. App. 1916). But see Reynolds v. Reiss, 145 La. 155,
161, 8I So. 884, 886 (1919) (apparently indicating that plaintiff merely has the
alternatives of claiming "his property ... or as damages the value of his prop-
erty") ; Pisciotta v. Du Saules, 125 So. 2d 181 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961) (dam-
ages not allowed).
389. See Begnaud-Martinez, Inc. v. Pellerin, 154 So. 2d 644 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1963) (action for the value of potato crates used by defendant against plaintiff's
admonition that they will not be accepted after such use; held, plaintiff was en-
titled to the value of the potato crates rather than to restoration in kind). The
same rule applies where the thing no longer exists or "has 'been sold to a third
person." Pisciotta v. Du Saules, 125 So. 2d 181, 185 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
The "measure of damages ... is the value of the property." Ibid.
390. See Importsales, Inc. v. Lindemann, 231 La. 663, 92 So. 2d 574 (1957)
Hitt v. Herndon, 166 La. 497, 117 So. 568 (1928) ; Martin v. Texas Oil Co., 150
La. 556, 90 So. 922 (1921) ; Chamberlain v. Worrell, 38 La. Ann. 347 (1886) ;
Davis v. American Marine Corp., 163 So. 2d 163 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964) ; Chest-
nut v. Hammatt, 157 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963) ; A. B. C. Oil Burner
& Heating Co. v. Palmer, 28 So. 2d 462 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1946); Edwards v.
McThieme Chevrolet Co., 191 So. 569 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939) ; ef. Tolbird v.
Cooper, 243 La. 306, 143 So. 2d 80 (1962). Quite frequently, however, the term
"conversion" is avoided. See, e.g., Carter-Allen Jewelry Co. v. Overstreet, 165 La.
887, 116 So. 222 (1928) ; Bender v. Looney, 22 La. Ann. 488 (1870) ; Burch V.
Willis, 21 La. Ann. 492 (1869) ; Begnaud-Martinez, Inc. v. Pellerin, 154 So. 2d
644 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963) ; Young v. LeBlanc, 144 So. 2d 905 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1962) ; Trumbull Chevrolet Sales Co. v. Maxwell, 142 So. 2d 805 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1962) ; Daigle v. Fournet, 141 So. 2d 406 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
391. See PROSSER, TORTS 67, 70 (2d ed. 1955) ; HARPER & JAMEs, TORTS 217,
129 (1956) ; JAMES, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF TORTS 83 (1959).
392. See, e.g., Importsales, Inc. v. Lindeman, 231 La. 663, 92 So. 2d 574
(1957) ; Martin v. Texas Oil Co., 150 La. 556, 90 So. 922 (1921) ; Davis v. Amer-
ican Marine Corp., 163 So. 2d 163 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964) ; cf. Note, 37 TUL.
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the law of Louisiana seems to be a hybrid system, having bor-
rowed characteristics from both the common law and the civil
law.
It is submitted that the importation of the tort of conver-
sion in Louisiana leads to a confusion of ideas and is quite un-
necessary. In the framework of the common law, conversion
and its standard of strict liability are needed to fill the lacuna
caused originally by the narrow delimitation of the action in
replevin 93 and the absence of a broad revendicatory action for
the recovery of movables. Further, conversion may be needed
in common law because of the hesitancy with which the courts
have recognized quasi-contractual actions. In Louisiana, how-
ever, the remedies under the Civil Code are flexible and suf-
ficiently broad to satisfy all reasonable demands for the pro-
tection of movable property. It has been stated, quite to the
point, that in Louisiana "revendication should be revived and
encouraged," the quasi-contractual action "should be permitted
to remain at its extended level," and the delictual action "should
be allowed only in case of theft or other fault. 3 94 In a recent
case, Edward Levy Metals, Inc. v. New Orleans Public Belt Rail-
road,39 5 the Louisiana Supreme Court has, in effect, confined
L. REv. 843, 847 (1963) concluding that "the action of revendication has thus
disappeared, rendered unnecessary by the importation of conversion."
393. See BLUME, AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE 12 (1955) indicating that re-
plevin was available in cases of "forcible taking of the property by the defendant
out of the plaintiff's control"; JAMES, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
ToRTs 92 (1959) explaining that in England "replevin only lies where the defend-
ant has wrongfully taken the goods out of the claimant's possession; and it will
therefore not lie against someone who merely detains the goods after the claim-
ant has knowingly parted with possession, though in such a case detinue or con-
version may lie." In this light, the revendicatory action of the civil law appears
to afford a much broader remedy. In American jurisdictions today, however, the
statutory replevin lies for any unlawful detention of personal property, whether
the original taking was lawful or unlawful. See text at note 538 infra.
394. Note, 37 TUL. L. REV. 843, 848 (1963).
395. 243 La. 860, 148 So. 2d 580 (1963). A load of scrap steel was delivered
to the defendant railroad for shipment aboard a vessel in New Orleans. The de-
fendant forwarded the steel by mistake to a scrap metal company who shipped it
for its own account. When the owner of the steel brought an action against the
railroad for the value of the steel, the railroad brought a third party action against
the scrap metal company. The latter then pleaded the one-year prescription alleg-ing that the third party plaintiff elected in his petition to state an action for
conversion. The court found that the petition did not allege that the third party
defendant had had knowledge of the delivery of the steel and had refused to return
it. The petition, therefore, did not satisfy the requirements for the tort of con-
version, i.e., it did not allege that the third party defendant had wrongfully de-
prived defendant of property to the possession of which he was entitled. Accord-
ingly, the action was held to be one for indemnity subject to the ten year libera-
tive prescription. The case was decided under the Code of Practice of 1870. Had
the case arisen under the new Code of Civil Procedure, the court would have no
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"conversion within narrow limits. The result of this case may
well be that pleadings in the future will be carefully framed so
as to state a quasi-contractual claim rather than a delictual
.. action where both remedies are available to a plaintiff. And
conversion may well fall into disuse and oblivion.
iv. Prescription. The question of the nature of an action
for the protection of movable real rights acquires great prac-
tical significance in light of the applicable rules of liberative
prescription: It is in this context that the question has ordi-
narily arisen in Louisiana cases and has led, at times, to judicial
determinations of questionable consistency. If the action is
founded on an unlawful act, i.e., an offense or quasi-offense,
the period of prescription is one year 96 If the action is one in
revendication based on title, no liberative prescription is pro-
vided for in the Code; the action, however, becomes without
object where the movable has been acquired by someone as a
result of the three- or ten-year acquisitive prescription. 9 7
Finally, if the action is one resting on a quasi-contractual obliga-
tion, the period of prescription is ten years.3 98
The jurisprudence has almost consistently overlooked the
imprescriptibility of the revendicatory action and has decided
the question of the applicable prescription on the basis of the
alternative theories of delictua 39 9 and contractual"° or quasi-
difficulty reaching the same result by direct application of article 2164 rather than
with reference to the wording of the petition. See text at note 406 infra.
396. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3536 (1870). The one-year prescriptive period
begins to run from the day of the discovery of the fraudulent appropriation of the
movable property. McGuire v. Monroe Scrap Material Co., 189 La. 573, 180 So.
413 (1938) ; cf. Davis v. American Marine Corp., 163 So. 2d 163, 167 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1964) (prescription starts to run from the day of "an absolute, unquali-
fied refusal to deliver").
397. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3506, 3509 (1870).
398. Id. art. 3544.
399. See, e.g., McGuire v. Monroe Scrap Material Co., 189 La. 573, 180 So.
413 (1938) (action for the value of a stolen "Mickey Mack River Rig") ; Carter-
Allen Jewelry Co. v. Overstreet, 165 La. 887, 116 So. 222 (1928) (action against
agent for accounting for property placed in his custody) ; Ducros v. St. Bernard
Cypress Co., 164 La. 787, 114 So. 654 (1927) (action for the value of timber
unlawfully cut) ; J. A. Bel Lumber Co. v. Stout, 134 La. 987, 64 So. 881 (1914)
(action for the recovery of certain logs or damages; the court found that the
action sounded in tort and applied the one year prescription) ; Liles v. Producers'
Oil Co., 155 La. 385, 99 So. 339 (1924) (action for damages for the unlawful ex-
traction of oil) ; Liles v. Barnhart, 152 La. 419, 93 So. 490 (1922) (same) ; Mar-
tin v. Texas Oil Co., 150 La. 556, 90 So. 922 (1921) (same) ; Reynolds v. Reiss,
145 La. 155, 81 So. 884 (1919) (action for damages for the wrongful taking of
a switch track) ; Shields v. Whitlock & Brown, 110 La. 714, 34 So. 747 (1903)
(action for the value of timber unlawfully cut) ; Wood v. Harispe,: 26 La. Ann.
511 (1874) (action for the value of cotton converted by defendant),; Bender v.
" Leoney, :22 La. Ann. 488 (1870) (action for the value -of cotton sold without
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contractual actions.401 Illustratively, in Kramer v. Freeman, 4 2
the Louisiana Supreme Court declared that the owner of cash
and jewelry wrongfully detained by defendant had two causes
of action, one in tort and the other on "quasi-contract" or "an
implied contractual obligation to return it." Since it was found
that plaintiff had "waived" his tort action and elected to proceed
in quasi-contract, the applicable prescription was held to be ten
years. Obviously, it would have been more accurate to state
that plaintiff in that case had a revendicatory action and a
delictual action.
When the plaintiff has available two or more actions based
on different theories of recovery, it would seem that he should
be entitled to the appropriate relief without being bound to
make an election of remedies in his petition. In Louisiana, how-
ever, cases decided under the Code of Practice of 1870 indicate
that the plaintiff was held to an election.4 3 As a result of the
authority) ; Burch v. Willis, 21 La. Ann. 492 (1869) (same) ; Millspaugh v. City
of New Orleans, 20 La. Ann. 323 (1868) (action for the value of stone ballast
wrongfully taken by defendant) ; Davis v. Marican Marine Corp., 163 So. 2d 163
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1964) (action for the value of a swivel).
400. See, e.g., Faison v. Patout, 212 La. 37, 31 So. 2d 416 (1847) (action for
the recovery of jewelry) ; Clark Brothers Co. v. John Blank & Co., 3 Orl. App.
439 (La. App. 1906) (action for the recovery of movables) ; Kempt v. Kelly,
Gunby's Dec. 65 (La. App. 1885) (action for the recovery of the price of plain-
tiff's mule wrongfully sold by defendant) ; cf. Miller v. Krouse, 177 So. 472 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1937) ; Comment, Prescription, Classification and Concurrence of
Obligations, 36 TuL. L. Rav. 556 (1962).
401. See, e.g., Smith v. Phillips, 175 La. 198, 143 So. 47 (1932) (payment of
a thing not due) ; Heirs of Burney v. Ludeling, 47 La. Ann. 73 (1895) (action
for the proceeds of sale of lands) ; Gaty, McCune & Co. v. Babers, 32 La. Ann.
1091 (1880) (action for the price of certain materials belonging to plaintiff and
sold by defendant to third persons; held, the action was quasi-contractual, gov-
erned by the ten year prescription. The Gaty case was found to be "out of har-
mony with the more recent jurisprudence" in Importsales, Inc. v. Lindeman, 231
La. 663, 672, 92 So. 2d 574, 577 (1957) ; King v. Cressap, 22 La. Ann. 211 (1870)
(action for the recovery of furniture deposited with defendant) ; Roney v. Peyton,
159 So. 469 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935) (action for the recovery of sums paid by
officer of corporation in discharge of personal debt) ; Rizzio v. Moriarity, 1 Orl.
App. 150 (La. App. 1904) (sale of plaintiff's movables in good faith) ; cf. Roussel
v. Railways Realty Co., 165 La. 536, 115 So. 742 (1928) (action for rents pro-
duced by immovable) ; Bryceland Lumber Co. v. Kerlin, 143 La. 242, 78 So. 482
(1918) (action to recover sums paid by manager of corporation in discharge of
his personal obligation) ; Wardlaw v. Conrad, 137 So. 603 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1931) (action for the recovery of a diamond ring or its value; one year prescrip-
tion not applicable) ; Bender v. Looney, 22 La. Ann. 488 (1870) (action for the
recovery of the value of cotton sold without authority; held, the action was one in
tort, prescribable in one year. The court indicated, however, that plaintiff could
have sued in quasi-contract for the cotton itself in which case the applicable period
of prescription would have been ten years). Classification of the action as con-
tractual or delictual may also be important for other purposes. See, e.g., Morgan's
Louisiana Ry. v. Stewart, 119 La. 392, 44 So. 138 (1907) (attachment).
402. 198 La. 244, 3 So. 2d 609 (1941).
403. See Importsales, Inc. v. Lindeman, 231 La. 663, 670, 92 So. 2d 574, 576
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confusion surrounding the various theories of recovery and
the stress on the alternatives of delictual and contractual or
quasi-contractual actions, courts searched for frequently self-
contradictory language in the pleadings and held that a prayer
for the thing itself signified an action in contract or quasi-
contract,404 whereas a prayer for its value evidenced a delictual
action.40 5 Under the Code of Civil Procedure, however, Louisiana
courts will look to the theory of recovery indicated under the
circumstances rather than the wording of the pleading, since
articles 862 and 2164 insure that the "theory of a case" doctrine
is no longer applicable in trial or appellate procedure. 40 6
D. GERMAN LAW
The protection of real rights40 7 in Germany is regarded as a
matter of substantive rather than procedural law. The pertinent
question, therefore, is which claims accrue to the holder of a
real right in the event of an infringement of his right, rather
(1957) : "For the determination [of the nature of plaintiff's action] we must ex-
amine the allegations and prayer of the petition." The question whether a plain-
tiff's petition stating a cause of action in tort can be later amended to state an
action in restitution was left open in Davis v. Ameiican Marine Corp., 163 So. 2d
163 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
404. See Importsales, Inc. v. Lindeman, 231 La. 663, 669, 92 So. 2d 574, 576
(1957) : "With reference to a claim of the instant kind the proper main demand
in a suit in contract is for restitution to plaintiff of his property, or if it has
been sold, for judgement against the defendant for the proceeds of sale." Cf. Ed-
ward Levy Metals Inc. v. New Orleans Public Belt R.R., 243 La. 860, 140 So. 2d
580 (1963).
405. See Martin v. Texas Oil Co., 150 La. 556, 558, 90 So. 922, 923 (1921).
In this case, plaintiff sued for the value of oil unlawfully extracted from his land
and purchased by defendant, admittedly of good faith. The court said that the
action was one in tort, prescribing in one year, for the reason that plaintiff claimed
value rather than the oil itself. "Under the law, a distinction must be made be-
tween an action for the property itself," the court declared, "and one for its value,
in cases of this nature." See also Importsales, Inc. v. Lindeman, 231 La. 663, 669,
92 So. 2d 574, 576 (1957) ("In an action ex delicto . . . plaintiff's recourse is to
seek judgement for the value of the property wrongfully detained or appropri-
ated").
406. Article 862 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that "a final judg-
ment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings and the
latter contain no prayer for general and equitable relief." Article 2164 provides
that "the appellate court shall render any judgment which is just, legal, and
proper upon the record on appeal." Cf. Hughes v. O'Neal, 166 So. 2d 549 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1964).
407. The number of real rights under the German Civil Code (hereinafter
B.G.B.) is limited (humerus clausus) to the following nine: ownership (§§ 903-
1011), servitudes (§§ 1018-1093), right of preemption (§ § 1094-1104), real charges
(§§ 1105-1112), mortgages (§§ 1113-1190), land debts (§§1191-1198), annuity-
debts (§§ 1199-1203), pledge (§§ 1204-1296), and the heritable right to maintain
a structure under or above another's land (§§ 1012-1017, superseded by the law
of January 15, 1919). For details, see Yiannopoulos, Real Rights in Louisiana
and Comparative Law, 23 LA. L. REV. 518, 538-46 (1963).
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than which forms of procedure ought to be followed. In this
sense, the notion of real actions as known in Louisiana has no
exact equivalent in German law. However, the generally ac-
cepted term Anspruch (translated as claim) may be regarded
as the equivalent of the Roman. actio, expressed in terms of
substantive law. Real rights, in general, are protected by rules
found in various parts of the Civil Code as well as by rules of
public law, including criminal law, police and administrative
regulations, constitutional provisions, and even rules of public
international law. 4 8 This study will be limited to a brief dis-
cussion of the protection of real rights by rules contained in the
part of the Civil Code dealing with property.
Under the rules of property law, the infringement of real
rights gives rise to real claims (dingliche Anspriiche).409 Sub-
stantively, these claims are distinguished from obligatory and
other claims in the light of their origin. 410 Procedurally, how-
ever, real claims are subject to the same rules governing claims
in general, with the exception that the German Code of Civil
Procedure establishes a specific exclusive competency ratione
loci at the situs of immovable property involved in litigation.
41
'
In spite of the absence of procedural particularism, the actions
for the protection of real rights are distinguished into petitory
actions, i.e., actions for the protection of the property right
itself, and possessory actions, i.e., actions for the protection
of possession as factual control. 412 The petitory actions are fur-
408. See HEDEMANN, SACHENRECHT DES BtRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHES 194
(3d ed. 1960) ; BAUR, LEHRBUCH DES SACIIENRECHTS 105 (2d ed. 1963).
409. Cf. B.G.B. § 221. In the exceptional case of an unlawful interference
with a real right which fulfills also the requirements of an offense or quasi-
offense, a cross-reference is made in the property book of the Civil Code to the law
of delictual obligations for the settlement of the resulting obligatory claims. See
B.G.B. § 992.
410. As to their effects, however, real claims are in general subject to the same
rules governing obligatory claims. Real claims are subject to special rules only
where the law so provides (e.g., B.G.B. §§ 986-1003) or where deviation from the
rules governing obligatory claims is indicated in the light of their nature (e.g.,
in connection with assignment and prescription). See WOLFF-RAISER, SACHEN-
RECHT 9, 328 (10th ed. 1957) ; HEciC, GRUNDRISS DES SACHENRECHTS 126 (1930);
3 SOERGEL-SIEBERT-M1tIL, KOMMENTAR ZUM B.G.B., p. XV (9th ed. 1960).
411. See GERMAN CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (hereinafter cited Z.P.O.) § 24.
The same forum rei sitae of the immovable property is also available for the de-
termination of a number of obligatory claims, but in this case the competency is
concurrent rather than exclusive. Id. §§ 25, 26. For the realization of both per-
sonal and real claims concerning movables, appropriate forum is the court at the
domicile of the defendant (forum generale). Id. § 13.
412. See BAU1, LEHRBUCH DES SACHENRECHTS 66 (2d ed. 1963); ,WOLFF-
RAISER, SACHENRECHT 59, 69 (10th ed. 1957) ; WESTPRMANN, SACHENRECHT 101
(4th ed. 1960).
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ther divided into revendicatory and negatory. The retention of
these historical distinctions, and of the attendant terminology,
may be explained in the light of the peculiar nature of the claims
under consideration. In contrast with other claims, for example,
real claims are directed, as a rule, to satisfaction in natura and
injunctions for the future.4 13
The German Civil Code regulates in considerable detail the
protection of the right of ownership. These provisions apply
to both movables and immovables, and, by analogy, to real rights
other than ownership. 414 Ownership is protected, in the first
place, by the Herausgabeanspruch,4 5 corresponding to the Ro-
man rei-vindicatio. This action aims at the restoration of the
thing cum omni causa, i.e., recovery of possession of the thing
with all its emoluments (fruits and profits) .416 Plaintiff is
413. Section 249 of the Civil Code provides that, generally, compensation may
be had by satisfaction in natura. In practice, however, obligatory claims are ordi-
narily satisfied by a judgment for damages. See 1 SOERGEL-SIEBERT-SCITMIDT,
KOMMENTAR zum B.G.B. 920-930 (9th ed. 1959) ; EsssR, SCHULDRECHT 168 (2d
ed. 1960). Injunctions today have become available for the protection of other
absolute rights by application by analogy of the rules governing real rights (quasi
negatory action). Cf. text at notes 414, 439 infra. 3 SOERGEL-SIEBERT-MVHL,
KOMMENTAR ZUM B.G.B. 289 (9th ed. 1960) ; WOLFF-RAIsER, SACHENRECHT 350
(10th ed. 1957).
414., See, e.g., B.G.B. § 1065 (usufruct), § 1227 (pledge), law of Jan. 15,
1919, § 11 (heritable right to maintain a structure under or above another's land).
As to the ownership of individual apartments, see law of March 15, 1951, 3 SoER-
GEL-SIEBERT-BAUR, KOMMENTAR ZUM B.G.B. 323 (9th ed. 1960). In respect to
predial servitudes, the loss of possession is regarded as a disturbance which can be
set aside by the negatory action. See note 439 infra. Accordingly, the claims of
the holder of the servitude for fruits and damages are determined under the gen-
eral law rather than the rules of the revendicatory action. According to the pre-
vailing view, the rules applicable to revendication apply by analogy to the claims
of the holder of a predial servitude only if he has lost possession of both the domi-
nant estate and the servitude. See WOLFF-RAISER, SACHENRECHT 448 (10th ed.
1957) ; 3, 2 STAUDINGER-RING, KOMMENTAR ZUM B.G.B. 1073 (11th ed. 1963).
415. See B.G.B. § 985. Where the plaintiff can claim the same thing by
virtue of a contractual right, according to the prevailing opinion the revendicatory
action may be cumulated with the contractual action. See B.G.H.Z. 34, 122;
PALANDT-HOCJE, KOMMENTAR ZUM B.G.B. 899 (22d ed. 1963); WESTERMANN,
SACHENRECHT 137 (4th ed. 1960); HECK, GRUNDRISS DES SACHENRECHTS 277
(1930). Certain authors, however, suggest that in this case plaintiff must bring
forth the contractual action. WOLFF-RAISER, SACHENBECHT 320 (10th ed. 1957)
3 SOERGEL-SIEHERT-MfIHL, KOMMENTAR ZUM B.G.B. 249 (9th ed. 1960).
The revendicatory action, though available as to both movables, and immov-
ables, is much more frequently brought for the recovery of movables. This is
explained by the fact that the owner of immovable property has frequently an
effective remedy in the correction of the land-register. See B.G.B. § 894. This
claim for the elimination of obnoxious entries in the land-register is similar in
nature with the negatory action, discussed infra p. 673. See HECK, GRUNDRISS
DES SACHENRECHTS 169 (1930); 3 SOERGEL-SIEBERT-BAUR, KOMMENTAR ZUM
B.G.B. 112 (9th ed. 1960) ; BAUR, LEHRBUCH DES SACHENRECHTS 97 (2d ed.
1963).
416. For the notion of fruits and profits in German law, see Yidnnopoulos,
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ordinarily the dispossessed owner of the thing, defendant any
person possessing417 the thing without right.418 The defend-
ant must be specifically designated. If the defendant declines
to defend the action, the trial is concluded in favor of the
plaintiff. The judgment, if in favor of the plaintiff, pro-
nounces the duty of the defendant to make specific restitution.419
Since the action is directed to restoration of possession, a judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff does not, strictly speaking, con-
firm his ownership. 420 Plaintiff, however, may bring a declara-
tory action for the confirmation of his right of ownership or he
may join an action for restoration of possession with a declara-
tory action.421
The burden of proof of ownership rests on the plaintiff.
Once proved, however, ownership is presumed free of charges
and it is for the defendant to prove his right to the possession
of the thing.422 In that regard, the parties may invoke a number
of presumptions established in the Code. In actions for the re-
covery of immovable property there is a rebuttable presumption
Introduction to the Law of Things: Louisiana and Comparative Law, 22 LA. L.
REv. 756, 793-796 (1962).
417. Possession is defined in § 854 of the B.G.B. as "actual physical control
over a thing." This definition does not fully accord with the legal situation under
the Code. Indeed, not all persons having physical control over a thing qualify as
possessors. For example, under § 855 of the B.G.B. a person who exercises
physical control over a thing for another in the latter's household or place of
business and who must follow directions with respect to the thing is merely a
"possessory servant" while the master is the possessor. Conversely, persons not
having physical control over a thing may qualify as possessors. See 1 FOREIGN
OFFICE, MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW 113 (1950). One possessing as owner is
designated as Eigenbesitzer. B.G.B. § 872. If a person possesses as usufructuary,
pledgee, lessee, depositary, or in a similar relationship by virtue of which he is
temporarily entitled or bound to possess the thing on behalf of another, this person
(Fremdbesitzer) is a direct possessor. The person on whose behalf the thing is
possessed is termed indirect possessor. Id. § 868.
418. The action may also be brought by a person having indirect possession
against a person having direct possession. In this case, the action is directed to
the recovery of the indirect possession. See WOLFF-RAIsER, SACHENRECHT 322
(10th ed. 1957) ; BAUR, LEHRBUCH DES SACHENRECIITS 84 (2d ed. 1963) ; 3, 1
STAUDINGER-BERG, KOMmENTAR ZUM B.G.B. 779 (11th ed. 1956). Where the
action is brought by a landlord (indirect possessor) against a lessee (direct pos-
sessor) for the recovery of the leased thing upon termination of the lessee, the
revendicatory action may be cumulated with the contractual action. See text at
note 415 supra.
419. The judgment, if necessary, is executed by a ministerial officer (Gerichts-
vollzieher) who takes possession of the thing in the hands of the defendant and
delivers it to the plaintiff. See Z.P.O. § 883.
420. The judgment of restoration, in effect, constitutes an indirect confirma-
tion of plaintiff's ownership. See 3, 1 STAUDINGER-BERG, KOMMENTAR ZUM B.G.B.
774 (11th ed. 1956).
421. See Z.P.O. §§ 256, 260, 280; WOLFF-RAISER, SACIENRECHT 321 (10th ed.
1957); 3 SOERGEL-SIERERT-MtYHL, KOMMENTAR ZUM B.G.B. 255 (9th ed. 1960).
422. See WoLF-RAISER, SACHENRECHT 320 (10th ed. 1957).
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in favor of the person registered in the land-register., the
Grundbuch.423 In actions for the recovery of movable property
there is a rebuttable presumption in favor of the present pos-
sessor, but the revendicating owner may set aside this presump-
tion on proof that he has lost possession involuntarily, in which
case he has a rebuttable presumption in his favor as prior pos-
sessor.42 The defendant has a number of defenses available,
including his right to possession under rules of property law or
of the law of obligations.425
In case restoration of the thing has become impossible, the
revendicatory action is naturally directed to the recovery of
its value in the form of pecuniary compensation. This happens,
ordinarily, in the event of an accidental loss or destruction of
the thing, or a disposition by the defendant prior to the execu-
tion of the judgment.42  Where the thing has been only par-
tially destroyed or otherwise deteriorated, the action is directed
to recovery of possession plus pecuniary compensation. 427 This
pecuniary compensation is grounded on principles of property
423. See B.G.B. § 891. Where the defendant is in a position to invoke this
presumption, the plaintiff, in order to rebut the presumption, must prove that
the registered right does not exist in fact. See BAUR, LEHUBuCH DES SACHEN-
REOHTS 74 (2d ed. 1963).
424. See B.G.B. § 1006 (1). This provision, in most cases, favors the defend-
ant. See HEDEMANN, SACHENRECHT DES BtRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHES 174 (3d
ed. 1960). This presumption may be invoked only by a person possessing as owner,
whether by himself or through others. See BAUR, LEHRBUCH DES SACHENRECHTS
72 (2d ed. 1963).
425. See B.G.B. § 986.
426. Id. § 989. In either case the plaintiff is free to change his demand to
one for pecuniary compensation up to the time of the last oral argument. See
Z.P.O. § 268(3) ; BAUR, LEHRBUCH DES SACHENRECHTS 86 (2d ed. 1963). Plain-
tiff's original demand, however, cannot he stated in the alternative. See 3, 1
STAUDINGER-BERG, KOMMENTAR ZUM B.G.B. 774 (11th ed. 1956). The defendant
may effectively, but at his risk, dispose of the property prior to execution of the
judgment. His disposition has no influence on the proceeding. See Z.P.O. § 265;
STEIN-JONES-SCH6NKE-POHLE, KOM1MENTAR ZUR Z.P.O. § 265 n. TV, 2b (18th
ed. 1960). The plaintiff, instead of changing his demand to one for pecuniary
compensation and possibly to one for damages under § 989 of the B.G.B., may
in this case seek an execution order against defendant's successors or assigns,
provided that these persons acquired the property with knowledge of the pendency
of the action. See Z.P.O. §§ 325, 727, 731. The alienation by the defendant of a
thing that he knows belongs to plaintiff may be a punishable offense under § 246
of the Penal Code.
427. See 3, 1 STAUDINGER-BERO, KOMMENTAR ZUM B.G.B. 793 (11th ed.
1956). The revendicating owner cannot claim in this action the value of the
thing in lieu of recovery in kind, at least where the thing has not materially
deteriorated. In exceptional circumstances, a claim for the value of the thing
might find support in § 242 of the Civil Code. If the plaintiff is no longer inter-
ested in the recovery of the thing, his remedy is an action for damages (rather
than the revendicatory action) under the law of delictual obligations, provided
of course that the defendant has acquired the possession of the thing through the
perpetration of an unlawful act. See note 429 infra.
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law and is distinguished from claims for damages arising under
the law of delictual obligations.4 28 Ordinarily, the revendicatory
action cannot be cumulated with an action for damages based
on principles of delictual responsibility. The responsibility of
the possessor for loss, destruction, or deterioration of the thing
is governed, primarily, by rules of property law. However,
where the defendant has acquired possession as a result of the
perpetration of an offense, the owner may claim recovery of
the thing and damages, or damages only, under the rules of
delictual obligations. 429
The responsibility of the possessor for loss, destruction, or
deterioration of the thing, the apportionment of fruits and
profits produced by the thing, and the claim of the possessor
for reimbursement of expenses, are matters determined accord-
ing to the good or bad faith of the possessor. In general, good
faith is material only prior to the commencement of the action;
after the initiation of the proceedings a good faith possessor is
treated as a bad faith possessor (quasi-mala fides). A good
faith possessor is not liable for the loss, destruction, or deteriora-
tion of the thing, even if this is the result of his negligence. 48 0
A bad faith possessor is liable if the thing has been lost, de-
stroyed, or deteriorated through his fault.431 In cases where
the bad faith possessor has acquired possession by the com-
mission of an unlawful act, his liability in possession of the
thing is measured under the law of delictual obligations. 43 2
428. The nature of the action is important for the determination of the ap-
plicable period of prescription and for the jurisdiction of the courts. Thus,
delictual claims prescribe in three years while real claims prescribe in thirty years.
See B.G.B. §§ 852, 195. Further, as to delictual actions, jurisdiction ratione loci
is vested in the court at the place where the unlawful act has been perpetrated
and, as to the revendicatory action, at the place of the situs of the (immovable)
property. See Z.P.O. §§ 32, 24; HEDEMANN, SACHENRECHT DES BttRGERLICHEN
GESETZBUCHES 181 (3d ed. 1960); 3 SOERGEL-SIEBERT-MOHL, KOMMENTAR ZUM.
B.G.B. 268 (9th ed. 1960) ; W OLFF-RAiSER, SACHENRECHT 334 (10th ed. 1957).
429. Cf. B.G.B. § 992. This type of recovery is clearly predicated on fault.
430. See B.G.B. § 993 (1, 2).
431. Id. § 990. If the bad faith possessor is in default, his responsibility is
extended to cover accidental loss unless there is proof that the loss would have
occurred in spite of timely restoration of the thing. See B.G.B. 990 (2) ; 287.
Default is predicated on notice and fault, i.e., knowledge or negligent ignorance
that the thing must be restored to the true owner. The commencement of the
action constitutes sufficient notice. B.G.B. § 284(1), (2). The proof of the
possessor's fault, however, is a difficult matter and, therefore, the provision has
little significance in practice. See 3, 1 STAUDINGER-BERG, KOMMENTAR ZUM
B.G.B. 797 (11th ed. 1956).
432. See B.G.B. § 992, note 429 supra.
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. Where the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, the courts
are frequently faced with the question of the apportionment
of fruits and profits produced by the thing. A good faith pos-
sessor is entitled to keep all fruits and profits regularly pro-
duced. 433 The bad faith possessor must account to the owner
for all fruits and profits produced, as well as for those the
thing did not produce because of the possessor's negligence. 43 4
A bad faith possessor whose possession derives from an unlaw-
ful act is further liable under the law of delictual obligations
for all fruits and profits the owner might have extracted from
the thing, or for the fruits and profits the possessor has actually
derived although the owner would not have derived them.3 5
With respect to claims for reimbursement of expenses, a good
faith possessor is entitled to recover all necessary expenses, with
the exception of those regarded as ordinary management ex-
penses, as well as useful expenses to the extent that the value
of the thing has thereby increased. The increase in value is
determined as of the time of the delivery of the thing to the
owner.4 3 0 A bad faith possessor is entitled to recover only neces-
sary expenses, if the requirements of a management of affairs
in favor of the owner are satisfied.4 7 No possessor can claim
recovery for luxurious expenses.
Ownership is protected, in the second place, by the Beseiti-
gungs-und Unterlassungsanspruch, which is a broadened actio
negatoria of the Roman law.4 3 8 This action protects the right
of ownership, and by analogy other real rights,43 9 from un-
authorized disturbances falling short of dispossession. Any
unprivileged act of a third person, whether intentional, negli-
gent, or non-negligent, which encroaches on the owner's right,
constitutes an actionable disturbance. The action aims at elimi-
nation of the disturbance and injunction for the future. Where
433. See B.G.B. § 993 (1, 2). See also HEDEMANN, SACHENRECHT DES
BItRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHES 179 (3d ed. 1960) ; WoLFF-RAIsER, SACHENRECHT
332 (10th ed. 1957).
434. See B.G.B. §§ 987 (2), 990.
435. Id. § 992. See 3 SOERGEL-SIERERT-MYHL, KOMMENTAR ZUM B.G.B. 272
(9th ed. 1960).
436. See B.G.B. §§ 994-996.
437. Id. § 994(2). Ci. id. §§ 677-687.
438. See B.G.B. § 1004; WOLFF-RAISER, SACHENRECHT 347 (10th ed. 1957).
439. See B.G.B. §§ 1027 (predial servitudes) ; 1065 (usufruct) ; 1090 (limited
personal servitudes) ; 1134 (mortgage). In respect to predial servitudes, the
negatory action is available for the setting aside of any disturbance, including the
loss of possession of the servitude. See 3, 2 STAUDINGER-RING, KOMMENTAR ZUM.
B.G.B. 1074 (11th ed. 1963).
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the disturbance fulfills the requirements of delictual responsi-
bility, the action may also be directed to the recovery of dam-
ages.440 The action is available both for movables and immov-
ables, but, by its nature, it is almost exclusively used for the
protection of immovable property.441 In practice, the action is
most frequently brought to contain excessive omissions origi-
nating in neighboring immovables and, generally, in order to
eliminate what would be considered in common law terminology
as trespassory invasions.
Plaintiff must prove his right of ownership and the fact of
interference. The burden of proof of ownership may be dis-
charged with the assistance of the same rebuttable presumptions
available under the Code to the revendicating owner. Owner-
ship, once proved, is presumed to be free of charges, and it is
for the defendant, by way of defense, to prove a real or personal
right which authorized the invasion of plaintiff's property. The
negatory action may be cumulated with the revendicatory action,
in case the dispossessed owner is interested in the removal of
obnoxious structures erected by the defendant on the immov-
able.442 The broad scope of the negatory action, and its avail-
ability by analogy to holders of real rights other than owner-
ship, has rendered unnecessary provisions for an action cor-
responding to the Roman actio confessoria.
Ownership is further protected by two actions, one of which
is similar to the revendicatory action and the other to the nega-
tory action. Both actions arise under the rules of property law.
The first is granted by article 1005 of the Civil Code to the
owner of a thing, which, after having escaped the owner's pos-
session, is located on an immovable possessed by another person.
The owner under this article may demand permission to enter,
search for, and recover his thing. As in the case of the revendi-
catory action, the recovery of the thing is only an indirect con-
firmation of the claimant's right of ownership. The second
action is granted by article 894, to any person having a legiti-
mate interest, for the correction of the Grundbuch so as to
reflect accurately the existing legal situation.443
440. See WOLFF-RAISER, SACHENRECHT 349 (10th ed. 1957).
441. See BAua, LEHRBUCH DES SACHENRECHTS 91 (2d ed. 1963) ; WOLFF-
RAISER, SACITENRECHT 347 (10th ed. 1957).
442' See BAUR, LEIRBUCH DES SACHENRECHTS 95 (2d ed. 1963).
443. Id. at 140, 144. Cf. note 414 supra. Ownership is also protected, in-
directly, by he right of intervention to recover movables or immovables in execu-
tory proceedings or in bankruptcy. See Z.P.O. § 771, K.O. § 43.
[Vol. XXV
REAL ACTIONS IN LOUISIANA
Possession under the German Civil Code is protected by two
possessory actions and, under certain circumstances, by the
authorization of self-help. In all cases, protection is predicated
on an unlawful interference, i.e., an interference which is neither
in accord with the will of the possessor nor authorized by law.4
44
The good faith of the aggressor, or his right to possession, is
immaterial. The possession acquired by means of an unlawful
interference is designated as defective. 445 The possession of the
aggressor's heirs is always defective, but that of his other
assigns is defective only if at the time of transfer of possession
these assigns knew of the defect. 446 The possessory actions are
directed either to the recovery of a lost possession or to the
discontinuation of a disturbance447 and injunction for the future,
if further disturbances are expected. 448  Either action must be
brought within a year of the dispossession or disturbance. How-
ever, even if timely brought, either action will fail, if plaintiff's
possession is defective against the defendant or his ancestors
and has been acquired by plaintiff within a year prior to the
dispossession or disturbance, of which he complains. 449 In effect,
this rule extends the period for recovery of possession by force,
because interferences with the possession of the aggressor within
a year of the dispossession are not actionable.
The possessory actions may be brought by the direct posses-
sor,450 whether he possesses for himself or for others, and by
the indirect possessor in case of interference with the possession
of the direct possessor by third persons.45 1 In the interest of
expedient disposition of the possessory action, the defendant
444. See B.G.B. § 858(1). Fault is not necessary. See 3, 1 STAUDINGER-
SEUFERT, KOMMENTAR ZUM B.G.B. 48 (11th ed. 1956).
445. See B.G.B. § 858(2).
446. Id. § 858(2).
447. Id. §§ 861, 862(1, 1). Strictly speaking, distinction is not made in Ger-
many between disturbance in law and disturbance in fact. However, the notion
of disturbance is broad enough to cover not only what would be considered in
Louisiana as disturbance in fact but also disturbance in law.
448. See B.G.B. 861 (1), (2).
449. Id. §§861(2), 862(2).
450. The possessory actions are thus available to holders of real rights sus-
ceptible of possession, such as predial servitudes (B.G.B. § 1029), usufruct
(B.G.B. § 1936), limited personal servitudes (B.G.B. § 1090(2)), and pledge
(B.G.B. § 1205). The right of preemption, real charges, mortgages, land-debts,
and annuity debts do not give rise to a right to possession. Accordingly, as to these
rights, the possessory actions are not available.
451. See B.G.B. §§ 869, 868. The indirect possessor cannot bring the posses-
sory actions against the direct possessor while the latter possesses for him. See 3
SOERGEL-SIEBERT-ROTHE, KOMMENTAR ZUM B.G.B. 38 (9th ed. 1960).
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cannot assert title or a right to possession. 45 2 He may bring,
however, a separate petitory action. In this case, the two ac-
tions proceed independently and, as a result, the parties are
subjected to a true race of diligence. If the possessory action
is disposed of first and the plaintiff is successful, possession is
restored to him pending disposition of the petitory action. If
the petitory action is passed upon first, the possessory action
abates, since the rights of the parties are fully determined in this
proceeding.45
The possessory actions have limited practical significance
today. In the first place, the evicted or disturbed possessor, in
the great majority of cases, is also the owner or holder of a
real right and has at his disposal the much more effective
remedies for the protection of the right of ownership. In the
second place, actions for the protection of possession have proved
in practice much slower remedies than the proceeding of
Einstweilige Verfiigung (provisional disposition), which is gen-
erally available under the Code of Civil Procedure.454 This pro-
ceeding displays certain functional similarities with the Louisi-
ana writ of sequestration. The possessory actions retain their
significance in cases where neither party has a right to posses-
sion or where a lessee seeks protection against excessive omis-
sions from neighboring immovables. 455
Self-help, in contrast with the possessory actions, has still
much practical significance. The Civil Code accords to the pos-
sessor the privilege to exercise reasonable force to repel aggres-
sion and, in case of dispossession, to recover possession. In that
regard, distinction is made between movables and immovables.
The possession of movables may be recovered by force when the
aggressor is caught in the act or is immediately pursued. The
possession of immovables may be recovered only by the expul-
sion of the aggressor immediately following dispossession. 458
Self-help may be exercised by one possessing as owner,4 57 by
452. B.G.B. § 863. The defendant, however, may deny that he has committed
an unlawful interference. See 3 SOERGEL-SIEBERT-ROTHE, KOMMENTAR ZUM
B.G.B. 25 (9th ed. 1960).
453. See B.G.B. § 864(2). It is questionable whether the one who has com-
mitted the unlawful interference may rely on a petitory judgment in his favor
which antedates the interference. See 3 SOERGEL-SIEBERT-ROTHE, KOMMENTAR
ZUM B.G.B. 27 (9th ed. 1960).
454. See Z.P.O. § 935.
455. See BAUR, LEIMBUCH DES SACHENRECHTS 66 (2d ed. 1963).
456. See B.G.B. §§ 859(2) (movables) ; 839(3) (immovables).
457. The privilege of self-help is even granted to persons having defective
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"possessory servants,' 458 and by persons who, for the time being,
are entitled or bound to possess for another.459 A person posses-
sing through others (indirect possessor) is not entitled to exer-
cise self-help.460 Recovery by force is also excluded where mov-
ables escaping one's possession are located on an immovable pos-
sessed by another. In this case, the possessor of the movables
has a claim against the possessor of the immovable for permis-
sion to conduct a search and recover the movables. 46 1
In addition to his claims arising under the law of property,
an evicted possessor or one disturbed in his possession may have
claims arising under the rules of delictual obligations and unjust
enrichment.462 The question of the nature of possession and of
possessory actions has given rise to interminable discussions in
Germany. Today it is frequently stated that possession, though
not a right, is legally protected as a pecuniary interest and a
factual relationship in the interest of public peace.
463
A peculiar action which arises under article 1007 of the Civil
Code and combines characteristics of both petitory and posses-
sory actions deserves special consideration. 464  This action,
granted to a prior possessor for the recovery of movables in the
hands of a present possessor, is essentially possessory in nature.
The plaintiff, however, if successful, recovers possession defin-
itively as against his opponent and the defendant is not deprived
of defenses resting on his right to possession. These are obvi-
ously characteristics of petitory actions. The action is available
to a prior possessor who acquired his possession in good faith
and did not relinquish it voluntarily. It is brought against a
present possessor who either acquired possession in bad faith or
who, regardless of his good or bad faith, acquired possession of
possession. See 3 SOEROEL-SIEBERT-ROTHE, KOMMENTAR zUm B.G.B. 19 (9th ed.
1960).
458. See B.G.B. §§ 860, 855; note 417 supra.
459. See B.G.B. § 859(1), note 417 supra.
460. See 3 SOER(EL-SIEBERT-ROTIE, KOMMENTAR ZUM B.G.B. 38 (9th ed.
1960).
461. See B.G.B. § 867.
462. Id. §§ 823, 812. See BAuR, ILEIIRBUCH DES SACHENRECHTS 68, 69 (2d ed.
1963).
463. See WOLFF-RAISER, SACHENRECHT 52 (10th ed. 1957). This explanation
has been criticized. See HECK, GRUNDRISS DES SACHIENRECIITS 12 (1930) ; BAUR,
LEHRBUCH DES SACHENRECHTS 65 (2d ed. 1963) (arguing that this "theory of
peace" should give way to a "theory of continuity," in the light of an individual's
interest in his possession).
464. See HEDEMANN, SACHENRECHT DES B1VRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHES 191
(3d ed. 1960) ; 3 SOERGEL-SIEBERT-MfHL, KOMMENTAR ZUM B.G.B. 318 (9th ed.
1960).
1965]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
a thing lost, stolen, or otherwise taken from the custody of the
prior possessor without his consent. The action has great prac-
tical significance in cases where neither party is in a position
to prove an obligatory or real right to possession. In spite of its
apparent functional similarity with the actio Publiciana of the
Roman law, the action of the previous possessor may be traced
directly to ancient Germanic conceptions. 46 5
The discussion may conclude with a reference to actions for
the partition of immovable property,4 6 the action of boundary, 46 7
and the action for the payment of a credit secured by mort-
gage.4 68 This last action aims directly at satisfaction of the un-
paid credit by judicial sale of the mortgaged immovable. In that
regard, it differs essentially from the Roman actio hypothecaria
in rem, which aimed at taking possession of the property for the
purpose of subjecting it to judicial sale. 469
E. GREEK LAW
The Greek Civil Code is so similar to the German Civil Code
in its conceptual technique and methodology that detailed discus-
sion here of the protection accorded to real rights in Greece
would be largely repetitious. Attention, therefore, will be fo-
cused on points of difference between the two codes.
In general, the Greek Civil Code has deviated from the com-
plex structure of the German Civil Code pertaining to the pro-
tection of ownership and possession in favor of much simpler
solutions along the lines of Roman law and national practices
prior to codification.47 0 Real actions 47 1 are classified as either
petitory or possessory. Ownership, and by analogy other real
465. See WOLFF-RAISER, SACHENRECIIT 69 n.1 (10th ed. 1957).
466. See B.G.B. §§ 749, 1008. See STEIN-JONAS-SCH6NKE-POHLE, KOMMENTAR
ZUR ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG, § 24 n.III, 6 (18th ed. 1960).
467. See B.G.B. § 919.
468. Id. §§ 1113, 1147.
469. See WOLFF-RAISER, SACHENRECHT 572 (10th ed. 1957). Section 1147
of the B.G.B. applies by analogy to land-debts. Id. § 1192.
470. See Zepos, Law of Things and Real Actions in Greece, 29 TUL. L. REV.
697 (1955).
471. In contrast with the German Civil Code, the Greek Civil Code does em-
ploy the term "real actions." See GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1292. Real actions
under the Code are clearly those for the protection of real rights. They are con-
trasted to personal actions, available for the protection of personal rights, and
mixed actions which, like the actions of boundary (art. 1020) and partition
(art. 799), involve both personal and real elements. See Zepos, Law of Things
and Real Actions in Greece, 29 TUL. L. REV. 697, 712 (1955) ; Diamantakos,
Unlawful Infringement of Another's Real Rights, 31 E.E.N. 609 (1964) (in
Greek).
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rights, 472 are protected under the Code by three petitory actions:
the revendicatory action, the negatory action, and the Publician
action. Predial servitudes are especially protected by the con-
fessory action, and the right of mortgage by the hypothecary
action.
The revendicatory action may be defined as the claim of a
dispossessed owner against a possessing non-owner for the
recognition of his ownership and return of the thing.473 The
action is available for both movables and immovables. Plaintiff
is the owner or a person to whom the owner has assigned the
revendicatory action. Defendant is any person having posses-
sion 474 or detention 475 at the time of the commencement of the
action.
476
The defendant has several defenses available. He may deny
that the plaintiff was ever the owner of the thing and assert
that he is the owner. He may also, without necessarily conceding
plaintiff's right of ownership, assert his right to possession or
detention vis-a-vis the owner by virtue of a contractual or real
right.477 The plaintiff has the burden of proof of his ownership,
472. Under the Greek Civil Code real rights are only ownership, servitudes,
pledge, and mortgage (art. 973). Possession is neither personal nor real but a
sui generis patrimonial right. Protection analogous to that of ownership is ac-
corded to the right of usufruct (art. 1173), habitation (cf. art. 1187), and pledge
(art. 1236). However, the nature of pledge excludes claims for fruits and profits
or resort to the Publician action.
473. See GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1094. Plaintiff may limit his demand to the
recognition of his ownership or to the recovery of possession. Where plaintiff
has not been dispossessed, the revendicatory action cannot be brought. Plaintiff,
however, may bring for the recognition of his ownership an action for a
declaratory judgment under article 127 of the Introductory Law of the Civil
Code.
474. Possession is defined in the Civil Code as the exercise of physical control
over a (corporeal) thing animo domini (art. 974). The exercise of servitudes
and pledge under claim of right is qualified as quasi-possession (art. 975). Pos-
session may be exercised personally or through others. The person having actual
control on behalf of another is called detentor (cf. art. 997).
475. Defendant thus may be a person exercising physical control on behalf
of a third person (e.g., as lessee of the animo domini possessor) or even on behalf
of the plaintiff (e.g., as depositary of plaintiff's property). When the action is
addressed against the animo domini possessor, even if he does not exercise pos-
session personally, a judgment against him will be executed against any person
having control over the thing on behalf of the defendant. GREEK CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE art. 867(4). If the action is addressed against persons exercising
detention or quasi-possession, these persons are entitled to implead the animo
domini possessor. Id. arts. 69, 608. The judgment has res judicata effect against
the animo domini possessor only if he has been sued or impleaded.476. If at the time of the commencement of the action the defendant is no
longer in possession, plaintiff's remedy against him is an action for damages
under article 1098 of the Civil Code rather than the revendicatory action. See
BALIS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 220 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek).
477. See GR.E CIVIL CODE art. 1095.
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unless the defendant concedes plaintiff's prior ownership and
asserts affirmatively his own present right of ownership, in
which case the burden of proof shifts to the defendant. The per-
son asserting ownership of immovable property must prove ac-
quisition by original title or from a person who had original
title.4 78 This probatio diabolica necessitates the tracing of land
titles for a period in excess of twenty years which is the requisite
time for the acquisitive prescription of immovable property.
Ownership of movables is proved with the assistance of two pre-
sumptions. Under article 1110 the present possessor of mov-
ables may rely on the presumption that he is the owner of the
things. Plaintiff may rebut this presumption on proof that he
was possessor and that he has been dispossessed as a result of
loss or theft.47 9 In this case, a presumption arises under article
1111 that plaintiff was the owner during the period of his pos-
session. 48° This presumption is likewise rebuttable. Since under
the Code the ownership of movables may be acquired in certain
circumstances a non domino,481 the revendicatory action for the
recovery of movables has lost some of the practical significance
it had under Roman-Byzantine law.
As in Germany, the liability of the possessor for loss, de-
struction, or deterioration of the thing, the apportionment of
fruits and profits, and claims for reimbursement of expenses
are matters determined primarily in the light of the possessor's
good or bad faith. A good faith possessor prior to the commence-
ment of the action is not liable for the loss, destruction, or de-
terioration of the thing, need not account to the owner for fruits
and profits, and has a claim for reimbursement of necessary and
useful expenses. 4 2 After the commencement of the action, the
good faith possessor is liable for loss, destruction, or deteriora-
478. Cf. id. arts. 239, 1033. This is so because with respect to the acquisition,
of immovable property the Code adopts the maxim that no one can transfer a
greater right than that he himself has.
479. Proof of loss or theft, however, does not rebut the presumption of owner-
ship in favor of the present possessor where the property involved in litigation
is money or negotiable titles issued to the order of the bearer. Of. GREEK CIVIL
CODE arts. 1039, 1110.
480. If the plaintiff cannot prove that he lost possession as a result of loss or
theft, he must prove that he has acquired ownership and that the defendant has
not acquired the right he claims. This can be done also in the case of money
and negotiable titles issued to the order of the bearer. If the plaintiff proves.
that the defendant acquired possession from him and that defendant presently
exercises possession on behalf of the plaintiff, proof of ownership may be dis-
pensed with because plaintiff may rely on the presumption of article 1111.
481. See GRF-ny CIVIL CODE arts. 1036-1039.
482. Id. arts. 1100, 1101, 1103.
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tion of the thing attributed to his fault.48 3 If he is in default,
i.e., he positively knows that he is bound to restore the thing,
his liability is extended to cover accidental damage, unless he
proves that the damage would have occurred in any event. 48 4 He
must account to the owner for fruits and profits received, even
if the owner would not have received them, or for fruits and
profits which did not materialize owing to his fault, if they could
have been produced under regular management. His claim for
reimbursement is limited to necessary expenses other than ordi-
nary management expenses. The bad faith possessor occupies
the same position as the good faith possessor after the com-
mencement of the action. But if he has acquired possession
through the perpetration of an unlawful act, the bad faith pos-
sessor is liable to the owner for damages under the law of de-
lictual obligations. 48 5 All possessors are given the right to detach
the essential component parts they have attached to the thing
(jus tollendi) and to retain the thing until satisfaction of their
claim for expenses (jus retentionis) .486
The negatory action is available for the protection of real
rights against disturbances falling short of dispossession. 48 7 The
action applies to both movables and immovables and aims at set-
ting aside disturbances with an injunction for the future. Plain-
tiff may be the owner, co-owner, usufructuary, or pledgee. Mere
detentors, like lessees, cannot bring this action. Defendant is the
person who has caused the disturbance, or bis heirs and assigns
who continue the disturbance. The plaintiff must prove his real
right, as in the case of the revendicatory action, and the fact of
483. Id. art. 1097. Alienation of the litigious property by the defendant after
the commencement of the action has no influence on the proceeding. If the plain-
tiff is successful, the court will order the defendant to return the thing and the
judgment may be executed against third persons deriving title from the defendant.
See GREEK CODE OF CIVIL PROcEDuRE art. 867(4). In the case of movables, how-
ever, execution against third persons is excluded if these persons have acquired
ownership under arts. 1036-1039 of the Civil Code. When defendant's assigns
have not acquired ownership of the litigious property, plaintiff has the choice of
proceeding against them for recovery in kind or against the defendant claiming
damages under article 1097 of the Civil Code. The liability of the defendant
is measured according to the principles of unjust enrichment, and, if he is in
default, according to the principles of delictual obligations. See BALIS, CIVIL LAW
PROPERTY 233 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek).
484. See GREEK CIVI CODE arts. 1098, 344.
485. Id. art. 1099.
486. Id. arts. 1104, 1106.
487. Id. art. 1108. The disturbance need not be attributed to the fault of the
person who caused it. The notion of the disturbance for the purpose of the nega-
tory action is the same as that for the foundation of the possessory action. See
text at note 497 infra.
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the disturbance. The defendant may effectively defend the
action by proving a real or obligatory right which entitles him
to perform the acts characterized by plaintiff as disturbances.
In addition to this action, plaintiff may have a claim for dam-
ages under the rules of delictual obligations.
The Publician action is very similar in its function to the
revendicatory action and is governed by the same rules applied
by analogy. 488 It differs from the revendicatory action in that
the plaintiff need not prove acquisition of ownership by original
title or from persons who had original title. The plaintiff, in
order to recover, must merely prove that he has acquired pos-
session of the property by meeting the requirements for acquisi-
tive prescription and that he has been evicted prior to the com-
pletion of the prescription. By its nature, the action cannot be
brought against the true owner, or against persons situated in
the same position as plaintiff. Under the regime of the Civil
Code, the action applies only to immovable property. The rea-
sons for this limitation are that the ownership of movables may
be acquired a non domino and that there is a presumption of
ownership in favor of the present possessor.
48 9
Plaintiff in the Publician action is a person having acquired
possession by meeting the requirements of acquisitive prescrip-
tion but evicted prior to the completion of the prescriptive period,
as well as his heirs and assigns. Plaintiff may also be a person
claiming co-ownership or usufruct 90 Defendant is the posses-
sor or detentor of the immovable, whose right is inferior to that
of the plaintiff. For the rest, the defenses available to the de-
fendant, his liability for loss, destruction, or deterioration of the
property, the apportionment of fruits and profits, and claims
for expenses are subject by analogy to the rules governing the
revendicatory action. Where the plaintiff has been merely dis-
turbed in his possession, without being evicted, the Publician
action functions as a negatory action.
Predial servitudes are especially protected by the confessory
action. 491 This action arises when the holder of the right is evict-
ed or otherwise disturbed in the exercise of his servitude. Plain-
tiff is the owner or Publician possessor of the dominant estate
488. See GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1112.
489. See text at notes 480, 482 8upra.
490. See GREEK CIVIL CODE arts. 1116, 1173.
491. Id. arts. 1132-1133.
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and beneficiary of the servitude. Defendant is the person who
has caused the disturbance. Plaintiff must prove his acquisition
of the servitude, the ownership of the grantor of the servitude,
and the fact of disturbance. The defendant may defend the ac-
tion by proving that he has a real or obligatory right which en-
titles him to object to the exercise of the alleged servitude. The
action is directed to a judgment recognizing the right of servi-
tude, setting aside the disturbance, and prohibiting any future
disturbances. A claim for damages under the rules of delictual
obligations may be cumulated with this action. The confessory
action is also available in the form of a quasi-Publician action;
for example, it may be brought by one who has acquired a servi-
tude by meeting the requirements of acquisitive prescription, if
he has been disturbed prior to the completion of the prescriptive
period. For the rest, the rules governing the revendicatory ac-
tion may apply by analogy.
The mortgage creditor has, in addition to a personal action
against his debtor for the payment of the debt, a real action re-
ferred to in the Civil Code as hypothecary action. 492 By this ac-
tion, which is predicated on a valid mortgage and a debt due, the
creditor may obtain satisfaction by means of a judicial sale of
the mortgaged immovable at public auction. The action must be
brought in the first place against the debtor; but if the mort-
gage has been granted by a third person, or the immovable is
now in the hands of persons possessing under a lawful title, the
hypothecary action must be brought also against these persons.
A judgment in favor of the creditor is effective erga omnes and
orders the person in possession of the immovable to accept the
judicial sale. Neither the debtor, in case the creditor elects to
bring the personal action, nor the persons in possession of the
immovable, in case the creditor elects to bring the hypothecary
action, may invoke the benefit of discussion. Third persons in
possession of the immovable, however, may invoke any exception
the debtor has against the creditor, as well as any exceptions de-
riving from their own relations with the creditor, and they may
contest the validity of the title or of the registration and the
actual existence of the mortgage. From the procedural view-
point, the hypothecary action is closely regulated in the Code of
Civil Procedure.
492. Id. arts. 1291-1301.
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Possession under the Greek Civil Code is protected by the
privilege of self-help and a variety of possessory actions. Any
possessor, however wrongful his possession may be, is entitled
to protect his possession by the exercise of reasonable force. The
same privilege is accorded to persons possessing on behalf of
their master or principal. The regulation of this privilege in the
Code follows the pattern of the German Civil Code.
4 93
A person evicted from possession unlawfully and without his
consent has under article 987 of the Greek Civil Code an action
for the recovery of possession. 494 Plaintiff is the person who had
possession at the time of the eviction, or his heirs and assigns.
In case possession was exercised by a detentor (e.g., a lessee) on
behalf of the lawful possessor, the action may be brought against
a third aggressor by either or both of these persons. Where pos-
session has been usurped by the detentor, the lawful possessor
may bring the possessory action against him. But an evicted de-
tentor has no possessory action against the person from whom
he derived his detention (for example, against his lessor) .4 5
Defendant is the person who evicted plaintiff, if he is still in pos-
session at the time of the commencement of the action, whether
he exercises possession personally or through others. If at the
time of the commencement of the action the wrongdoer is out of
possession, plaintiff may either sue him for damages under the
law of delictual obligations or proceed against any third person
whose possession vis-a-vis the plaintiff is defective. If, after
the commencement of the action, the wrongdoer transfers pos-
session to third persons or otherwise loses it, the proceeding con-
tinues regularly and the judgment is executed against any per-
son who took possession pendente lite.496 Object of the action is
the recovery of possession. The action may be cumulated with
an action for damages under the law of delictual obligations, or
with an action for the return of the thing by virtue of an oblig-
493. Cf. text at notes 458-463 supra. GREEK CIVIL CODE arts. 282-284, 985-986.
494. The quasi-possessor of the rights of servitude and pledge is accorded the
same protection as the possessor of corporeal things. See GREEK CODE art. 996.
This protection avails also against the animo domini possessor or owner of the
encumbered thing.
495. See id. art. 997. This article of the Civil Code, departing from the strict
Roman law notions, establishes the concept of "protected detention." For reasons
of practical necessity, the Code accords the possessory actions to persons who
acquired physical control over a thing from the animo domini possessor by virtue
of a lease, deposit, or other similar obligatory relationships. The privilege of self-
help, however, has not been extended to a mere detentor.
496. See GREEK CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 867(4).
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atory right. Plaintiff must prove his prior possession and the
fact of eviction.
Unlawful interferences falling short of dispossession are ac-
tionable under article 989 of the Civil Code. This article pro-
vides that any person unlawfully disturbed in his possession may
obtain judgment ordering the discontinuation of the disturbance
and prohibiting future invasions. Disturbance may be either an
act or an omission. Plaintiff is the unlawfully disturbed posses-
sor and his heirs or assigns. An unlawfully disturbed detentor
may bring the action only against third persons. Defendant is
the person who caused the disturbance, his heirs, or persons pos-
sessing on his behalf. Plaintiff must prove his possession and
the disturbance.
The defendant may defend both possessory actions by rais-
ing the defense of defective possession, i.e., that plaintiff ac-
quired possession wrongfully vis-a-vis the defendant or his an-
cestors during the year prior to the eviction or disturbance.
4 97
He cannot defend, however, by asserting a right by virtue of
which he may be entitled to possession, unless this right has
been recognized by final and unappealable decision in litigation
between plaintiff and the defendant. 49  Both possessory actions
prescribe in a year from the time of the eviction or interference.
Rights to possession may be provisionally determined, inde-
pendently of any possessory action, in a special summary pro-
ceeding initiated by application to the Justice of the Peace at
the situs of an immovable. In this so-called proceeding of "pro-
visional measures, ' 499 the judge may grant possession to either
litigant on the basis of a cursory examination of the merits of
each case. This disposition has no res judicata effect in a sub-
497. See GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 988. Article 629 of the Greek Code of Civil
Procedure, inspired from articles 25 and 26 of the French Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, establishes a general prohibition against the cumulation or consolidation
of petitory and possessory actions. In applying this article in the past, Greek
courts reached results comparable to those reached in France. See text at notes
90-96 supra. Today, article 629 is considered as repealed by implication as con-
trary to the provisions of the Civil Code. See INTRODUCTORY LAW to the GREEK
CIVIL CODE art. 1; BALIS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 83 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek).
498. See GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 991. The defendant, therefore, cannot defend
a possessory action by asserting his ownership, or other real or obligatory right,
which enables him to claim possession. But the defendant may deny the founda-
tion of the action, i.e., that an unlawful eviction or disturbance occurred, by
asserting that he himself had possession or detention from plaintiff by virtue
of a real or obligatory right and that the acts complained of were merely the
exercise of his rights or of privileged self-help.
499. Law r*hz of 1911, as amended.
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sequent possessory action. Possession, being a patrimonial right
under the Code, is finally protected by actions for declaratory
judgments, unjust enrichment, and damages under the law of
delictual obligations.
F. COMMON LAW
An exposition of the protection accorded in common law ju-
risdictions to interests in property is a particularly difficult task
due to the complex structure of substantive and procedural in-
stitutions. 50° A detailed comparison with the civil law in this
area is an almost impossible undertaking due to substantial dif-
ferences in conceptual technique and the frequent absence of
equivalents. Accordingly, the discussion will be limited to es-
sentials.
Current forms of property protection in common law juris-
dictions may be fully understood only in the light of the his-
torical evolution prior to the era of procedural reform. Common
law actions for the protection of property rights were distin-
guished according to their subject matter, perhaps under the
influence of civilian doctrine, as personal, real, or mixed. 50 ' Ac-
tions for the recovery of damages to any species of property, as
well as actions for the recovery of specific chattels, were desig-
nated as personal.50 2 Actions for the recovery of lands, tene-
ments, and hereditaments were referred to as real. Actions for
the recovery of real property, as well as for damages for injuries
to the property, were qualified as mixed. Mixed actions came to
be treated commonly as species of real actions.
50 3
Interests in real property were protected, primarily, by the
real (and mixed) actions.50 4 These actions were divided into
proprietary and possessory, according to whether plaintiff
500. The matter is ordinarily dealt with separately from the viewpoints of
real and personal property law, torts, equity, and procedure. Cf. WOLFF-RAISER,
SACIHENRECHT 319 n.1 (10th ed. 1957).
501. See MARTIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE AT COMMON LAW 8 (1899) ; 2 POLLOCK
AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 570 (2d ed. 1899).
502. The category of personal actions was broad enough to include, in addition
to actions for damages to property and recovery of chattels, actions for the re-
covery of a debt, breach of contract, and injuries to the absolute or relative rights
of a person. Personal actions were said to arise either ex contractu or ex delictu.
See MARTIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE AT COMMON LAW 8 (1899).
503. See ROSCOE, ACTIONS RELATING TO REAL PROPERTY 1, 3 (1840) ; MARTIN,
CIVIL PROCEDURE AT COMMON LAW 8 (1899).
504. See generally 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 46-80
(2d ed. 1899).
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sought recovery on the strength of his title or merely on the
strength of his possession. The proprietary actions were basic-
ally of two kinds, writs of right properly-so-called (four spe-
cies), and writs in the nature of writs of right (eighteen
species). Possessory actions were just as numerous. Of most
frequent use were the "most ancient and favored" 505 writs of
assize, the writs of entry, the writ of waste, and the writ of forc-
ible entry and detainer, which, strictly speaking, was an inci-
dent to a criminal prosecution rather than a real action. The
possessory actions were available to any person having actual,
quiet, and peaceable possession of lands, irrespective of the
means by which he acquired it. Possessory and proprietary ac-
tions were concurrent remedies. Proprietary actions, however,
involved delays and were seldom brought when the simpler and
much more speedy possessory actions were also available. None
of the real actions had more than a temporary place in American
law, apart from the practice in parts of New England, where
resort was made at an early date to simplified versions of these
actions.506 In modern times, the various real actions merged into
a few simple forms under the name of ejectment. 0 7 Apart from
the real actions, protection was afforded to interests in real
property by equitable remedies °0 and the "exceptionally rigor-
ous" 5°9 personal actions of trespass and trespass on the case, di-
rected to the recovery of damages for unprivileged interferences
with the possession and enjoyments of land.
Interests in the possession and ownership of personal prop-
erty were likewise protected by actions at law and equitable
remedies. The earliest forms of protection were the pursuit of
the thief, and the actio furti,510 which gave way to the writs of
trespass and trespass on the case.511 Trespass was strictly a per-
sonal action directed to the recovery of the value of the chattel.
Other early common law remedies for the protection of interests.
505. MARTIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE AT COMMON LAW 120 (1899).
506. See MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL.
PERSPECTIVE 470 (1952).
507. See text at note 518 infra.
508. See generally 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 893, 933, 1014, 1021-31
(5th ed. 1941).
509. 1 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 19 (1906).
510. See 2 BRACTON, DR LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE f. 150 b,
p. 509 (Twiss' ed. 1870). See generally 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 157-83 (1899).
511. See 1 WALSH, PROPERTY 39 (1947).
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in personal property were the actions of replevinl5 12 and deti-
nue.5 13 Replevin lay against a person who had made an illegal
distress by the seizure of chattels. The action became concurrent
with trespass and did not acquire great practical significance,
at least until the nineteenth century, when it was resurrected in
a substantially different form.514 Detinue developed from the
action of debt and was originally based on the contractual rela-
tions of the parties. The gist of the action was the wrongful de-
tention of chattels upon termination of a bailment. A judgment
in favor of the plaintiff could be satisfied by the defendant, at
his election, by the return of the chattels or payment of their
value. 51 5 The scope of the action was later extended to include
proceedings against third persons in possession of bailed chat-
tels who failed to return them on demand. Still later, detinue
became available against third persons who in any way acquired
possession of chattels wrongfully taken from the owner, by
treating the defendant as a finder of lost property. This was the
action of detinue sur trover, out of which the modern action of
trover and conversion was developed. 516
Today, ownership, possession, and other proprietary inter-
ests in real and personal property are protected in the United
States by a variety of legal and equitable remedies. 517 Legal rem-
edies are, generally, actions for the recovery of the possession
of property as well as for damages, or actions for damages for
trespassory and non-trespassory interferences with the posses-
sion and enjoyment of property. Equitable remedies are suits
for injunctive or other appropriate relief. This relief is ordi-
narily limited to the protection of interests in real property. Its
availability rests in the discretion of the court and depends upon
the adequacy or inadequacy of legal remedies, the comparative
hardships to the parties or the public from its use or non-use,
and on the comparative equities of the litigants. The details of
legal and equitable protection vary with the nature of the prop-
erty.
512. id. at 42. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 472 (1952).
513. See JAMES, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF TORTS 90 (1959);
MARTIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE AT COMMON LAW 74-78 (1899).
514. See text at note 537 infra.
515. For all practical purposes this judgment resolved the proceeding into an
action for damages. See MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 472 (1952).
516. See text at note 534 infra; 1 WALSH, PROPERTY 47 (1947) ; MATIN,
CIVIL PROCEDURE AT COMMON LAW 85-92 (1899).
517. See BLUME, AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE 19, 24 (1955).
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A person out of possession who has a legally protected inter-
est in the immediate possession of real property may be given
a judgment for possession, as well as damages, by means of two
forms of judicial process: ejectment, and a summary proceeding
for unlawful detainer.5 18 These are statutory remedies in prac-
tically all American jurisdictions, with many variations of de-
tail.519 Ejectment, the more formal action, is brought in a court
of record with jurisdiction over land titles for the settlement of
all claims to possession, whether founded on disputed titles or
on the construction of leases and other possessory agreements.5 20
Under code procedure, the remedy, though commonly termed
ejectment, is an action formally styled one for the recovery of
real property. Although stripped today of its fictitious features,
this action is still of a relatively slow and expensive remedy. The
plaintiff, in order to recover in an ejectment action, must prove
his title or prior right to possession rather than defects in the
title of his adversary. Where the defendant does not derive his
possession from the plaintiff or his predecessors, he can effec-
tively defend the action by showing title in a third person un-
connected with the plaintiff. This defense is not available in
cases of dispossession because prior possession gives rise to a
right superior to all who cannot show title in themselves or in a
person from whom they derived possession.
In many states the statutory ejectment action settles defin-
itively, among the parties, the question of title to the land.521 In
518. See VI-A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 61-63 (1952); MILLAR, CIVIL
PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 470-72 (1952) ; 1
WALSH, PROPERTY 61-74 (1947) ; BLUME, AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE 19 (1955).
Markedly similar with the ejectment action is the action of trespass to try title.
This action originated in an early South Carolina statute, was later introduced
in Alabama, and still later found its way into Texas as a common law action.
South Carolina and Alabama have abolished this action by statute. See MARTIN,
CIVIL PROCEDURE AT COMMON LAW 145-46 (1899). In Louisiana, a 1908 statute
had provided for an action to establish title. See LA. R.S. 13:5062 (1950). This
action has been superseded by article 3651 of the new Code of Civil Procedure.
519. See generally, 3 WAIT, ACTIONS AND DEFENSES 1-134 (1878). On the
whole, however, the essential principles governing the various remedies for the
recovery of land in the United States "constitute practically one general method
of procedure distinguished under a variety of names." SEDGWICK & WAIT, TRIAL
OF TITLE TO LAND 47 (2d ed. 1886).
520. See BROWN, DIGEST OF PROCEDURAL STATUTES AND COURT RULES 46-54
(1954).
521. Some statutes provide expressly that the ejectment action may be brought
by a person "in or out of possession," while other statutes make the action
available only to persons out of possession. Where the action is so limited in
scope, persons in possession may ordinarily settle disputes over titles by a recourse
to other remedies. See notes 522-523 infra. Sample of statutes has been collected
in LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, CODE OF PRACTICE REVISION, E.Tpo86 des
Motifs No. 19, at 48-50 (1956).
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states where the ejectment action leaves open the question of title,
the successful plaintiff may bring a statutory action to quiet
title.522 In the absence of a pertinent statute he may obtain
equitable relief in the form of decrees quieting title, or remov-
ing clouds from title and injunctions preventing clouds from be-
ing cast on titles.523 Relief in the form of a declaratory judgment
is not always available.5 24
The unlawful detainer action is also a statutory remedy sup-
plementary to ejectment. 25 It is brought informally in justice's
courts, is free of delays, and results in speedy restoration of pos-
session. This summary process is limited to cases where the title
to the land is not in dispute or where the aggressor has admit-
ted, or is estopped to deny, the claimant's right to possession.
The action is available to persons who have been dispossessed,
whether forcibly or peacefully, and in some jurisdictions even to
persons who have not had prior possession. By its nature, the
remedy is most frequently used in disputes between lessors and
lessees and in cases of eviction perpetrated by persons without
right or claim. The lessee is estopped to put his landlord's title
in issue, and can defend the action only by showing that his
term has not expired. If the defendant cannot show a right to
possession, he is speedily evicted.5 26 If the defendant is able to
show a right to possession, the proceedings are either trans-
ferred to a court of record, where they evolve into ejectment
action, or dismissed. If dismissed, the plaintiff may resort to a
formal ejectment action.
Apart from these actions for the recovery of possession and
determination of title disputes, the possessor of land is accorded
522. In many states this is the ordinary mode of trying disputed titles. See 4
POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 1024 (5th ed. 1941) ; BROWN, DIGEST OF PRO-
CEDURAL STATUTES AND COURT RULES 73-86 (1954). At common law, the eject-
ment action did not settle the question of title and the successful plaintiff could
be harassed by repeated litigation of the same question. To remedy this situation,
equity courts granted perpetual injunctions restraining further litigation. See 4
'POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 1021 (5th ed. 1941).
523. See 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 1021, 1027 (5th ed. 1941).
524. See 1 ANDERSON, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 108 (2d ed. 1951) : "Where
the only question presented in an action is that the defendant contends that he
owns an interest in real estate claimed to be owned by the plaintiff, no justiciable
controversy is present and the action cannot be maintained."
525. See BROWN, DIGEST OF PROCEDURAL STATUTES AND COURT RULES 55-59
(1954).
526. In ejectment and unlawful detainer proceedings the judgment of recovery
is enforced, ordinarily, by a writ of possession under which the sheriff installs the
plaintiff in possession. See MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF TIrE TRIAL COURT IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 471 (1952).
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far-reaching legal protection by actions for damages for either
trespassory or non-trespassory interferences with the exclusive
use and enjoyment of his estate. Any unprivileged intended
intrusion or encroachment constitutes actionable trespass, re-
gardless of the duration of the interference or the absence of
pecuniary harm.5 27 Unintended invasions of possession result-
ing from negligence or ultra-hazardous activities are actionable
only if they result in actual damage. The surface possessor's
right to exclusive possession extends, in principle, downward
usque infernos and upward into the overlying air-space insofar
as necessary for the present or prospective uses.
The protection against non-trespassory interferences is
"qualified in scope and uncertain in existence. '528 In general,
unreasonable activities in neighboring estates which cause sub-
stantial and disproportionate injury to the peaceable possession
of others constitute actionable nuisances. Due to loosely defined
standards, however, recovery in individual cases is a matter of
conjecture. The liability for intentional interferences, or inter-
ferences resulting from ultra hazardous activities, is independ-
ent of proof of fault; on the other hand, the liability for unin-
tentional interferences is founded on negligence. Plaintiff's rem-
edy is ordinarily an action for damages, but in the exceptional
case where this legal remedy is inadequate equity courts may
restrain or grant other appropriate relief against existing or
threatened nuisances.
The possessor of land may protect his possession against un-
privileged intrusions by the exercise of self-help. 529 Provided
that he first makes reasonable efforts to achieve peaceful termi-
nation of the intrusion, the possessor is privileged to repel ag-
gression or, if he has been evicted, promptly expel trespassers
with the use of necessary force. The infliction of serious bodily
harm, however, is not privileged.
Interests in personal property are protected in American
jurisdictions by actions for damages and actions for the recov-
ery of possession as well as damages. Unprivileged interferences
with the possession of tangible personal property may be re-
527. See VI-A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 3 (1952). Protection against
non-injurious interferences with the use and enjoyment of land is limited to pos-
sessions. Other persons, however, may claim damages for actual injuries to their
legally protected non-possessory interests. Id. at 37, 40.
528. VI-A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 64 (1952).
529. See 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 255-69 (1956).
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pelled, and if possession is lost the property can be recovered, by
the exercise of reasonable force.5 0 Equitable relief is available,
though rarely, in the form of equitable replevin. 531 In general,
the protection afforded to interests in personal property is less
drastic than the protection afforded to interests in real prop-
erty.58
2
Damages for unprivileged interferences with the possession
of tangible personal property may be recovered in trespass.
However, in contrast with real property, the action here lies only
for intended injurious interferences. 533 Negligent interferences
may be actionable under the law of negligence and, if they ful-
fill the requirements of conversion, by an action under that
name.
Conversion has been defined as any conduct which deprives
another of his personal property permanently or for an indefi-
nite time, or any exercise of dominion over personal property
which is inconsistent with the owner's right in it. 5 34 Ordinarily,
it is necessary that the defendant have committed an overt act.
Conversion is an intentional wrong giving rise to absolute liabil-
ity. A mistaken belief, however innocent, that the dealing with
the chattel is proper or privileged will not constitute a valid de-
fense. In the case of dispossession without the consent of the
owner, the action lies against the wrongdoer and subsequent
transferees. Where the owner has voluntarily parted with pos-
session, as in the case of a bailment, conversion lies against the
bailee and his transferees, unless the latter have become owners
of the chattel by the rules of the law of property.5 5 The owner
may thus be estopped to assert an interest inconsistent with that
which the possessor purported to convey, if by his conduct he
created a situation which made it appparent that the possessor
had the interest in question and could transfer it, or that the
possessor was his authorized agent.
The effect of a successful action is to force a sale of the chat-
tel upon the defendant. The price of the enforced sale, i.e., the
measure of plaintiff's recovery, is the value of the chattel at
530. See PROSSER, TORTS 93 (2d ed. 1955).
531. See BLUME, AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE 26 (1955).
532. See 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 105 (1956).
533. Ibid.
534. Id. at 116; PROSSER, TORTS 66 (2d ed. 1955).
535. See LAWSON, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF PROPERTY 37 (1958);
BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 206, 211, 215 (1936).
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the time of conversion with interest until the date of judgment.
Occasionally, consequential damages are also allowed if demand-
ed and proved. The defendant was not allowed in the past to
return the chattel in mitigation of damages, and the rule still
prevails in most jurisdictions. In some states, however, the de-
fendant may choose to return the chattel, if the conversion is the
result of an innocent mistake and if the chattel is not substan-
tially damaged or impaired in value. Under modern practice, the
plaintiff may elect to receive the chattel and recover damages
on the theory of trespass, or refuse to accept it and recover its
value on the theory of conversion. 56
Actions for the recovery of personal property are largely
statutory remedies today, referred to as actions of claim and de-
livery in some states, as detinue in at least one, and as replevin
in most jurisdictions.53 7 The remedy is available in the case of
any unlawful detention of tangible personal property, whether
tortiously taken or not.5 8 The principal relief given is posses-
sion of the property, either before trial as in common law re-
plevin, or after trial as in common law detinue. Ordinarily,
plaintiff is entitled to take possession pending trial by filing the
requisite affidavits and bond; the defendant may keep posses-
sion of the property by offering double the amount of plaintiff's
bond. 5 39 If the claimant (replevisor) establishes his property
right at the subsequent trial, he will be awarded possession and
damages for the harm he has suffered. If it appears that the
defendant was in the right, he will be awarded costs and dam-
ages together with possession of the property. Although in con-
temporary law the defendant in replevin cannot satisfy an ad-
verse judgment by paying the value of the property, as under
the earlier common law, defendant's rebonding privilege in
536. See I HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 129, 139 (1956).
537. See BROWN, DIGEST OF PROCEDURAL STATUTES AND COURT RULES 60-65
(1954). In England plaintiff still has available two remedies, one being detinue
and the other replevin. See JAMES, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF TIHE LAW OF TORTS
91 (1959).
538. See BLUME, AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE 19 (1955). In England, replevin
is limited to cases of wrongful taking of personal property. See JAMES, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF TORTS 92 (1959). Where possession of goods is
merely withheld from the one entitled thereto, the action of detinue is the ap-
propriate remedy. By the (English) Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, the
court has been given power, at its discretion, to order the defendant in detinue to
return the property. Id. at 90-91.
539. In some states replevin is a distinct independent action. In other states,
replevin has been reduced to an ancillary proceeding adjunct of a statutory action
for the recovery of personal property. See MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE
TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 503 (1952).
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effect may prevent a specific recovery of the chattels. Indeed,
the defendant may dispose of or use up the goods pending trial
by electing to forfeit the bond, should judgment eventually go
against him. With good reason, therefore, it has been suggested
that the power of the adverse party to set at naught the delivery
process should be suppressed by a wider adoption of the con-
tempt process.54
0
Conclusion
The preceding brief analysis indicates that the protection of
proprietary interests in common law jurisdictions is substantial-
ly different from that accorded in civil law countries and in Lou-
isiana. Everywhere the protection may be regarded as adequate
and nearly complete. However, a word of caution may be here
appropriate: due to underlying fundamental differences in con-
ceptual technique and methodology, borrowing of common law
rules for the solution of problems arising under Louisiana law
is unnecessary and utterly confusing. It is submitted, therefore,
that the legal profession in Louisiana should definitely look for
guidance in this area to its own legal tradition and to develop-
ments in other civil law countries. Particularly with respect to
movable property, it ought to be remembered that the common
law has never provided a real action for the revendication of
chattels, 541 that today the tort of conversion dominates this area
of the law, and that the absolute liability which characterizes
conversion is in direct conflict with the Louisiana Civil Code
principle of liability based on fault.
540. See id. at 507.
541. See JOLOWITZ, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 142 (1952)
Cf. SALMOND, TORTS 252 (13th ed. 1961) ; LAWSON, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW
OF PROPERTY 32 (1953) : "It is a matter for the discretion of the judge whether
he will order the return of goods or give judgment for either the return of the
goods or payment of their value at the option of the defendant. Thus a person
who loses goods can never be certain that he will recover them in specie."
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